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ART. I.—HARD MATTER.

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Is there an external world? Certainly, says Dr. Hickok, there is such a reality, beyond all question. Certainly, says Dr. Hall,\*—an external world there is, and of hard matter too; are we not every day coming in contact with it? But how do we know it—that is, how do we know it as external? Here is another question, and on this they differ. How do we know it, says Dr. Hickok; why, we know it from our reason. It stands to reason that there is something outside of us, when there are effects produced within us of which we are conscious, but which we are sure did not come from any willing, or any internal self-originated activity of our own. The reason, as a higher comprehending, overlooking faculty, comprehends the one universal time and space which never could have been found in the chaotic sea of individual sensations,

\* [See Dr. Hall's article on the Rational Psychology and its Vindications, in the AMERICAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, Oct. 1862.]

and without which such sensations could never be certainly known to have a common objective reality existing in the one space and time that belongs alike to all. It is only by reason that we can be quite sure we are not dreaming. We state his argument very partially and defectively. There is much more of it; but this is sufficient for the purposes of the present contrast. We know it, says Dr. Hickok, by our reason. Dr. Hall, too, sometimes forgets himself, and attempts to prove it in a way which shows that he has a little unconscious distrust, occasionally, of the sense; but in general he has another, and, as he thinks, far more direct way of settling the matter. How do we *positively* know that there is such a real outside world? Why, we smell it, Dr. Hall maintains; we take cognizance of it in the spiritual olfactory, and all reasoning about it is superfluous, besides being a treasonable denial of something better and more religious. Reason and reasoning will make us pantheists, but sense is orthodox; it is the only sure foundation for a right faith.

In stating Dr. Hall's position, we have chosen this sense of smell, not for the purpose of an unjust or partial caricature, but because, in this matter, any one sense is a representative of all the rest, and, therefore, the grosser presents the most direct and plainest issue. If we were confined to this sense, we could, doubtless, though with more difficulty, get from it much, if not all the knowledge we derive from the others, any or all of them. Greatly quickened, as it doubtless would be in that case, we might get, from its varying intensities, distance, direct and lateral; hence, extension, bound, figure. Modification in such intensities might correspond to hardness, softness, solidity. Other differences of odor might *represent* to us something like colors. Long use might make these seem like direct and inseparable perceptions, so that it would cease to be absurd to say, it smells hard, or long, or round, or square, or hollow, or solid, or even red, and green. We might have not only a smell of some huge, indefinite thing outside of us, but of a well furnished world of greatly varied perceptions. All this knowledge we might get, through this one avenue; or rather, to use more correct language, the mind



from its own rich stores might cloth these dull sensations, or the infinitely varying intensities of them, with manifold ideas, so that it might be truly said that a being endowed with reason, and a nose only, would smell out more knowledge from the external world, than a being without reason, that is, without ideas, would get from the highest sense-organization, including, as is perfectly conceivable, many more sense avenues than have ever been given to man. But this is a digression, since Dr. Hall does not believe in any such mental furnishing of ideas, and we took this sense of smell because it represents his doctrine as precisely as any or all the rest.

In a previous article we made use of the sense of hearing in an attempt to show that we are not directly conscious of the external thing, but only of our own sensation. Dr. Hall is surprised at that, for he says that "Professor Lewis argues as though he really supposed that those of a different philosophy maintain that we perceive the bell by hearing alone" (p. 614). We are surprised at Dr. Hall. The argument about the hearing was meant to be applicable, and truly is applicable, to all the senses. And so it was expressly said. The sense of hearing was taken because it was so much slower in its process than the sight, and we could, therefore, the more easily trace the steps. It was like taking a magnified object, or a slow motion, when we know that the law of its continuance is the same with that of the lightning telegraph. "No advocate of natural realism", says Dr. Hall, "pretends that hearing *alone* would give knowledge of a bell; the hearing is limited to the sensation". "Nor is it every sense", he says further, "that gives immediate intuition of an outward object". In conceding this, he concedes all. It is not a mere question of accumulative testimony. Senses themselves defective cannot help other senses. Besides, to resort to this looks very much like an attempt to prove it by reason; as when Dr. Hall says, just below, "For sufficient reasons we *judge* these causes to be qualities in the object". Here, again, is that irreligious reason or reasoning, involving a distrust of the sense, and opening the door to all the horrid spectres of pantheism. But there is one sense, it seems, that is unerring. "The natural

Realist", we are told, "holds that in touch, or rather in the muscular sense of resistance commonly included in touch, we are presented *face to face with outward objects having extension and solidity*". This is from Sir William Hamilton, and it really is very remarkable language. If Dr. Hall means by it the sense of touch as distinguished from the others, then sight goes along with smelling and hearing, as among those that "do not give immediate intuition of an outward object". But if all the senses are ultimately touch, then the distinction between primary and secondary qualities *in sensation* falls to the ground. With all respect for Sir William Hamilton, this we affirm and proceed to prove. But first a few preliminaries.

The sense of touch differs not essentially, in this respect of nearness from sight and hearing. It does not bridge the chasm between matter and spirit, any more than they do. As there is an *imago figuræ*, an *imago vocis*, so, also, is there an *imago tactus*. One is as much representative as the others. Our consciousness of repellency takes us no more *out of ourselves* than those lighter contacts of some lighter medium which we call sound and hearing, or sight and seeing. Language itself, which, when freely developed, is reason itself, and will not permit us to talk nonsense, tells us that consciousness can only be of that which is *within* the soul. It is self-consciousness, and can be nothing else. Take this away, and there is no difference between it and *scientia*, and no call for a different word. But how to get within the soul by touch rather than in any other way of sense — this is the difficulty. The chasm may have but the breadth of a hair-line, but it presents no easier passage than though it had the width of infinity. In truth it is infinite; and *tactus* can no more spring across, or climb over, than smelling or hearing. Sir William Hamilton's ladder of "primary and secondary qualities" can give it no aid in doing this, as we proceed to show.

We say, first, that this distinction will not do, because what are called secondary qualities are but modifications of the primary so named. As bodies cannot exist without the first, so the first cannot exist without the second, or the grounds of

the second, inhering as they do in the first, and ever ready to manifest themselves whenever the sentient comes to which they are adapted. That which cannot exist without *something*, cannot exist without having (*in effect*) all the things that have their ground inhering in that first something. Color, for example, has its ground in the inner organization of bodies,—in the extent, number, site, size, distance, force, ratio, of the elementary parts, be they what they may, of the body colored. When we see color, then, it is also a touching (we use the language of this school), an ultimate touching, by the soul, of those “primary qualities” in which its sentiency inheres. We need not stop to show that the same reasoning applies to sounds and odors, or to hearing, taste and smell. The distinction of “primary and secondary” falls away in like manner in respect to all of them. They all come from a certain disposition of the elements and forces of the bodies that give rise to the sensation, and these run immediately down to the primary notions of force, quantity, and extent. Hence we may truly say that a body can no more exist without color, than without figure. There may not be a sentient to perceive either, but the *intensity* of the one feeling, which is the source of the color-sensation, has its ground in the causing body, as much as the *extensity* of the other, for intensity in degree is but extent in another aspect and direction. In other words, it inheres in those modifications of extent and force which will make it *appear* to an adapted sentient. Go to the bottom of matter; traverse it by the sense, the imagination, or the reason, and we have these elemental bones, these “primary qualities”—nothing more or less. *Qualities*, we say, by way of accommodation; but they are, all in themselves, strictly *quantities*, matters wholly of more and less. All else are affections in us, however caused, or however far it be true or not that the mind creates them. We can see nothing else, think nothing else, in which one material object differs from another, until the mind comes, and, out of these varieties of resistance and differences of quantity (which it comprehends in some strange and ineffable way through some prior knowledge of

its own), raises its splendid temple of qualities, all real, but real only as they are spiritual.

All quality is spiritual, and spiritually perceived. On the other hand, says Comte, who knows nothing of spirit, "*all is quantity*". No man ever explored this material ground of sensation more acutely than this French atheist. Denying everything spiritual, whether as a blank power, or an *à priori* intelligence, holding that mind added nothing here,—denying, in fact, all soul or mind, except as thinking matter,—he carried out most rigidly and most consistently this materialising atheistic theory of contacts of which Dr. Hall is so fond. We love to read Hobbes or Comte. They are so thorough, so unshrinking, and, withal, so clear. When pressed with some of the difficulties of spiritualism, we find relief in their square, logical mason-work; for they show a man what he must come to if he departs a hair's breadth from the belief that the soul has a knowledge of its own; and as we cannot accept their darkness, though it be a darkness visible, so are we the more content with the light we have, notwithstanding its necessarily accompanying shadows. Now, Comte denies, and, on his theory of materialism, truthfully denies, that there is anything in matter, anything in the outer world, but quantity. Quality is wholly spiritual, and, therefore, to him a delusion and a nonentity. There is no *ποῶν* except as a cheating name for differences and diversities of *πῶσον*. Its place must be wholly erased from the list of the categories. All qualities, so called, are but varied exhibitions or *more or less* among the primary numbers, figures, distances, forces, and intensities, that are in the ultimate constitution of matter. There are no qualities, so called, but what may be expressed arithmetically; and, therefore, they are strictly quantity, and nothing else. So holds Comte. But we do know that there *is* quality as a pure spiritual entity, and that is the way, and the only way, in which we know that Comte is false. There lie before us, for example, two musical strings. They differ in length as four fifths and five sixths. There is nothing here, as yet, but quantity; and there is just such a difference of quantity in the outward sounds and undulations they produce. There is just this

difference of quantity in the sensation felt from them; just this and nothing more. But listen to them, and hear how they speak to the soul, or, rather, how the soul speaks through them, when it *qualifies* them, or puts its quality into them. One is now the sad melting minor, the other the joyful major strain. Whence comes it? There is a mighty difference of quality, we say, but this is from the spirit alone, and its eternal harmony. All the mathematics and all the dynamics of the schools could not find it in the strings, or in any motions or bare sensations from the strings. There is nothing there but number, tensions, and intensities,—nothing but bare quantities, and that is all a soul would get, or a blank spiritual power would get, which, having no ideas of its own, could only “stand face to face with outward objects”, meeting them fair and square, “in touch and the sense of muscular resistance”. Tact would meet tact; tension would meet tension, and the offspring would be a sensation of tact and tension, having so much quantity,—just this and nothing more.

But how to get even this primary quality (yielding the name) with which the soul is thus said to “stand face to face” in direct and immediate consciousness. This is not so easy as the plausible plainness of the theory might lead one to suppose. I have a single sensation. Let it be the puncture of a sharp instrument in that part of the material sensorium that lies nearest to the spiritual. It is hard telling what I perceive in that, except a change in my being. There is being and not being—there is *is* and *was*. I can hardly think of anything else I could predicate of it, or any other idea in my mind which it wakes up, and which I bring as a lamp to its cognition. Again—I have a second sensation. It is like the first. So far as sense is concerned, it can give me nothing different from the first in kind, but only in quantity. There is something, however, something different in kind, which was not in the first. Not one, or two only, but a host of ideas now start up, not one of which can be said to be in that second sensation, any more than in the first; for, as sensations, they differed not at all, or only in quantity. But here a wide spiritual space (we cannot talk here without a metaphor), is illumined by the

flash within which this outside spark hath lit up in my mental consciousness. Here there is not only being and not being, but there is time, there is movement; there is unity, duality, and, from them, plurality; there is, virtually, the whole infinite world of number; there is presentness and pastness, and a glimpse of futurity; there is difference and identity; there is quality; there is quantity, moreover, not in the sensation merely, but as an idea of the mind. Should any one say that all this comes from memory and comparison, through a connecting of the former sensation with the present; true, we answer, but how does that solve the mystery of memory and judgment themselves? How is memory conceivable without the previous idea of time? how can there be comparison without number and ratio? how can there be measure or measurement without a rule? Again, the first sensation, it may be asserted, remains in the sensorium, and this, connected with the second, gives birth to the new knowledge that is not in either singly. To this we say, the first, if it remains at all, can only remain simply as it was, so *much* felt force, so much quantity; and this, added to the second, can only make so much additional quantity. It can add a *more or less* to the old sensation, or the two together may make a sum total of more or less *motion* in the material sensorium, and of more or less *feeling* in the spiritual sensorium, but whence the new knowledge?

To go back again. I feel a single puncture of sensation. There is no extension in it. A second comes, but it cannot give it. The two are put together. They are only felt as additional quantity. Unless the soul brings to it the idea of space, there cannot be distance here, any more than memory in the other case of successive sentiencies. There can be no felt distance of one from the other, unless it be in the sensorium, that is, the spiritual sensorium, and there it can only exist as a knowledge, a spiritual idea; for if we make a space distance in the soul, spiritually felt as such, we thereby give soul itself extension, and plunge immediately into a returnless sea of materialism. It can only come there as represented, and that can only be by something which can dwell on



either side of the line, some quantity of force or number which can be predicated of spirit as well as of matter. It is in this way, and, as thus represented, through some unknown process, that the quantity or *intensity* in the sense (and in what avenue of sense makes no difference) is built up by us, or builds itself up, into this seminal idea of extension, and the immediately related ideas of outward space, form, or figure.

Sir William Hamilton has somewhere, if we are not mistaken, refuted Aristotle's doctrine of "occult qualities", as they were called; that is, the supposition that there might be different *qualities* in bodies whose *quantities*, and quantitative arrangements, were precisely alike. With all his great learning, of which, as we cannot help thinking, he often makes an unnecessary show, he has fallen in his distinction of primary and secondary qualities, as applied to sensation, into precisely the same error.

This doctrine of Sir William Hamilton, as Dr. Hall cites him, of soul "*touching*" matter, or "coming face to face with outward objects having extension and solidity", becomes very easy on one theory, which, although it has a terrible mystery at the entrance, is all the plainest of sailing ever after. Matter thinking is a thing unthinkable to the true spiritualist, but only get over this, and psychology becomes the smoothest of the sciences, the most "exact of the sciences". So it was to Comte as an avowed materialist. With him matter is the only thing in the universe. Matter is not simply thought about; it thinks, and so the thinking and the thing thought about become identical. One is just as long, and as wide, and as deep as the other. This clears up, at once, a host of difficulties. The chasms are all bridged, or, rather, they are all filled up, and "touch" and "muscular sense of resistance" go right over. This language of Dr. Hall and Sir William Hamilton, this talk of soul "*touching*" matter, and "standing face to face" with matter, and thus taking an impression of its primary qualities of extension, etc., right from the matter itself, and being "directly conscious of things themselves", becomes as simple as geography; psychology is as easy as the study of a town map, or the brain lots of phrenology. To get over the



awful chasm from extension, and touch, and space, and motion, to that which has no place, and no touch, and no extension, and no motion, that is hard indeed; but only concede that matter thinks, and all trouble vanishes. That which thinks, and that which is thought, are one. The soul is matter, and matter thinks itself. Being extension, it thinks extension; being figure, it thinks figure; being touch, it can "stand face to face with solidity" and all outwardness. It is directly "conscious of the things themselves", for it is *the things themselves*, and, therefore, its consciousness of matter is self-consciousness. The old Democritic, Epicurean, and Lucretian dogma of "like feeling like", *ὁμοῖον τῷ ὁμοίῳ*—carries us over at once. This explains all; but it makes the converse equally true, and therefore we say, unhesitatingly, that this Hamiltonian dogma of soul-contact, and "muscular resistance", and the soul, through it, "standing face to face with outward objects having extension and solidity",—this must be given up, or the doctrine of Comte and Hobbes must come in to make it intelligible. At all events, its advocates must be a little more modest in claiming it to be the peculiarly religious doctrine, and in branding those who hold that the soul has a knowledge of its own, and ideas of its own, as running into pantheism and impiety.

But this suspicion of materialism, or a tendency to materialism, they indignantly repel. They can talk *à priori* too, sometimes, notwithstanding the "flowing horse", and the very fresh joke of "the Hibernian, who began to build houses at the top". *A priori*, after all, is respectable, and with all their attempts to jest about it, they get an inkling, sometimes, that what is absurd to the sense, may be the highest truth in another sphere. There is a knowledge which builds from above, whether the Hibernian can comprehend it or not. "Sense can give nothing but objects of sense." This admission sounds very well indeed. But then, to make it worth anything, it should be remembered that the only pure objects of sense are intensities of sensation. All else in thought must come from another sphere; it must be "a building down". Again, hear how well men, whose vernacular is the speech of

Ashdod, can talk the Jews language: "It is reason that rises to necessary principles and truths, and that discerns in objects of sense more than sense reveals". This is an improvement. But really what is meant by these fine words? Either there is no thought in them, or they furnish an entrance large enough for the whole Rational Psychology to come in. Let us interrogate them. "Discerns in sense more than sense reveals." Where does it get this *more*? Has the soul always had it, or has there been a special revelation made to it for that purpose? They are no Sadducees; they believe in spirit; but it is a blank spirituality, rising by hardly a perceptible grade above Comte's panhylism, or pansomatism. For that which has only a *power* of thinking what matter or experience gives it, is barely distinguishable from matter thinking matter. A reason, too, they would have; but what is this but a blank reason, determined by no knowledge of its own, conditioned by no ideas? There is, indeed, some demand for these words. Naked materialism, beside having a very unorthodox look, is, at present, philosophically vulgar. Such brave men as Comte, to be sure, care nothing about its vulgarity; they have no spiritualism to take care of. But their orthodox collaborators have not nerve enough for that; they, too, would talk a little transcendentalism now and then; or to do them more justice, they have too much sincere religion, too much of the spirit of the Bible, to carry it out. They have, it is true, left the old philosophy of the Church, but its spirit and its Scriptures hold them back from the perilous places where Comte and Hobbes walk so fearlessly. Along with this there is another feeling, perhaps, which is not so spiritual. *A priori*, and reason, and Rational Psychology, are, after all, very respectable things. Ideas are bugbears, they are *τερατώδεις*, as Aristotle called them long ago; their old, bright Platonic stamp has been sadly marred by modern usage, yet still "*ideas*" can never be vulgar; they can never lose their look of intelligence, or cease to belong to the choice language of philosophy. The worst radicals in our land are now claiming to themselves that respectable word, conservative, and doing immense mischief under it. It is not this exactly, but some-

thing like it, which unconsciously draws men of the hard-matter school, or the believers in soul-contact and "immediate sense consciousness of things themselves", to use, now and then, a little of the *à priori* dialect.

A blank spiritual power, whether we call it a faculty or a reason,—a blank soul activity, undetermined by ideas, unconditioned by any innate knowledge, we say again, rises by a hardly perceptible grade above thinking matter. Such a soul, or spiritual entity, having nothing *à priori* to determine it to know one thing more than another, or to think one thing more than another, or to believe one thing more than another, can only be a recipient of what the world of sense and matter is pouring into it, without any power to modify or to add. It is simply *δεκτικόν τι*, a "capacity", a thing that holds—measuring nothing, *qualifying* nothing, but ever itself measured by the quantities of sensation it contains. Should any say that this blank power is determined by truth, as the mighty locomotive is determined by the rail, the short answer immediately rises, truth has no being separate from mind; it cannot be conceived except as thought and knowledge. It dwells in soul, even as matter dwells in space. The one is *ἐν νῷ*, even as the other is *ἐν τόπῳ*. It dwells in the eternal mind. It is absolute because the Eternal Soul is absolute. It is seen by men, however dimly, because men are made in the image of God—we may startle Dr. Hall here again, but we cannot help it—because men were made in the image of God, and through that image have a vision of the divine, the absolute, and the immortal ideas. Truth can only determine in so far as the soul carries with it a knowledge, or something else, that corresponds to the truth itself. It is the "*self-determination*" of the soul to truth. The famous phrase has far more application to that spiritual activity we call the intelligence, or the reason, than it has to the *motive* determined and motive determining will.

We have said that consciousness could only be of that which is in the soul. And most solemn is the declaration; for if it can cross this barrier, then, as we have proved before,

there is no limit short of the outermost bound of nature. On this side is the material sensorium. How far it extends we cannot say. Some parts of the body have barely an organic connection of vegetable growth. In regard, however, to continuance of motion and physical effect, there is no severance of such continuance between the body and all outward nature. That motion which terminates, on the one hand, in the sensation of which I am conscious after it has passed the last matter of the material and entered the spiritual sensorium,—that same motion, on the other hand, and in the other direction, has no break until it dies away in the last matter of the material universe. Once let consciousness pass this line between the spiritual and the material, and we pass it without any calculable limit in time and space. We have pan-psychism, *all-soulism*; we are lost in a world-consciousness,—a heresy which has as bad a look, and is equally dangerous, if not rather identical with that pantheism of which Dr. Hall seems so much afraid. The holy boundary is broken, the sacred precinct is invaded, the separate human personality is gone. But we have already dwelt on this. Dr. Hall might, perhaps, call it a play upon the word consciousness. By being conscious of an external object, there is meant, he might say, the knowing an external object through consciousness, or by means of consciousness—that is, a consciousness of its representative. But that, if it means anything, means a knowing it by a *reasoning* from consciousness. This, to be sure, is a very different thing from a direct consciousness of it. But if he thinks the difference small, what is all his clamor about? What mean these persevering attempts to excite the unthinking theological odium against men as orthodox, as pious, and as humble as himself? Why this outcry of pantheism, atheism, and every other horribleism that he maintains must come from saying that we are not conscious of external things themselves, but of the impressions or sensations that from any outward cause or object are produced in our spiritual region?

But Dr. Hickok has tried to prove an external world. The heresy consists in the assumption that this needed proof, or

was not as plain as "muscular resistance" could make it. Surely Dr. Hall's own quotation, from Edwards, ought to have shown him that there was some little difficulty here. Edwards was not a man who loved absurdity *per se*, or adopted opinions which "a moment's reflection" would show to be false. Neither was Edwards heretical, or a teacher of dangerous dogmas, because, as Dr. Hall intimates, he could not see the tendency of his own reasoning. There was as much light in old Northampton, as there is now in the chair of theology at Auburn. Neither do we think that there is anything in the latter position which enables its holder to look clear over Edwards, as from some high plain, and tell us, so confidently, how he came by his notions of "*being*" and "*becoming*", and of the comparative unreality of matter in its relation to a higher and more real world of truth and ideas, where all things *stand* and nothing *flows*. Edwards, he says, got this notion from Sir Isaac Newton, and Newton was befogged by holding this dogma which had come down to him through the Church and the Schoolmen, that in perception we are conscious only of our own sensations.

Again,—all that Newton could see in matter, or, rather, think in matter, was that "God, by his power, renders a certain portion of space impenetrable to another portion of space rendered likewise impenetrable"; a doctrine which very much resembles Dr. Hickok's space-filling force, at least so far as the pantheistic heresy is concerned. Edwards, too, although he is allowed to have a little more acuteness than Newton, and to have had a glimpse of what was coming, is at last brought to a stand in a similar wild absurdity. Finally, Dr. Hall, from his higher place, has a clairvoyant vision. He sees these benighted men struggling with their own absurdities, until at last, along with Berkeley and Kant, they are all "swept by the same resistless tide to the shores of a dreary pantheism". Appalling catastrophe! "And now Dr. Hickok", says the reviewer, "assumes the same principle". Unwarned by all this "resistless drifting", which had made such a sad wreck of Newton and Edwards, he still "holds that the phenomena of the sense are all thoroughly subjective". A

man so incorrigible as this can expect no mercy, and so our clairvoyant proceeds to show "that in Dr. Hickok's hands also, this principle still yields its necessary results of pantheism". Ever more this same horrid pantheism, how it haunts the seer's terrified imagination!

But let us go back to Newton, and see what is the real absurdity and real danger of his position. As far as the pantheism is concerned, it is the same with that of Dr. Hickok. Newton had a difficulty about matter. In this respect he differs from Dr. Hall, who regards it as the simplest and plainest thing in the universe. It puzzled him, this hard thing, which is something aside from force and resistance, this dead thing, in which force and resistance inhere. Perhaps it was owing to some idiosyncratic defect in this great man's thinking; but all that he could see in matter, and all that he could say about matter, was this, that "God, by his power, renders a certain portion of space impenetrable to another portion of space rendered likewise impenetrable". Thus far the sentence given is a true representation of Newton's view, but Dr. Hall, as usual, must put in something of his own, and thereby make nonsense of it. He adds immediately after Newton's statement, these words: *both spaces continuing absolutely void as before*. Here he has a *void*, and not only a void, but an "absolute void", foisted upon Newton, a man who, of all men among the moderns, "had a horror of a vacuum", who contended that the universe was a plenum having no void, and this simply because he could not surrender that teaching of the *à priori* reason that nothing can act but *when* it is and *where* it is. A man who goes alone by a seeming experience, and who rejects an *à priori* reason, might believe that, but Newton could not. Hence he could not conceive of gravitation except as force pervading, or a real something at every point of cosmical space. It was not a power at two distant points with nothing between them — that is, the hard-matter-man's idea — but a continuity, a continuity of force. Force was something; force was matter; what we call gravity was its most primary state, as far as we know, and this was everywhere. This great man, in not being able to think matter at



all, except as force or space impenetrability, must have lacked a mental power which Dr. Hall claims to possess in abundance. But may not a man differ from Newton? Certainly; but then he should do so very modestly, and not talk about a "moment's reflection" being sufficient to show the false and dangerous tendency of Newton's views, or declaim so volubly about being "swept down the tide of pantheism", as though there had really been some new light cast upon this "matter" which Newton did not possess.

In putting these words, "*both spaces continuing absolutely void as before*", into Newton's terse definition, Dr. Hall makes him not only contradict himself, but talk inconceivable nonsense. These two mutually impenetrable "spaces remaining an absolute void as before"! That is, the impenetrability is nothing, the resistance is nothing, the force is nothing. They are all a show, a mighty show indeed, for all the powers of the universe might be there, the sumless strength of the strong Jehovah might be there, but if this *absolute* hard matter, which is something else, be not there, then there is an *absolute* void all the time. How fond Dr. Hall is, we cannot help remarking, of this word *absolute*, as applied to matter and voidness, when he would make an unmeaning jest of its holier sense: "The Absolute", he says (p. 634), "the transcendental name for God"!

And this he would call the religious doctrine! Never did the poor African seem more attached to his fetish, and more determined not to let it go, than Dr. Hall clings to this hard matter. If we let it go, we are all gone, he thinks. There is nothing left but names, ideas, laws. Ask him what is more real than an idea dwelling in the mind of God; what is stronger than the power of God which makes that idea to dwell as an abiding outward law in space? He shakes his head. There is nothing there, he still insists, unless we have that inconceivable *something else*, which is over and above the idea, the law, and the force. We know of no one, since the days of Protagoras, who seems better entitled to Plato's most descriptive epithet, ἀντίτιπος ἀνὴρ, a repelling, resistant, absolute, hard-matter man. Saint Paul seems to find the ground



of all religion in "the unseen" or unseeable; our reviewer finds the deep root of reverence in his hard matter, all irreverence, all irreligion, in the least departure from this inconceivable conception, this idealess idea.

Now, we are not so much concerned, at present, to debate this absolute hard-matter question *per se*, as to test its religious or irreligious aspect, especially as that has been so prominently thrust into what ought to have remained, and might otherwise have remained, a purely speculative discussion. Let us try it, then, on this charge of irreverence, and see on which side the imputation most clearly lies. Newton supposed that God, by his power, renders a certain portion of space impenetrable to another portion of space rendered likewise impenetrable. Any one who chooses to say that Newton talked nonsense, may do so if he has the hardihood; but to the irreligion, the dangerous tendency. Newton supposed so and so. Now certainly the thing is conceivable. It involves no contradiction of idea. Not only can we imagine something very much like it, on a smaller scale, but actually, to some extent, reduce it to practice. Let us just imagine magnets so arranged, that the repellent power, stronger or weaker, is brought to bear on certain points and lines, in an ordinary vacuum, so that the space in which the resisting influence is exerted, may be said to have bound and figure. It is *a certain space*, and, under such arrangements, iron particles cannot freely enter it; they are repelled; to them it is impenetrable. Is there anything there, or is it an absolute void? Some might talk of magnetic fluids, but that is a thing of which they know nothing; it has not yet been proved, and fluid remains but a name for unexplained phenomena. Besides, it would not interfere with our question of conceivability, which is all that we are, at present, concerned about. Within this space there is force, there is resistance, there may be varying diversities of force and resistance, such as those that give rise to the secondary qualities of Sir William Hamilton. Let the magnetic or electrical repellences be conceived as affecting the human repellences of nerve or muscle, instead of points of iron, and there may arise in that space colors, odors, sounds. Yet still, says

the hard-matter man, it is an absolute void, there is nothing there.

Now, if the conception can be thus indulged in regard to supposed human arrangements of human wills, certainly may it be entertained in respect to the power and will of God. Will Dr. Hall say that God cannot, simply by the activity of his will, so make a certain space affected, that he, Dr. Hall, cannot enter it without being driven back? Such a denial would surely look like "running on the thick bosses of the Almighty's buckler". Or, which is the same thing, will he say that God cannot fill such space with such resisting power, without at the same time putting there hard or soft matter which is not such resisting power, but a distinct substance or entity by itself?

Now, the perfect conceivability is the possibility; and this being admitted, which it would be blasphemy to deny, let us reverently suppose it actually accomplished. "It is spoken and it is done; it is commanded and it immediately stands *fast*", resisting and impenetrable. Here are spaces filled with power, excluding other spaces in like manner filled. These spaces are transferable, or, which is the same thing, if the other language be objected to, these resistances are transferred from space to space, so that the space before impenetrable, now ceases to be so, or in the same degree of intensity, and another becomes such. This would fully answer all the phenomena of motion, and motive force, which have always been found, under any theory, so difficult of definition. It would present every conceivable aspect of matter as it can be felt by the sense, perceived by the perception, imagined by the conceiving faculty, or thought as an idea of the reason. All the hard-matter men on earth may be challenged to point out a single logical differentia. Such resistances thus occupying spaces would have bound and figure; they would have relation to each other of more or less of distance. There might thus arise worlds, and planets, and systems, and human bodies — spirit, of course, remaining unaffected as on any other view of matter. Along with these resistances and varying intensities of force, there might be a world of sentient

beings receiving affections from them ; of moral beings finding in them motives and reasons of action ; of rational beings comprehending their sequences of cause and of effect ; of religious beings adoring the Great God, who, by the creative energies of his "Word of *power*", had so manifested himself to them in time and space. This manifestation might remain just so long as the immanent divine power remained through which such phenomena came, upheld as this power upheld them, modified as it changed, and ceasing wholly when it should be withdrawn.

Would it be a real world ? No, says Dr. Hall ; it would be all a cheat ; there would be no hard matter in it. These spaces, though filled with resistances and impenetrabilities, according to Newton's conception, or space-filling forces, to use some of Dr. Hickok's language, would, after all, be absolutely void. How so ? Why so ? Because Dr. Hall cannot conceive any such thing, cannot think any such thing. These resistances are, to him, resistances of nothing ; it is nothing resisting nothing. But shall his difficulty of thinking be the limit of all other men's thinking, as it is even made the limit of God's power ? Some of the Germans are charged with blasphemy, because they would fit up a world by their thinking. Dr. Hickok is charged in the same way, in spite of his protestation and his proof that his "profane attempt", so-called, is simply a humble effort, and we believe it a very devout as well as able effort, to trace God's necessary thinking by the intuitive reason which he has given to us. But here we have a denial of reality to that which has every thinkable element of reality, merely because Dr. Hall cannot conceive how it can be, unless over and above, and under and below, and around and besides all this, there is a something which he calls hard matter, but which something, by itself, he, like all other men, is utterly unable to think or define. We candidly think that the German irreverence is far outdone in this.

We can form a clear idea of Newton's theory. We see how a most real and substantial world could arise out of it. But this something, which is wholly aside from force and resistance, is as utterly inconceivable as it is unthinkable. The

sense conception is ever slipping off; the reason cannot hold it, for it presents nothing—not even an ideal nothingness—to its grasp.

Ah! but the pantheism! This force you talk of is God's force, and so there is no matter aside from God. We are not careful to answer Dr. Hall in this matter. By the help of Scripture we cut the Gordian knot, and he can do no more. The Bible says: "In God we live and *are*". Our being is *in* his being. The same Scripture saith: "He dwelleth in light unapproachable". The Bible says: "God *is* all and *in* all". The same Scripture represents him as far off. "He is holy, most holy",—*separate* as the Hebrew word literally means, by himself, without contact or mixture with other things. He is far apart. "The heavens are not pure in his sight." We most reverently and literally believe both these representations. But as against this outcry of pantheism, it is enough to show that Dr. Hall no more escapes it, logically, than others. He is too good a theist to maintain that his matter, be it ever so hard, could remain one instant without the immanent power of God, and present will of God, pervading every part and particle,—that is, being *in*, and *through*, and inseparable from, and, therefore, both spatially and dynamically identical with, the whole and every part of every part. Take away, then, this divine power from the space where, and the time when, this hard matter is, and immediately there is nothing left. It would seem, therefore, like an axiom in the mathematics, that there could have been nothing there before beside that which is taken away, and that is divine, that is God. Here, then, is the pantheism all back again, unless we adopt the inconceivable supposition, that in the very moment of withdrawing the supporting and constituting force, God annihilates the hard matter as an extra work. But then this extra work, besides its want of all reason, brings us right up to the same difficulty again; for it seems to imply, if there was a real need of it, that there was some kind of resistance to be resisted, still remaining; or, if not, that then the hard matter, which would otherwise be left, having now no force, no resistance, no hardness of any degree, nothing by which it could

be felt by any sentiency, or thought by any reason, must be a very useless thing, if thing it could be called at all,—something which would never be missed, nor make any kind of difference in the universe, whether it was or was not.

We believe in creation, pure and simple, as well as Dr. Hall. "The things that are seen are temporal"; they all had a beginning in time. By the things that are seen, we mean all things that occupy space, and that are, or may be, sensible to any possible sentiency, or sense conception, in the universe. We think this is orthodox and scriptural. It saves the great truth, although we can hardly expect that our manner of stating it will be satisfactory to those of a radically different way of thinking. But let us try. Matter and form make up the universe. Of course we use form here in the scholastic or Aristotelian sense, not as the mere outside phantom, but as the *εἶδος*, the idea, law, or that which makes each thing what it is. Matter and form; matter is the thing, and the form is the form of it. That is one way of saying it, but it involves a contradiction for the reason. It is not a *thing* until it has a form, or, in other words, it is not a thing at all until it is a *thing formed*. That which is regarded as the matter, is only a thing so far as it has form, and then we must have another matter or mass to it, of which it is the form. "The bread is the form of the dough"—we quote the familiar illustration of a curious Arabic work, called the Book of the Pure Brethren\*,—"The bread is the form of the dough, and the dough is the matter to it". Or to give his language more truly, "the bread is the quality of the dough, and the dough is *mass* or quantity to it. The dough, again, is the form of the meal, and the meal is the matter or quantity to it; the meal is the form of the grain, and the grain is the mass or matter to it"; and so on. In a similar manner "the garment is the form of

\* Ach-wan-u-safa. A translation has been made in a work entitled, *Die Naturanschauung und Naturphilosophie der Araber im zehnten Jahrhundert*. Dr. Fr. Dieterici. Berlin. 1861. The Arabic treatise is a strange mixture of the Aristotelian and Platonic philosophies, with many thoughts and illustrations peculiarly Oriental. It is No. 1011 of the second volume of Zenker's *Bibliotheca Orientalis*. Calcutta. 1846.

the cloth, the cloth the form of the yarn, the yarn the form of the flax", until, as in the other example, we come to what the writer calls the element or elements, and still "this is the form of the hyle (or ur-grund), and the hyle is mass to it". But "this last thing, of course, is *form-less*", or, if not, then we have to march on to another last thing, which shall be matter or mass to this form, and so on *ad infinitum*. It must be sense-less and reason-less, that is, it cannot be taken by the sense or by the reason, for if either could take it, it would become itself quality or idea. We should have to take another turn on Proteus, and still another, to hold him fast, and then we could not do it. This last thing, then, is "without form and void". It is no thing for the sense of any sentiency; it is no thing for the reason. To us, therefore, it is *nulla res*, not a *res*—it is un-real—it is nothing. This is the inevitable consequence in that direction. It can have no place in our sense-world, or in our thought-world, unless we adopt Dr. Hickok's idea (for this purpose substantially that of Newton), that this last thing is force, pure and simple, in which power and idea, substance and form, matter and thing, become one and the same thing; so that if such first pure force could become perceptible to the sense of any possible sentient (which is very conceivable), then the sense would *feel* exactly what the reason *thinks*. The thought and the sense would be one; both mutually realizing, and both being equally real. Here we start, and then, in all the process above this, ever after, that which is lowest for the reason, is matter or material to the form which lies above, until we come to the highest forms, or most real things in the universe. But all through the forms are the real and realizing—that is, real-making things,—more real each than all the forms below which serve as material to each successive stage. To silence all cavil, it need only be said that this pure force which before was not in space, God causes to be in space, when, and where, and so much, and so long as it pleases him—that is, solely "according to the counsel of his will".

But it is contended that we *must* have a first something, a prime matter, beyond all this, even though it be sense-less and



reason-less, formless and void. We must have it whether or no. We must have it as a logical conception to stand upon. We must think of it, so and so, if we can; but alas, we cannot think of it at all. We can no more get a thought here than the clown whom the Aristophanic Socrates is forcing to think "out of himself" "the abstracting idea". We cannot think of it but by way of something that makes it form, demanding another mass or matter, and there we are. Our *ur-grund* is no *ur-grund* at all. Proteus is back again.

Hamilton and his school deny that we can have any idea of the Infinite and the Absolute. Matter is the thing for us in our human sphere. That is something we can understand. Hard matter is Dr. Hall's fulcrum; it is his *ποῦ στῶ* whence to begin a world making. What can be more simple than such a principium? But try and think it then, and see how we must ever fall back upon forms and ideas, even the ideas of the Infinite and the Absolute, for relief. And so it is found that the utterly unthinkable is actually at the other end of the scale. The infinite is doubtless very high, though we would still maintain that the human soul has a God-given idea of it; but this hard matter is unthinkable, from its falling utterly below our thought.

But, after all, what is the religious worth of this thing, be it what it may, which is nothing for the sense and the reason? If it is unthinkable, why think we at all about it? Why make we such ado, and call everybody pantheist or atheist, who in the least questions its moral or intellectual value? Let us go to the Scripture. As we read the Bible we find the very reverse of this modern philosophising. Not the first matter, be it what it may, but the building the Heavens and the Earth, the firmaments, the spheres, the seas, the lands, the trees seeding seed each after its kind, the living things each after its idea,—in other words, the giving their forms to things as they so sublimely rise in the order of reality,—this is the work, the great work of God the *Κτίστης*\*, God the Architect, the Formert†, the Great Master-BUILDER. That which this

\* *Eph.* iii, 9; *Col.* i, 16; *Rev.* iv, 11—x, 16.

† The Hebrew *מְבַרֵּא*, *The Former*, is one of the most frequent and significant of the epithets applied to God as Creator.



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modern speculation is so concerned about, the making the mass or masses out of nothing, is not mentioned at all in the sense it wants. The things that were not, of which the Prophet speaks, are the forms that were not. The new thing, *בְּרִיאָה*, is the event or doing that had never before been manifested in time and space. The first matter, the hyle, formless, sense-less, reason-less, is not dwelt upon at all, unless it be meant by the Tohu and Bohu, which are the nearest Hebrew words to nothingness. This would be making God, Dr. Hall might say, a *mere* form-giver, a *mere* artist, but this is just what the Bible does, leaving out the diminutively qualifying adjective. Whether the old Hebrews, in reading their simple, yet majestic Scriptures, got the conception of a first matter or not, yet this is certain, that instead of being dwelt upon as though it were so religious, and such a shield against pantheism, it is thrown altogether into the background, never made prominent as Dr. Hall would have it. Be it force, then, be it hyle, be it matter, be it what it may, this first thing is the easiest for God; it is the lowest, least thought of, least mentioned thing in the Scriptural creation.

And so is it with the earliest Christian writers. They received the doctrine of a pure creation from a previous non-existence both of mass and form. In what they say, however, of creation as a process or work, they differ strikingly from our modern schools. They dwell much more on the hypostatic Wisdom—the Word or Logos in nature. Hence their talk is more of *forms* and *ideas*, than of *causes* and *effects*. They made much of certain texts which are now hardly ever employed in such a way. The Scriptures, in a number of places, most explicitly teach that God made the worlds (*τοὺς αἰῶνας*) in and through the Son, the Logos; nay more, that “in Him all things consist” (*συνέστηκε*), stand together, have their present reality of being. (See *John* i, 3; *Col.* i, 15, 16, 17; *Heb.* i, 3—xi, 3; *Prov.* viii, 30\*. To these remarkable passages

\* The translation of the word *אֵינֶיךָ* here, “as one brought up with him”, is all wrong. It means the *Architect*. So the Syriac word from the same radix. It is from the radical sense of the universal Shemitic root, *אֵבֶן*, which everywhere carries the sense of constructive firmness and security, as, to be secure, to make se-

we give but little meaning, because it is felt that, somehow, our philosophy is not in harmony. Hence we seldom use these texts, except in a polemical way against the Unitarians, in order to fix the rank of the Logos, not to assist our ideas of creation and the world's subsistence. We think of the Logos as an instrumental *cause*, or, at most, as a *causa efficiens*, yet still as a mere mechanical or force-working power, making things so and so. According to this earlier idea, the Logos creates all things by giving them *form*, he himself being Forma Dei, *Phil.* ii, 16, Εἰκὼν τοῦ Θεοῦ ἀοράτου, the Great "Form of the unseen God", *Col.* i, 15. He is "the Outshining", the Χαρακτήρ ὑποστάσεως, the "Express, or perfect image", *Figura substantiæ ejus*, *Heb.* i, 3. As being thus Μορφή Θεοῦ, Forma Dei, he is the great source of form, or *formal cause*, to things, which are thus made things, not through a force causality solely, but in and through the in-forming Word. This is Scripture doctrine, whether we fully comprehend it or not; and in what perfect harmony is the Bible-teaching here! This same Logos, in whom πάντα ἐκτίσθη, "all things were built or formed", is "the light that lighteth every man" (*John* i, 9), that giveth form and idea to our souls. Thus *John* i, 9, in connection with *Col.* i, 5, and *Heb.* i, 3, is the interpretation of *Gen.* i, 27. From the Eternal Εἰκὼν Θεοῦ, the "express", or perfect Image, comes the human image of God, imperfect, finite, faint, and far away, yet through which man sees the ideas or forms in nature, reads them (ἀναγινώσκει), knows them again, remembers them as the thoughts of God, given to him in this image. The Logos in nature and in man; the early Christian theology made much of it, though held with but little science. It came from the Scriptures; it made their philosophy, and was not made by it. It must be revived again if we would have

cure, to make "to stand" in distinction from the flowing, the chaotic, the void which has no form nor constitution. Hence *ᾠδὴ* faith, *Isaiah* xxv, 1, and the common word for truth *אֱמֻנָה* *firmitas, perennitas, veritas*. It admirably corresponds to the description of the Logos, given elsewhere as the Former, he who gives form, idea, truth, that which gives a thing reality, or makes it something for the mind. The LXX render it ἀκρόνοια—the Vulgate, *cuncta componens*, the Syriac, *me-tak-no*, the artificer. Compare *κατηρίσθαι*, *Heb.* xi, 3.

science religious; it must again take its place in the Church if we would have theology truly philosophical and scientific.

The dangerous pantheism is that which denies the divine personality. But how is this done by the doctrine that matter is divine force made immanent in space, as Newton holds? Have we not still a personal God with will, and wisdom, and moral attributes? Have we not all that is necessary to religion? Have we not personal spirits, men, angels, devils? Have we not moral government, law, justice, retribution, reward, love, holiness, prayer, providence, revelation? Have we not a finite manifestation, and have we not reason by which we can separate this finite manifestation from the Infinite Manifester and from the Infinite Manifested? There is another kind of pantheism. It does not, like that charged upon Dr. Hickok, "build down" *à priori* from the will, wisdom, and power of a personal God (making a world which is the outworking, or manifestation in space and time of this will and wisdom), but is a development, *à posteriori*, of feeling and thinking matter, directly "conscious of matter", and rising up, through different stages of life, to the great development of a universal, impersonal soul of the world. This is the really frightful pantheism; but whether the inductive or Baconian thinking, as it is called, which derives all knowledge from experience, be more favorable to this than the *à priori* or rational psychology, is a question we cannot now discuss. We would merely say that Church history, and a knowledge of the tendencies exhibited by the most spiritual minds in the Church, would go far to settle it. Were Augustine, Anselm, Wickliffe, the martyr Huss, all spiritual realists, less holy, heavenly minded, spiritually minded, than the nominalists of the middle ages? Were Howe, and Leighton, and Edwards, if we regard his own peculiar thinking more than that which he derived from the schools of his day, less saintly, unearthly, godly, than Locke, or Dugald Stewart, or even Sir William Hamilton? We would be willing to rest the whole question of tendency on the right answer to these inquiries.

The truth is, this whole difficulty of pantheism, transcending as it does every human effort to solve it, is, in this respect,

precisely similar to that other great analogous problem of evil. How shall we separate the power and being of God from the force and being of the world, without making the latter independent? How shall we separate the truth and goodness of God from the evil that is in the world, without making the evil absolute and eternal? We do not say that either problem can be solved; but this may be affirmed, and the history of these controversies in all ages shows it, that whoever, on either question, and on either side of it, chooses to take the safe position of assailant, can raise objections, and ask questions, which the other party will find it difficult to answer, if he can answer them at all. Let him choose his own stand-point, and he can almost always drive his antagonist to the wall. But then this antagonist, if he chooses, can turn right round, and by taking *his* stand-point, and putting *his* questions in *his* way, drive the other back to the wall again in like manner; and so on as long as they are mutually fond of such amusement. Dr. Hall believes in an ante-mundane state when God was all. Let us repeat to him the question given a little way back: Has God ceased to be all? Then the all is more than it was, or God has become less. In either case he is comparatively finite. Now, where would Dr. Hall stand in answer to such a perfectly clear mathematical statement? Why, with his back to the wall, crying, mystery, mystery, "O the depths", etc,—O vain and boasting reason, "strive for the faith once delivered to the saints",—"because lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit". If, then, the difficulty in his own view, so far as it has any consistent meaning, is just as great, to say the least, as that of the one whom he so causelessly assails, why does he get up such an uproar about pantheism, that there is hardly a paragraph in which this bugbear word does not stare you in the face, with all the changes rung upon it that the dialect of polemics could furnish? We would not wish to be uncharitable here; but if we may regard the known as the intended effect, it does look as though this frequent word had been selected, and these ringing epithets ranged around it for the purpose of exciting the unreasoning *odium theologicum* against one who, though deeply



philosophical, is, perhaps, the least controversial, the least polemical, among all the thinkers and writers of our land.

We cannot follow Dr. Hall in all the places where he has been muddying the waters, but there is one question which he so utterly fails to comprehend, that we must ask the reader's indulgence when we attempt to put it in its true light.

What is reality, or if there are different degrees of it, what is the highest reality? We may take a production of human art, or we may take a work of nature, that is, of divine art. In the first we have matter and idea,—that which is for the sense, and that which is for the mind or reason,—the one *felt*, the other *thought*. The matter may be changed, or changing, and yet the idea remain the same. The matter may all pass away, and other matter take its place, and yet it is the same *thing*, *res*, *reality*. Again—all the matter may remain in quantity, whilst through disorganization, the idea departs. It is no longer the same *thing* that it was; it is another thing. If all idea is gone, if there is nothing for the mind, nothing thinkable (unless we may regard mere quantity, without any thinkable quality, as the lowest form of an idea), then it is no longer a thing at all, no longer a *res* or reality. Without quality, or idea, it may be for the sense, but the mind sees in it nothing to think about, nothing by which to separate it from the general mass of the sense world, and make it a thing *by itself*. In a work of human art, then, such as a chair, or a watch, or a structure of any kind, the idea is the reality. It would be the *reason* of the thing subjectively, if it had a conscious soul; it would be the *reason* objectively, if it had only an organic life. Having neither of these, it is the idea of the mind that creates it, and this is its reality, that which makes it a thing, a thing for the mind.

Again—take a natural object, or work of divine art. It differs from the other in this, that by the divine power, its idea is made an organic, reproducing, vital law, or life. Let it be a tree. Here, too, the matter is ever changing, more slowly, but just as truly as the water in the flowing river. The leaves and bark disappear, and are replaced at short in-



tervals; the whole matter goes and other matter comes in at longer intervals, but it is the same tree, because it is the same life, the same idea, the same vitalized law. On the other hand, take this away, or change it, and though all the matter remain, it is no longer *the* thing. When reduced to formless quantity, without anything for the mind to think, it is no longer a thing at all. The idea and the life here are the same. It is a spiritual force working on outward material, gathering and building it up for its material manifestation.

In either case, the idea, whether as artistic, organic, or vital, is the *res* or reality, the real thing; for it is that which makes it what it *is*,—its *οὐσία*, essence, *is-ity*, or being,—the verb *IS*, as thus used, being something more than the bare logical copula, and having a real predicative force. It is what Aristotle\* defines as the *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*, “the being what it *is*”, or the being something—that is, something for the mind, a reality—the thing itself. The true thought of reality, or what makes a thing, is so simple, that we overlook it on that very account.

With these preliminaries, we proceed to another very serious matter, though Dr. Hall treats it very lightly. He is so delighted with his “honest Hibernian”, and his “flowing horse”, and other facetiæ of a similar kind, that he does not seem to be aware how very solemn a question this is. It has been held by some great minds, and by very many devout, though unspeculating minds, that throughout the worlds of nature and matter, the thing of sense, or “that which is seen”, is ever “becoming”, but never truly *is*; whilst the “thing unseen” is *the* thing, the real thing, the reality. There has been much of speculation on this question; there is room for argument on both sides; but we doubt whether ever before it has seemed to any one a good subject for a jest. What is shadow, what is substance? From the days of Abraham, “who sought a city which had foundations”, it has ever been

\* *Metaphysica* VI, 6: Where there is discussed the question, *πότερον ταῦτό ἐστιν ἢ ἕτερον τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ἕκαστον*, “whether this *τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*, the constituting idea, and the individual mass (which it qualifies, that is, makes *ποιοῦν τι*) are the same thing.”

the inquiry, not more of serious philosophy than of true religion. The peculiar language of the question has come down to us from the early Greeks; but in the East, as in the West, by devout Buddhist, devout Mohammedan, and, most of all, by devout Christian, has it been solemnly asked: "Do all things *flow*, or do some things *stand*?" If anything can be said to have come out of the pure common sense and common thinking of the human soul, it is this question. It arose before schools were formed, before books were written, before science was heard of, or philosophy had a name. First as a devout sentiment having great depth of thought and feeling without precision or logical form, next as a scholastic or speculative theorem, did the human mind inquire: Is there a fixed being in nature, aside from the ideas and laws of nature which its flowing forces represent? This question affords matter of merriment to Dr. Hall. He cannot understand how a sensible man can entertain it. He has a very summary way of dealing with all such transcendental nonsense. To say that "quality as educed from sensation" is the true reality by which the "phenomenal being is particularized from all others", is with him too unmeaning and absurd for argument. Such moonshine as that need only be answered by dashes, and italicised exclamations, and imitations of slow oracular utterance—(*sic*): "*The sensation—becomes—quality!* quality of an outer material thing. What mystic muttering of robed priest; what hocus pocus of a conjurer ever wrought a more marvellous transformation!" To say, again, that material things are "becoming", or that "the realities are above the world of sense for evermore", is a mystical raving still more unworthy of a sober man's notice. If any reply is needed, Dr. Hall has one that is conclusive: "Where, then, did he find his Bible? If he believes it as he interprets it, then he believes there is no Bible". It is only a phenomenal Bible, a book becoming. There, answer me that. Surely such a reply must be an extinguisher.

"Do all things *flow*, or do some things *stand*?" From the way he treats this question, it would almost seem as though the reviewer regarded its very peculiar and somewhat strange

phraseology, as coming from Dr. Hickok. He may have thought that it was one of those "affectations of style", with which some of his critics have charged him. That word "flow" is so very comical, that, like some of the catch-words that Dickens puts into the mouth of certain of his characters, he never can cease repeating it. He will find, however, that some of the first cotemporaries of this very odd question had their jokes, too, about its quaint diction, and still more singular thought, as it appeared to their hard materialism. They were fond of telling the story of old Cratylus\*, who "heraclitized" to such an extent, they said, that finally he determined to say nothing at all, but, to every question, only moved his finger. Things were changing in the very moment of utterance, and, therefore, as a man could not speak without telling a lie, or the thing that was not, he had better hold his tongue altogether. It was this same "honest Hibernian" who found fault with his master, Heraclitus, for saying that a man could not twice jump the same stream. Not even once, said he, for it is a different stream before he gets over. The case differs from that of Dr. Hall, in the fact that there was some real Attic salt in these old repartees. It should be borne in mind, too, that these men, who are thus ridiculed, were not the idealists, but the downright atheists, materialists, and nominalists of their day. The Eleatic followers of Parmenides, on the other hand, reasoned from this imperfect, *never-abiding*, being of nature, to the necessity of something immovable, only to be found in a world of *à priori* truth and eternal ideas. The disciples of Heraclitus believed in the flowing,—all thinking men did,—for though atheists they were no jesters, but earnest inquirers after truth,—deeply thoughtful as an atheist may well be,—but they could not believe in anything *à priori*, or that anything stands, and so they were very melancholy men. Their awful position made them serious. They had a solemnity, these old Ionic atheists, which would not be out of place in some of the Synods, Conventions, or General Assemblies, of

\* There is a very full and interesting account of these odd matters, given by Aristotle in his *Metaphysica*, lib. iii, ch. 5.

modern polemics. Heraclitus, their master, was called the weeping philosopher. He could never smile at his own ghastly theory of a God-less, idea-less world. It may be said, too, that though materialists, they were not *hard-matter-men* like Dr. Hall. Matter, with them, was *all*; but it was in an everlasting flow; there was nothing about it which "*stood*", nothing that was hard, and solid, and substantial, in the sense of immovable, nothing that was not continually changing and "becoming", as much so in fact,—however differing in appearance or rate of movement—as the "water spilled upon the ground which cannot be gathered up again", or the disappearing smoke to which the Hebrew prophet compares the ever dissolving Earth and Heavens. This was their view of matter and nature, the true view, as it came out of the far-reaching thought of the ancient mind; the view, too, to which modern science, by its slow yet sure induction, is steadily advancing. Thus, thinking of matter, it may be said that so far they were prepared to be spiritualists. They must have wished to believe in something that did not flow, and that, therefore, stood above this flowing world.\* But they stumbled at *ideas*,

\* We see here the difference between the Platonic or Eleatic and the Hebrew aspect of the great thought. With the Greek it had more of the intellectual; with the Jew more of the moral idealism. "Matter *flows*, but ideas *stand*", said the one. "Heaven and Earth dissolve, but God's righteousness standeth fast forever", is the rapt language of the other. See *Isaiah* li, 6: "*Lift up to the Heavens your eyes, and look upon the Earth below; for the Heavens, like vapor, are melting away, and the Earth is wasting like a garment, but my salvation is forever, and my righteousness faileth not*". Some might think such a citation of Scripture extravagant, except as made by way of figurative accommodation. It is doubtless true that each man's habit of thought affects very much the ideas he gets from the Bible. But may not this be one of the designs in the peculiar construction of this most *suggestive* book? The language here is certainly highly suggestive of the Eleatic thought and diction. When we speak of different aspects of a passage, we mean not a double sense, or a mystical sense, or a philosophical sense, but the same essential thought expanding in different degrees for different minds, as it rises up toward that thought of the infinite Author, which is ineffable for all finite minds. We believe that the rudiments of this old world conception of nature's ceaseless flow were in the Prophet's mind. It lay not there philosophically formed. He had it as belonging to the common thoughtful mind of all ages. The style of expression is not far from that of the Greek thought, even as the Prophet himself was not far from being the cotemporary of some who were most fond of uttering it. There

that *τέρας, τερατώδες*, or bugbear, as Aristotle calls it. They could not see how these could be truly *res*, realities, or "*real things*", to use our modern tautological language, and so they rejected theism. They were too consistent to believe in a lonely "god of forces", without a world of eternal *immovable* ideas, in which he dwells for evermore. They already had an eternal, physical power, and as long, therefore, as they rejected the Eleatic ideal world, they did not, as consistent men, care much whether this was called a deity or not. In the same way Aristotle, in rejecting the Platonic ideas, could only believe in an impersonal God.

This old-world thought had its birth in a time to which the historical memory runneth not. But whether born on the Ganges, or the Nile, or in the mountains of Palestine, or first brought by Noah's grandson Javan to the shores of the Ægean, it has come down to our time, and still haunts the souls of men. No jesting will ever drive out this mode of thinking, and this talk of the "being and the becoming". There are minds that can find no religion, no higher world, no immortality of the human soul, if they once let go this very

was, too, the same mode of thinking and speaking in the early East, as we learn, not only from the writings of their Sages, but from peculiar expressions in language that must have been of ancient formation. Thus one of the old Arabic names for the flowing world, was *عاجل* literally "*the hastening*", the *quick-going*—*mundus caducus*—see *Koran* xvii, 19—very much the same with the Hebrew *הַיָּרֵךְ* *die schnell entschlüpfende* (*Gesenius*), the *gliding, slipping world*. *Ps.* xvii, 14—xlix, 2.

The resemblance in expression is seen especially in the verb *יִמְלֵךְ*, a denominative verb from the noun for salt—literally, "shall dissolve" like the flowing salt. The Prophet had never seen the vivid picture of this process under the immense magnifying power of the solar microscope, where the *melting crystals seem* like the flowing down of granite mountains, but he could conceive it in his mind, and there was that in all nature around which would suggest the conception. So the *Vulgate*—*coeli sicut fumus liquecent*.

The same conception is expressed in nearly the same language, *Ps.* cii, 27: "*They are flowing, but thou abidest*". We must give *יִאבֶדֶךָ* here this sense to make it parallel with *יִעֲמֶדֶךָ*, "but thou shalt stand, or standest—*tu autem permanes, thou abidest through*"—that is, through all cosmical change.

In both passages the evident pictorial design of the language requires that all the Hebrew verbs should be rendered in the present tense. It is not prediction strictly, but that which is now, and constantly going on. The *flowing*, and the *abiding*, or *standing*, are coëxistent.

old distinction. They trace in the Scriptures, too, much which, if it does not philosophically or logically prove, does at least make them often think about it. "The fashion of the world", το σχῆμα τῶν κοσμου τόντου, its *outside*\*, all that falls under the knowledge of sense, παράγει, "is passing off,"—passing away,—evermore passing away. It is the same thought. We do not say that Paul uses it philosophically, although he must have often heard this word σχῆμα thus employed in the wrangling schools of Tarsus, whither Greek philosophy migrated after it had left Athens and Alexandria. He must have known how they used it for the outside of things, in other words, the material, for it was the greatest philosopher among the Greeks who taught that matter, in its most remote analysis, must be all outside, having strictly nothing interior, as it had no real solidity. But we are not required to suppose any such technicality in the Apostle. It was that deeper musing of the soul, unscientific and unphilosophical, but out of which all true philosophy is born. The full round thought of the σχῆμα here, is not any particular fashion of the world, but the world itself†, all that is matter of sense, the "things that are seen" and touched, they are passing off, evermore passing off, as a stream that floweth and standeth not,—no less is it true in the hardest than in the most frail and transient phenomena. "They are flowing, but Thou abidest", Ps. cii, 27.

In this passage, and in the other from Isaiah, on which we have dwelt in the note, there is the same musing state of soul, whether we may call it sentiment or philosophy, which pre-

\* The term "*outside*", is used here in the sense of that which hath ever something still interior, to which the material, even in its most recondite departments, still stands as outside, surface, or outward vehiculum.

With the utmost respect for the translators of our English Bible, we cannot help regarding "fashion" here as a very poor rendering. We do not refer merely to its present frivolous sense; but it could never, at any time, express σχῆμα, either in its philosophical or its more general acceptation. It is still worse in that important passage, Philip. ii, 8—ἐν σχήματι ὡς ἄνθρωπος—"in fashion as a man". Rather in nature, in organization, in all that is physical, or according to the flesh,—including here, however, even the human soul.

† As it is expressly said, John ii, 17: ο κόσμος, "the world itself", παράγεται, "is passing away".



sents itself to us in the teaching of these solemn old Greeks. This latter did not take so religious a form, but it was the same ideally. The two "worlds" in the Bible, and the two forms of "being" in the other, have, to say the least, a striking resemblance. Two forms of being, we say, not strictly, but by way of accommodation, on account of the poverty of our own and most modern languages. In the Greek, with its two well-defined substantive verbs\* (as we defectively call them), there was no such amphibology. If that alone which abides for evermore — if that alone is being, or differs essentially from what is called being in other things, then we want some other word for that which is ever the flowing manifestation of the law and the idea which dwelt in the higher, — this lower thing never remaining for a moment the same, — never truly a *thing*, but ever a *doing*, an e-vent, a coming out, or "becoming". If the one was *being*, this was well named thus, "a becoming". If the one was truly *ὄν*, τὰ ὄντα, then the other was γιγνόμενον; and what was γιγνόμενον was, of course, ever ἀπολλύμενον, as the Psalmist says in one of the passages we have cited: "They perish", that is, are continually perishing, "but thou abidest" — *תָּמַדָּה*, literally, "*Thou standest*". It is almost the very language of the *Timæus* (28 B), or Plato's famous distinction of the two great worlds or states of existence, — whatever we may think of the coincidence.

All this, however, seems very funny to Dr. Hall. Let us see how he treats it. He says:

"The Natural Realist is not troubled with difficulties like these. If his senses give to him, for the moment, an outward horse, he will take him, and use him, not questioning whether he has a horse in a "flow", created anew and different every moment, nor whether—supposing a real horse—sense never presents him as a horse in *being*, but only as "*becoming*" a horse—a horse *about to be*. If all this be so, a flowing man will use the flowing horse, for the flowing moment,—the horse for the moment created in a flowing creation. Questions about the being and the becoming—let those who meet them solve them."

\* The writer hopes he may be pardoned here if he refers the reader to the *Platonic Theology*, Dissertation XXIV, entitled, "Philosophy of the Verb To Be, or the Verba Εἶμι Γίνομαι."

Doubtless he thinks that he has met this "famous" question, as he sneeringly calls it, of the "being and the becoming". We leave the above extract to the reader, without note or comment, except to remark briefly on the very happy state of mind in which the writer appears to be. He seems to give thanks that he is not like some other men. He is not in trouble as other men. He has no such difficulties as those bilious men of ancient or modern times, the *μελαγχολικοί*, as Aristotle styles them\*. If his senses give him, for the moment, an outward horse, he will ride him without asking whether it is a horse in a flow. Contented man! We are reminded here again of "the elephant", and "the cane", and "Nichts", and all that. "Questions about the being and the becoming" he regards as very trifling matters; "let them who meet them solve them".

Dr. Hall doubtless thinks he is doing God service in this way, and he has an unquestionable right, if he regards a thing as ridiculous, to endeavor thus to represent and expose it. But if the question is intrinsically a most serious one, then the attempt at ridicule recoils on him who would thus employ such a double-edged weapon. The highest aim of religion is to draw men to the contemplation of true being; to get them, if possible, above the sense, the temporal, the flowing, into the unseen and eternal,—to lead them from the shadow to the substance. Now, a man directly thwarts this aim, whether he mean it or not, who rejects, much more who would ridicule, that in philosophy which constitutes, or even seems to constitute, a true religious ground for such distinction. He does this who asserts, whether understandingly or not, that "that which is for the present, just as truly IS as that which is for eternity".

Is this a true way of treating such a question, a question, it cannot be repeated too often, which has come, not from any mystic or transcendental affectation, but from the purest common sense, the purest and most unaffected and most religious thinking of the human soul in all ages?

\* *Book of Problems, Sec. XXIX.*

It requires no science, no schooling, no philosophy, to form the thought that nature, and the world, and all things in them, are passing away,—not merely as a sentimental Sunday evening thought about some better land of Epicurean being, where man will enjoy more happiness than here, but as a truth sure as anything in the mathematics, that all things are flowing without intermission. Matter is a stream. There is no rest; there can be no rest in the natural; there nothing ever stands. It is a necessary law of the material, both now and forever; it is the condition of its finite existence; it must be ever flowing, from the most enduring, phenomenally, to the most frail of its manifestations. There is the moon-beam playing on the rippled waters. For a moment it occupies space. For a moment it has figure and color. There would seem to be something very like a *thing* there. It is matter, too, if light be a material undulation. It is, like all other matter, and neither more nor less than any other matter, a *doing*, a doing in space; at least, take away the doing, and nothing else, either sensible, or conceivable, or thinkable, is left. And yet even this common thinking, if it be pure, is enough to make us certain that such a moon-beam figure, or even the still fainter image-speck that has its space and time among the fluids of the eye, and which is gone the moment we attempt to look at it—that these are no more flowing than the oak of a thousand years, or the hard boulder of the Alps,—no more or less *becoming* than the solid granite of the Andes, which has seemingly “stood” for ages. For even that has been all this time, and is now, a flux,—a slower stream to be sure than the tree, or the human body, or the river, or the moon-beam on the water, but none the less a stream—not a particle at rest—ever dissolving and flowing off like the salt crystals in the lens of the solar microscope. Could our vision of time be enlarged with our vision of space, we would see that neither mass, nor any part or particle of the mass, had been the same for even the smallest moment (if there are degrees in moments) of ever flowing time. It has been moving, changing (for all change is motion) continually, continuously, and throughout; so that were our time-vision thus enlarged, we would see the

age-built Chimborazo as much a stream as any of the snow-fed rivulets that flow down its rocky hills, as much a going and coming *event* as the falling rain, or the flashing lightning, or the rolling thunder, of which it seems to stand the everlasting witness. There is no rest in matter. It could be shown, mathematically, that there can be no rest in matter, whether organic and growing, or dead and decaying. They are not standing things, but *doings* all of them, doings of invisible powers. They are all *events*, from the floating mote to the rolling world; as much *events* as the shower as distinguished from the river, or the river as distinguished from the tree, or the tree as distinguished from the mountain. And all things that go to make up these larger *doings*, they, too, have the same character. We do not call events *things* when plainly conceived as events, that is, as having no standing reality. And when it is shown that all that are called things are strictly motions, doings, or events, as much so as any that *come out* in history or nature, then are we prepared to see that in this world of matter the real things that *stand* are forces, ideas, laws, producing these out-comings or events that meet the human sense. These are the things immovable, the "unseen things from which are made", in God's good time and way, the "things that do appear",—whether in the great creation, or in the time-pulsations that have ever since been *coming out of* that originating act.

These unseen things not only stand above our present world, but they are ante-mundane. *Force*, too, was there, as well as *will* and *wisdom*. Dr. Hickok would, perhaps, limit this word to what he calls the "counteraction", or the outward doing in space, preferring the term *activity* to denote its ante-mundane existence in God. But for our more general, or less precise argument, we would rather say the *force* or *forces*, regarding them as plural, and having diversity before the creation, as well as the *νοούμενα*, or ideas; so that they together would be the "unseen things",\* from which, as the Apostle says, were

\* Heb. xi, 3. The translation of the Syriac, Vulgate, and Philoxenian Syriac which represents the most ancient Greek manuscripts, requires *ἐκ μὴ* instead of *μὴ ἐκ*, which brings out the Vulgate rendering, *ut ex invisibilibus visibilia fierent*. The

made the *βλεπόμενα*, the *φαινόμενα*, or "things that are seen". But Dr. Hall says (p. 636): "Nothing is hazarded in affirming that Dr. Hickok has no conception of any possible meaning in what he affirms" about spiritual activity. The ground of this rather hazardous assertion, as stated in the same paragraph (p. 636), is, that neither he, Dr. Hall, as he seems to confess, nor any other man, as he rather hazardedly implies, can conceive of *spiritual activity*, except as thought or intelligence, and then he asks: "Is it the activity of intelligence or thought pressing *physically* against another similar activity"? These ("thought and intelligence") he regards as the "known properties or acts of spirit". His meaning must be, that this activity or force, in its ante-mundane state, is not a real *potentia potens*, a power *in esse*, but only a *possibilitas*, a power *in posse*, which may, indeed, be predicated of a finite being, but contradicts every thought we can have of that Being whose very "essence is energy" ἀρχὴ ἧς ἡ οὐσία ἐνέργεια ἔστιν, as Aristotle says, in perfect harmony with the Scriptures, which affirm that his very command is power (*Ps.* xxxiii, 9), not creative *of* power, for that would necessitate a prior power to create the power, and so on with a *retrogressus ad infinitum*, which is an infinite absurdity. This is worse than pantheism. Force has assumed the form of matter in creation; but there is no more power in the universe, power *in esse*, than there was before "the morning stars first sang together" at the laying of earth's foundation stone.

Dr. Hall's difficulty is answered by a consideration even of the human spirit. There is power there, power which God

common view, as given by Bloomfield, is that *μὴ βλέπόμενα* is equivalent to our phrase "out of nothing". But there are very strong objections to this. It seems well to us, but did not agree with ancient thinking. It would be a strange phrase, any how, for absolute nihility, but its plural form would seem to be still more strongly against it. *τὰ μὴ ὄντα* would be a mere negation, and may be allowed to be used for nothingness; but the other, *τὰ μὴ βλέπόμενα*, "the things unseen", has too much of descriptive specification. The "unseen things are not *nothings* (if the word nothing can have a plural), since diversity, in its very essential idea, implies reality. They are varied *generic* entities. Such a thought, too, of nothingness is wholly at war with the high sense of *τὰ μὴ βλέπόμενα*, 2 *Cor.* iv, 18, and just above, *Heb.* xi, 1.

has given, an *active* spiritual energy, never *iners*, but ever *efficiens*, outwardly or inwardly,—in short, a true *potentia potens* (though limited and finite), from His own infinite energy. It is true we apply the term power to the thought and the intelligence. A strong mind, we say—"knowledge is power", etc. But that is only metaphorical. There is a real *dynamical* strength in the spirit. It as much, and as essentially, belongs to it, or is one of its "properties", as its thought or its intelligence. The strength of Hercules was in the soul of Hercules before it was in his arms. When a man lifts or propels a hundred pounds, it is ultimately by the soul he does it; and that, too, not simply by the soul, as determining will, using the outward means, but as *potens potentia*, or spiritually indwelling force, that is, a real spiritual thing. It is counteracted by the immense divine force lying all around it. The body, too, is not a means for producing, but truly a limitation to, the spiritual strength; and that is the only reason why one man is stronger than another. His healthier, stronger, organization is simply one that is less hindering, that is, gives a better outlet to the spiritual force within. A man can even feel this,—let him try to will beyond his muscular strength, and he will feel the *vis obstrictans* that is in the soul, even when every nerve and muscle are lying still. And so in nature, as we have shown, the greatest power may be held in the most quiescent rest.

Let Dr. Hall, if it pleases him, make light of things that called out the deepest thoughts of Edwards or Newton. Let him try to raise a laugh at "the flowing" and "the becoming", but for the honor of humanity, and for the honor of Christianity, let him not style this contented hard-matter philosophy of his, and of his brother philosopher of the *Princeton Review*, the religious doctrine preëminently, whilst, at the same time, he talks of the irreligion of that view which finds some higher being than that of sense, some veritable *ὄν*, in distinction from the *γενόμενον*,—something, even in man, that *stands* in distinction from that which is ever flowing.

This is not merely speculative, but most practical doctrine. It has been loved by the most pious souls that have ever been



nursed in the Church. The contrary view has ever tended to darkness and unbelief. Whatever truly *is*, *is* forever. Man has in him the Eternal; therefore man *is*, and *is* forever. The world is but a manifestation,—a manifestation of the eternal, and, therefore, that which it manifests, and that alone, truly *is*. All the rest is ever passing off, and passing away, flowing, disappearing. “The things that are seen are temporal; the things that are unseen are eternal.” *Πρόσκαιρα* and *αίώνια*, here, do not denote a present, and a future, however long, as parts of one duration, but two *opposite* states, as significant of two opposite natures or characters that belong to them. What does the Apostle mean by this? Is his “*unseen*” here simply equivalent to *not seen*,—now out of sight? Is it simply an unseen heaven, because shut from the sense by intervening clouds or sky? Or does he mean things in their very kind and essence unseen,—now unseen—always unseen—or, to make use again of that expression at which Dr. Hall shows so much alarm, and asks, “Where, then, did he find his Bible?”—The things which alone are real, because they are “above the world of sense for evermore”?

But still this is dangerous language, he thinks. It is the Platonic ideal world again,—at all events, looks very much like it. But what if it does? And what if there be much truth in it? What if the Bible teaches something very much resembling it, in distinction from the very modern notion of a six thousand years of hard matter, with an eternal blank of all but a lonely inconceivable divine Being, before and after it? Will it be any the less entitled to respect because the mighty mind of Plato once thought it, and the noblest souls in the Church have loved to lose themselves in its entrancing vision of reality?

## ART. II.—DORNER ON THE SINLESS PERFECTION OF JESUS.

[THE following essay, by the distinguished author of the *History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ*, was originally written for the *Revue Chrétienne*; published, with alterations and additions, in the *Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie*, and translated in the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, No. XLI. This translation is here reproduced, revised throughout.—H. B. S.]

IN discussing this subject, with a conscious though not always express reference to recent productions, we are aided by the fact that the words and narratives in the life of Jesus which bear reference to his moral character have, in point of credibility, well-nigh passed unchallenged; and we are therefore relieved from entering into preliminary questions of that nature. Apart from *à priori* grounds, the assaults on the sinlessness of Christ are in fact chiefly derived from passages of the New Testament itself, which even the opponents hold to be faithful and credible as to the moral bearing of Christ, and the impression it produced. But the following discussion will also be conducted under a further limitation. It will refrain from entering upon the question of the *possibility* of a sinless and yet true human life; and also from drawing inferences from the sinlessness of Jesus as to his origin and inner nature. We shall rather adhere strictly to this question, Whether we can hold, on good historical grounds, and with a good conscience, the *reality* of the sinless perfection of Jesus as an historical fact. We will only remark as to its possibility, that those who regard human nature as so good that they do not need to seek a Redeemer, are wont to fall into striking self-contradiction when they speak of the sinlessness of Jesus; for this, on the contrary, is doubted by them, because they hold that sin is a power which cannot be thoroughly overcome by any man in his own strength. Let a man deal in earnest with

the latter experience, without playing false with conscience and its problems, and he will feel that the claims of Christianity deserve a hearing; and that just because sin is such an invincible power in us, Christ must have been sinless, in order to be able to cope with sin in us. Were we, on the other hand, content with that power of evil over us as an inevitable destiny, it would amount to the assertion of an essential contradiction in our nature—a self-contradiction in the very idea of moral perfection, thus amounting to a dissolution of the idea itself, since it unconditionally demands the very thing which is absolutely denied by reason of its impotence in the face of what is physical. Faith in unconditional rectitude and the unconditional goodness of moral good, implies that this is the only true reality, not to be withstood by anything physical—not an empty, impotent *Thou shalt*; but the principle of all that truly is.\*

*I. The true humanity of Jesus in relation to his sinless perfection.*

We approach every man with the assumption, which never fails, that however great the moral differences of various individuals, no one is free from sin. This is not an experience of yesterday; to attain this presumption the high intellectual culture of a later age is not required. It prevailed in the time of Christ, and was applied even to him. There were not wanting some who, on this point, considered Jesus as, at best, different from others only in degree. The Pharisees regarded him as a sinner, because he did not observe their Sabbath commandment; because he did not share their reverence for the temple; because he did not enjoin on his disciples the prescripts of purification, fasting, and much prayer, after their manner; because he did not place the claims of the external Jewish theocracy, and its independence, above that of the Roman

\* Among recent writings on our subject, along with Ullman's classical work, *The Sinlessness of Jesus*, 6th ed. 1854, we may mention some writings in the English language, especially Young's, *The Christ of History*; Schaff's, *The Moral Character of Christ*. Among French works on our subject, may be named, on the one side, Edm. de Pressensé, *Le Rédempteur*, (*The Redeemer*); on the other, the most acute hostile work, Pécaut, *Le Christ et la Conscience*.

state, whose coin they had accepted ; not to speak of his testimony that he was the Son of God. They sought to persuade themselves that they did God service in persecuting him. In like manner Judas Iscariot thought himself justified in taking offence at the anointing of Jesus by the sister of Lazarus, and called to interest himself in the supposed waste of what might have been given to the poor. To this is added, his treachery, whether it was that, before committing it, he cherished the suspicion that Jesus wanted courage to proceed with the establishment of his Messianic kingdom, and therefore needed an impulse by which he must be driven forward, if he was not to fail ; or, whether he fancied that, in spite of his testimony regarding himself, he, Jesus, did not really have a divine call, as he neglected all those appliances which, in the opinion of Judas, were needful for success.

On the other hand, his disciples, especially the eleven, spontaneously received and preserved that impression of a wonderful elevation and greatness in his person and moral character, which even Judas Iscariot did not at first resist ; their souls became more and more indissolubly attached to him, and more and more filled with admiration of him, even to adoration.\* For they were imbued with the deepest conviction, which they afterwards sealed with their blood, that every human standard that could be applied to him was too narrow and too contracted. They who enjoyed the most confidential intercourse with him, who must have observed and known him most intimately, proclaimed to the world, that a sinless saint had arisen among mankind ; that he is the Redeemer, the fulfilment of the law and the prophets ; and that to suffer and die for him is gain, and only the grateful reciprocation of his love. And this preaching of him founded the Church, gathered out a world of redeemed ones, and placed a boundary line as clear and manifest as any event in general history between a perishing, lost world and a world restored and becoming green again.

The eleven were not utterly inaccessible to the offence which the Pharisees, Judas, and others took at Jesus ; for the power

\* It is worthy of remark, that sinless holiness was not one of the features of the then prevalent conception of the Messiah.

of moral traditions over what is good and pious, reaches to an immeasurable extent; especially if, as in Judea, they are mingled imperceptibly with national patriotism, and error has assumed an embodiment and organization, and found a system supporting itself on holy Scripture, and ruling life down to its minutest details. The more we weigh this, the higher must we rate that spiritual power, which must have influenced not only the understanding, but the conscience of him who raised his disciples high above these stumbling-blocks lying so near the national mind, and enabled them to found their souls' salvation upon him in opposition to the prevailing Judaism. If he was not pious and upright after the ideal of the Jews, there must have been something else to supply this want, something higher, the vision of an original holy purity and goodness, which attached their consciences to him, so that they were ready, in virtue of this impression, to allow themselves and their inherited moral and religious conceptions to be formed and remodelled by him, instead of seeking to measure and to judge him by them.

Even his enemies the Pharisees, however, betray their impression of an entirely original and wonderful grandeur. For though they may have regarded him as a sinner and despiser of the law, from the stand-point of their inherited moral and religious axioms, yet they could not stop short at this, and view him as an ordinary sinful man, or teacher of error. Rather, he appeared to them, in the very estrangement in which they had placed themselves towards him, so much like one who *had power* (Matt. 7 : 29 ; John 7 : 46), so wonderfully firm, strong, and great of his kind, that they were obliged to attribute to him a superhuman power of *evil*, after they had resolved not to concede to him a superhuman power of *good*.

The coat of mail, the scaffolding of those once powerful Jewish traditions about moral and religious things, has been rent asunder by Christianity. There are no longer any who share in those Jewish stumbling-blocks. On the contrary, it has become the triumphant general conviction that Jesus again evoked the real source of our original moral and religious consciousness from the rubbish of those dead forms and institu-

tions. What were then stumbling-blocks to many, so that they only believed on him in spite of them, or were wholly baffled thereby, are now to us rather a sign how high he towered above his time in moral wisdom and virtue, a sign that has now become an argument to attract to him, and to awaken confidence. It may be that in a state of more advanced knowledge, those very stumbling-blocks or doubts (afterwards to be discussed), occasioned by other, perhaps heathen views, may have a similar effect; and that mankind may discern in just these points peculiar revelations of his moral grandeur and divine originality. At least, there will ever be the same alternative, to which suspicions against his moral purity and perfection must come, namely, that if he is a sinner at all, in spite of his testimony about himself, he surely cannot any longer be called preëminently *pious* and *pure*; but there will remain only the dilemma which was presented to the Pharisees, when they reached the verge of the sin against the Holy Ghost, "singularly and marvellously superhuman either in evil or in good".

But, according to the Evangelists, whom we must hold to be worthy of belief *pro* and *contra* in this matter, if we would speak of it at all, does not Christ acknowledge himself to be on a perfect equality with mankind? Does he not himself, by word and deed, as it were, repudiate for himself perfect goodness?

Certainly his likeness to us in his ethical nature may not be abridged or curtailed. He was not merely in a physical and intellectual, but in an ethical, point of view, not absolutely complete from the first. He learned obedience. He proved and maintained his sympathy with us in its fullest power only after he was rejected by mankind. He grew in favor, not only with men, but with God. Growth points back to previous deficiency, or, what is the same thing, forwards to an absolute goal, to which the reality approaches only by degrees. Now, if deficiency in entire perfection were identical with sinfulness, then certainly all real humanity and sinfulness would be identical. But the ethical goal of perfection prescribes a gradual attainment, and excludes the finishing stroke from the begin-



ning. Absolute normality consists well enough with the reality of progress. If the complacency of God rests on every stage of a normal progress, it surely may also be said that it rests upon it in a higher degree, the nearer it has come to the goal of perfection, because abnormal possibilities have been in the same degree overcome, and the condition of immutable confirmation, of the absolute union of ethical freedom and of the ethical necessity has already advanced so much nearer. This leads to a *second* thing which we must attribute to real humanity, the liability to temptation, the passing through conflicts and temptations.

Jesus says himself that he had been in *πειρασμοῖς*, not once only, in what we are accustomed to call *the temptation*, but also on other occasions, and subsequently (Luke 4 : 13 ; 22 : 28). Some, as Schleiermacher, in order to guard his sinlessness, seek to weaken the force of this, by admitting in him only conflicts with outward foes, but not internal temptations at all. Others see in this a proof that even Jesus did not continue free from sin. Both agree in this, that all internal conflict of man with the good involves an evil desire, though only in germ. Hence the petition in Gethsemane, "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me", and the temptation in the wilderness, are either not historical facts, as Schleiermacher contends, or prove that even in Jesus there were stirrings of the germ of evil, though, as Menken and Irving maintain, it was always held in check, and never penetrated into the personal life which was to regenerate and transform our assumed sinful nature. This last view is so far correct, that Christ had a real moral task, not only external to himself, but in himself, which could not be solved at the beginning, if he was to be like us ; that his corporeal nature had not in and of itself spiritual impulses and discipline in subjection to the will of the spirit ; that it had not by nature the same law of life with the spirit, but was first only, so to speak, loosely connected with the spirit, and its complete union with the spirit as a promptly ministering organ, consenting even to the self-sacrifice to which it was called, could only be the result of an ethical process ; that this union of the spirit with the psychical and bodily life was a real labor

and might become a conflict. But the opinion is wrong, that this loose connection, which was gradually to attain perfect unity, or that the assumed bodily nature, as such, is evil in itself. That the bodily and physical nature of man shrinks from suffering and death, is not evil, but belongs to its (metaphysical) perfection. The opposition which natural inclination makes to suffering and death is perfectly innocent, and so very proper in its place, that a longing on the part of the sensitive human nature of Christ for suffering and death would rather have been unnatural, and would have deprived his self-sacrifice of its value. It would have converted it into a seeking of his own. Moreover, to this innocent conflict in Jesus were added traditions, hallowed by antiquity, and by the authority of his dearest associates, as well as by the Messianic anticipations of the whole people, above which he could not, from his birth, be exalted, but only by the severe toil of acquiring knowledge and fathoming the true will of God; and as these traditions and still more the temptations of the prince of this world might possibly have led him to flee from suffering, or to make a wrong use of that conflict, which was innocent in itself, but capable of leading to sin, we have grounds enough for discerning the necessity of a severe conflict prepared for him, while we have no warrant to infer sin from the fact of such a conflict; as, on the contrary, the cessation of this struggle would furnish a proof that the ethical process imposed on him had come to a dead lock.

It is true we have not, before his baptism, any trace of such conflicts and temptations. Though we may not question the severe internal discipline of Jesus up to the time of his baptism, his learning obedience towards his parents,\* his silent

\* His obedience to his parents is also expressly mentioned in the period after his twelfth year, Luke 2: 51. The record of his first visit to a feast is by no means recorded as one of an act of disobedience, or of mistake on the part of the boy Jesus. Jesus knows nothing of the departure and anxiety of his parents about him; and, summary as the record is, it nevertheless shows that a child-like certainty possessed the mind of Jesus that he was not staying in the temple against the will of his parents, but that his pleasure in holy things would rejoice them, and that they would make no effort to tear him away from them until he had refreshed and satisfied himself. Only the unfounded assumption of an omniscience of the

perseverance, notwithstanding the sharp contrast between his higher self-consciousness, as it manifested itself after his twelfth year, and his lowly condition,\* yet the harder struggles were spared for the last years of his life. His earlier life of retirement bears, in comparison with this, as it seems to us, the character of an even, clear mirror, of an untroubled, quiet stream, in which was reflected man's approval of such a symmetrical youth, as well as the complacency of God, Luke 2 : 52. It was no disorder in him, but the disorder and sin without him, which occasioned him the contests, temptations, sufferings, which filled his official life. These later conflicts were only assigned him because he remained the pure One, had become morally harmonious in the midst of moral anarchy; but they were still inward and personal struggles;

boy Jesus, whereby he would have had knowledge of the pain of his mother, would make the matter difficult. Such, however, does not consist with his questioning the teachers.

\* Forebodings of the conflicts, which the history of the temptation fully unfolds, may, under the above aspect, have occurred in the period before the baptism, when the divine seal and testimony of God's approbation was stamped on his former life. From his twelfth year he knew God to be in a special sense his Father; and as the difference of his pure nature from that of other men could not escape him, so a wish to serve and help the world and his people would as certainly be excited in him, as his heart was full of love. Just as we cannot assume that he had a definite consciousness of his calling as Redeemer while still a boy and youth,† when his task was rather personally to be about his Father's business, and to be, both at home and in the temple, absorbed in divine things, so this, his calling, must certainly have dawned upon him before his baptism. On this occasion, however, he is said to have sought and found the divine seal to it, the Father's answer to the question awakened in the heart of the Son, regarding the work of his life. The superficial opinion of Strauss, Pécaut, and others, that this coming of Jesus to baptism proves his consciousness of sin, would then only be worthy of regard if the baptism of John, historically viewed, could be proved to have had the exclusive design of working repentance. But, according to the Gospels, it had the more comprehensive design to prepare for the dawn of the kingdom of God, and to invite men to the resolution, to which Jesus had also in his way dedicated himself, ver. 12, to subordinate and sacrifice everything to the kingdom of God. Thus Jesus apprehended his baptism, as he places it in closest connection with his submission to suffering, and with his sacrifice for the world, Luke 12 : 50; Mark 10 : 38, 39. Compare my article on the baptism of Jesus in *Piper's Evang. Kalender*, 1860.

† Christ's own language, when a boy of twelve years (Luke 2 : 49), would seem to imply the very opposite.—Ed. B. & F. E. R.

for he was to introduce the power of his harmony and his sufferings, in order to overcome the disharmony in the world. He, the righteous one, must, as it were, in a way of suffering, take upon himself disorder and disharmony, must live through it, and taste it, in order to establish a power which is not only harmonious in itself, but so potent in harmony as to take the disharmony into itself, master it, and transform it into harmony.

The impression that the labors and the conflicts of his *public* life were not, in the ordinary sense, a moral conflict in Jesus himself, but only external, because his ethical self-cultivation had reached its goal at his baptism, has been constantly urged from ancient times. It is not in that case purity defending itself against possible disharmony, and ever more and more excluding that possibility; but it is virtue seeking out external disharmonies, and rectifying them by its own harmony, which forms the character of his public life; and to this work his entire organism, soul and body, must be devoted, in spite of the natural and just resistance that health has to sickness, life to death, purity to the touch of impurity. To this promptness of sacrifice the organism was to become accustomed, not that Jesus might thus acquire purity and personal virtue, but that he might approve his personal virtue in his high office by self-sacrifice.

It is an inadequate view to make this manifestation of his moral perfection something so different from the common duty of all men, as is done on the theory that there was in him only a divine freedom, bound to no law, in which also his humanity participated. He is, it is said, the free Son of God, whose moral duty involved no such self-sacrifice. He is Lord of the law, and therefore did not need to fulfil it for himself. Whatever moral arbitrariness appears in this phraseology is blameworthy. Such a freedom from the law as would make him the master of it, and which is said to be imparted by the *Communicatio idiomatum* to the humanity of Jesus, so that without detriment to the moral perfection he might have acted as he pleased, simply according to his own choice, is a misconcep-

tion. Arbitrariness dwells not with God. Such a super-ethical elevation would rather be a falling below the ethical—because it belongs to the mere category of absolute omnipotence, nay, is subject to it; and the real humanity of Jesus, his identity of nature with us, would not be consistent with it. If he be the sinlessly Holy, he is certainly also the Free, and high above the level of the law, but only in such a way that law has become life and reality in him. He does not first become good and virtuous through his ministry, he but executes it in the power of his own virtue; yet his ministry, as is the case with every man in every normal work, is so thoroughly interwoven with his person, that he could only maintain himself in the position he assumed at his entrance on his mission by responding to his calling, and yielding to the new sacrifices which the will of God imposed upon him in it—sacrifices which, as above mentioned, touch the innermost constitution of his harmoniously-ordered personal character, imposing a certain inward experience of the disharmony without. But however unique and peculiar his mission, and however thoroughly free and devoted his love, so far forth as this, that we could have no legal claim to it, still it was not his at his mere discretion, if he were morally perfect, to be and to exercise such love. There was a higher moral necessity for him; without it he would not have been morally perfect; and however different the measure of his powers from that of others, he could satisfy that love which acted in him so divinely free and divinely wise only by placing all these powers entirely at its service—just the same as is also the case in our higher law of life.

Hence, because he was and remained genuinely human in his calling, however unique, we are not to conclude that he exhibited a different kind of morality from that which passes current among men; that he was elevated above the moral obligations of the family, the moral duty of obedience to authorities, and the moral right of property; that he could regard all these only as far as he pleased, and that he might violate general human duties in these respects in the interest of his

higher calling, and in virtue of the greatness of his person.\* In the moral domain the higher includes the lower, preserves and confirms it *in its place*. The opposite view would lead to

\* My excellent friend, the late Professor Bonifas, of Montauban, whose early loss I bitterly lament for myself, and still more for science, especially in the French Church—for, after his fair first fruits, distinguished service was to be expected from him—said many beautiful things in his article in the *Esperance*, on Pécaut's writing, in which I perfectly concur. But when he explains some facts in the life of Jesus, on the supposition that the usual moral laws incumbent on us were not incumbent on him, this appears to me hazardous, and superfluous for the object in view. Hazardous, because then Christ would not have exhibited our human morality, and into it would have entered what christologically borders on Docetism, and morally borders on Antinomianism, and which would bring into question the universal, eternal, and absolute character of morality. The consequence would be the necessity of conceding a purely empirical or positivist origin to ordinary morals. But no such expedient is necessary. As to the objection that Jesus did injury to the Gadarenes, Matt. 8, it would be pertinent only in case he had either willed this injury or known it beforehand. There is no ground for the first supposition; rather, it is certain enough that the casualty, which also by the way shut him out from the Gadarenes, happened without his will.† Certainly this issue of the affair would at once have occurred to any one, if we put the matter as is so often done: Jesus permitted the devils to go into the swine. But that is not the statement of the evangelists; and if any one will not believe their narrative, they must not seek to derive argument from them against the sinlessness of Jesus. They record that the *demons* prayed him not to banish them back into the abyss, but to be permitted to go into the herd. Jesus does not *command* them to do that; he only permits them, as he does not banish them, as they feared, into the abyss. Since he does not do this, they retain liberty, not immediately, it is true, but yet mediately to do damage to men. This liberty they use in such a manner, that they seek by means of it to damage the cause of Jesus. But we have no right to assert that it belonged to the official prescience of Jesus to prevent what they would do to the herd of swine, or that his power should ward off damage to property, which may come equally by storm, tempest, or pestilence. Compare Trench, Notes on the Miracles of our Lord, ed. 5, 1856, pp. 151–180. The same thing holds good of the cursing of the fig-tree, in which it is not at all certain, that damage was really done by it, an unfruitful fig-tree being no better than barren wood. The action of Jesus, however, is no miracle of display, whose object was annihilation, but a symbolical action, the object of which was an awe-inspiring warning of the people and city of Jerusalem for their repentance unto life, a warning of impending judgment; for Israel is the unfruitful fig-tree, which cumber the ground, and which is cut down, because it does not improve, is rich only in leaves above others; that is, promising, pretentious, but disappointing hope (in the fig-tree, leaves certainly warrant us to look for fruit, because the fruit comes before the leaves). (Compare Luke 13: 6–9; Trench, p. 439.)

† The language of Jesus, *ἀπάγετε*, is plainly a permissive imperative; and it is more natural to regard the event, with Lisso, as an act of punitive discipline upon the Jewish proprietors driving a trade not in harmony with their Jewish religion.—ED. B. & F. E. R.



various species of moral goodness according to Roman Catholic doctrine, and would introduce inner contradictions and caprice into the moral world. But we must emphasize *in its place*. God is the highest good; without him or contrary to him, nothing may be loved or spared.\* Thus every thing depends

\* When Jesus (John 2 : 4), with a severe word, directs his mother to the exercise of patience, and does not allow her to interfere with his calling (as he deals with Peter similarly, Matt 16 : 22), he gave her something which she needed, if she was to come to faith in him. He faithfully observed the duty of a son, even in his last words on the cross (John 19 : 2). But for Mary (as in a less degree for his brothers) it was, from obvious reasons, more difficult than for others to subordinate herself to him as her Redeemer, on whom she, as well as others, must believe. Hence love to her, which could not exist without truthfulness, could not otherwise evince itself than by the fact that he could concede nothing more to her than to others, when he was acting and speaking in his office. By placing her in the position becoming her, which she soon feels (John 2 : 5), he lightens and facilitates her faith as much as possible, and imparts a counterpoise to the customary intercourse of their lives. He honors her as his mother, but not at the expense of his Father, of his office, and of true love to her soul.—Things which in themselves do not possess moral necessity and utility, and belong only to conventional propriety, Jesus did not allow when he foresaw that there would grow out of them danger and violence to that salutary and decisive step in life which was just on the point of becoming ripe. Thus he addresses him who would first go bid farewell to those who were at home at his house, before he will follow him, "No man having put his hand to the plow, and looking back, is fit for the kingdom of God". And to him who would leave him again, in order to bury his father, he said, on the one hand, that the dead body of his father would not lack burial, and that his presence was not required for the last honors to be paid to it; and, on the other hand, he calls him away from this over-estimate of a service for the dead, which to Jesus himself is only a single symbol of the spiritual deadness of this man's life, to the divine fountain of life, to fellowship with God, to whom even the dead live (Luke 20 : 38), and who, little as he desires outward sacrifices and gifts from children at the expense of the necessity of parents (Matt. 15 : 4-6), will as little permit a filial love which places the soul in the background, but rather claims the heart of man, and infuses into it a still higher than natural love to parents. The hating of fathers and mothers (Luke 14 : 26) is manifestly to be understood *cum grano salis*, and cannot be taken in any other sense than the hating of our own life, demanded in the same place. Everywhere is zeal and conflict with natural affection demanded, when it idolatrously and self-contentedly interferes with the higher love; but the self-denial and the struggle against such ungodly love which is here demanded is itself again only a condition of true life and of the resurrection of true love (Luke 17 : 23; Matt. 19 : 29; Luke 14 : 26).—With regard to the decisive step which Christ demands, namely, to seek first the kingdom of God, and leave all other goods behind, and to count as gain all loss in money, property, honor among men, the reference is, of course, to the period of Jesus' sojourn on earth, the outward disruption of previous employ-

on understanding what is truly, that is, divinely good; not what is conventionally moral, or that certain moral notions prevalent in a particular age or nation are, without examination, to be made a rule by which to measure Jesus, instead of first rectifying our own views of the moral, as we have seen above in relation to the Pharisees. But a word about this below.

But does not Jesus himself say to the young man: "Why callest thou me good? No one is good save God alone." (Matt. 19: 16, and following verses.) Some have interpreted this as a reproof to the youth for regarding him as a good human master, instead of the Son of God. Certainly Jesus did not mean to point him away from himself to God—to a God who had nothing to do with the sending of Jesus—as if the youth had no need of Jesus. It is true he does not say to him, Thou hast not kept the commandments, as thou thinkest, from youth up; but tells him that he is not perfect, and invites him to follow him, which would reveal to him still more. Nor are the words of Jesus to be understood as implying that voluntary poverty would make him perfect, for the demand to renounce his goods is only the negative side of the summons to

ments and relationships being then a condition of following Jesus, such as is no more the case. Jesus, in whom the kingdom of God was embraced, could only be in one place at one time; and, consequently, all who sought the kingdom of God must also join his train, and break with old relationships. After his exaltation, the gospel of the kingdom had more and more omnipresence—nay, it worked as a leaven on earthly relationships. Hence, in order to draw near to Christ, it usually requires only the separation of times for retirement and self-recollection, rather than a change of place or calling. The exposition just given explains a series of passages which on a superficial consideration have given offence, or which do not seem to harmonize with pure moral conceptions, because many have found in them the implication that the true following of Christ is inconsistent with the pursuit of an ordinary calling, with riches, or the administration of property, or even with entrance into the marriage relationship. (Compare Matt. 9: 9, 5, 29, and following verses; 6: 25, and following verses; 10: 37-39; 12: 48, and following verses; 13: 24-26; 19: 21; Luke 6: 24; 16: 1, 19; 18: 23; 12: 33.) Connected with this, it is also worthy of observation, that the first limitation of the kingdom of God to local boundaries, just because it involved the necessity of separation from house and home to follow Christ, won for itself the means of overcoming those limits by introducing numerous laborers into the mission service, and thus procuring room and material for a second stage of the kingdom of God, the systematic, ethical elevation of earthly relationships.

follow Jesus, which he would no longer need, if he had already kept the law from his youth up, or if he could have earned for himself a supererogatory perfection by his voluntary poverty. Verse 23 shows plainly that in the eyes of Jesus the youth was outside the kingdom of God, to which he was only approaching by the inquiries made of Jesus. Thus there is no doubt that the design of Jesus was to keep him near himself, not to send him away to God without Christ; and equally certain is it that he would have led him to the true knowledge of Jesus himself in due time. But the first thing needful for him, as Jesus perceived from his light and liberal use of the word "good", was self-knowledge, not the preaching of Christ's mission and dignity, for the comprehension of which the prerequisites were still lacking; and upon these, according to the method which he evidently followed in other cases, Jesus was silent. The youth thought that he was done with the task of the law, and inquired after a new one, since the law gave, indeed, temporal promises, but not the promise of eternal life. To attain self-knowledge, he required to be awakened to a sense of God as holy, as alone good; to discern the difference or contrast between God and the world, which he, in relation to goodness, was disposed to place so near to God, that there would be no absolute necessity for either a perfecting or a redeeming revelation of God. The intention of the passage, therefore, is not to deny the goodness of Christ's person, or positively to declare what he is, but to reprove the thoughtless ascription of goodness to a master at the expense of the fear of God, the source of good, and to tell the youth in one striking sentence, fitted to win on his heart from its very humility, his fundamental error—namely, that he was dealing too lightly with goodness. That Jesus meant to assert sinfulness of himself is impossible; for with this his other declarations concerning himself and his office as the Redeemer contained in the synoptical gospels, as well as in John, and the position which he assigns himself in reference to the kingdom of God, would not harmonize. The evangelists, as well as the primitive church, never understood the word in that sense. But certainly Jesus could hardly say, There is none good save God

only, if he had not distinguished himself, the man, with the goodness belonging to him, from the divine Being himself, and that, too, not only so far as God is the original source of all goodness, (for the perfect cause might also have a perfect effect), but because all earthly creature-goodness cannot be called perfectly good, as it is not yet perfected or raised above temptations and mutability. Hence the passage bears testimony anew to the complete real manhood of Christ in his ethical character, but not to any participation on his part, even the least, in human sinfulness. For his participation in the misery of human sin, there is place, according to the evangelists, only in the sense that his love permitted the disharmony without him to exercise an influence on his susceptibilities (see above). Hence the Christian mind will ever view it only as a profanation of his love, when his soul-agony in Gethsemane, and his sufferings on the cross, even to desertion by God—suffering which his own self-forgetting love brought upon him, and which is the brightest manifestation of his pure divine soul—are explained as a confession, an admission of his sinfulness.

He was perfect man in growth and progress, in his temptations and conflicts, but without any historical trace of a flaw or blemish in his life. He was in all points made like to us, without being necessitated to become like us as sinners. For sin is the negation of the truly human. He laid claim to no exceptional law for himself, as a privileged individual, but subjected himself to the universal human moral law. With this he was satisfied, but this, in its purity, depth, and fulness, he fulfilled. He knew nothing of, and would have nothing to do with, a super-moral religious genius. His religion is moral, his morality religious.

It is true, in one respect, it may seem that he lacked that which all other men have—namely, the peculiar *individuality* of virtuous character. His moral character, as it addresses us in the gospels, bears not the impress of any particular time or nationality, but reveals the eternal beauty of universal morality, of generic humanity in the deepest sense, refreshing, humbling, and yet elevating the inmost heart of every age, and

race, of every century, to which his image is unveiled. It is a prerogative of all that is classic, and even of the classic in ethics, that there breathes in it an air of the eternal—an air of unfading ideality. His portrait, as the evangelists sketch it for us, with the emphasis of artless simplicity, the strength of which lies in its truth, places before every susceptible mind a historical personage irradiated by moral ideas and moral truth in all the loveliness and power of reality. In the contemplation of him, the seeker after a living knowledge of human good stops to breathe again; here he rests, for every one's conscience shouts, as it were, exultingly to him, as if at last THE MAN had appeared, or as if the conscience of mankind had now become an objective and living reality. Moreover, what he carried on as his *calling* did not lie, as with us, in a single region of human existence, but it is directed to what is central, to the setting of mankind right in their relation to God, and to the truly universal and human in every man, whence the renewing life-blood is to flow into all the spheres of human existence. In this, too, lies the marvel of his character, that his acting and discourse do not run into the vague and the abstract; his character does not leave the impression of the flat, the feeble, the tame, the monotonous. Rather, we must say, so far as one understands by individuality, the opposite to the undefined and undeveloped, that he exhibits the most definite and clearly marked character. His peculiar distinguishing individuality just lies in this, that he exhibits in his own person what is essentially and truly human, and, that, too, in a manner fraught with saving power. The delusion is common that the good in itself would be monotonous and tame, and that it is indebted for its loveliness and color, not to its creative power and originality, but to the evil, its opposite. The picture of this life-full finished character is the triumph over this dead opinion, which makes good the eternal debtor of evil, and evil and death the dispenser of life.

Thus he lived as an individual, just like others, and along with them; but there was in him the power of the universal. He was THE MAN absolutely, for whom the enlightened part of mankind waited, a Plato as well as the prophets. And hence

his calling is "the calling of callings", the central calling, touching the principle of life in humanity, on which depends the power and the imperishableness of all individualities. For they win eternal life only as they incorporate into their individuality that essential excellence, which is at once divine and human, and became real in his individual person. He is the Son of Man.

*II. How Christ's Sinless Holiness can be historically known.*

If the holy, sinless character of Jesus is perfectly human, it is then also *knowable*, a revelation of the idea of what is truly human, not in doctrine only, but in fact. It is not a mere mystery, believed on foreign authority; but a historical certainty of his sinlessness and moral perfection is attainable. There are, we conceive, many errors abroad in this respect. Too much is usually conceded to those who deny that Christ's moral perfection can be historically evinced; and it is forgotten withal that a revelation which does not really reveal, and cannot give a certainty regarding itself, would be no revelation, but a mere secret, the purport of which men perchance take for granted according to some agreement.

Yet let us hear the objections to this knowableness. It is said, we lack sources of information as to the early years of Jesus' life. The early life of Jesus, therefore, cannot with certainty be pronounced sinless. We reply, the credibly reported purity of his later life guarantees the earlier. All the errors of earlier life leave scars in us, of which in Jesus we observe none. And if those who associated with him from youth up, as Mary and even his at first obstinate brothers, subsequently became, as no one denies, sincere believers in him as their Redeemer, have we not in this a weighty testimony that sin was never detected in him, and that they received from him a deep impression of a holy life? From this point of view, the passage in Luke 2: 51, 52, which without doubt goes back to the source of the holy family itself, like the entire narrative of the first visit to the temple, receives a high significance. What his relatives perceived was obedience to his parents, growth in wisdom and in favor with God and man.



Further, it is said the sources of information for the time of his public life are imperfect. We have indeed the words and deeds of Jesus; but important as are these for forming a judgment as to his moral character, still we see not his demeanor and bearing, the glance of the eye, the tone of the voice; all this is wanting to us, so that a sure judgment is not possible. To this finally it is added, that in morals everything depends on the heart, which always remains hidden from human gaze. With regard to the first of these statements, we certainly have not that visible presence which the disciples had; but we know from them what impression his character produced. We hear them speak of the gracious words which proceeded from his mouth; of the eye which lingered lovingly on the rich young man, which shed tears at the grave of Lazarus, and as he gazed on Jerusalem; of the heart-piercing glance which revealed to Peter the pain of denied love, and with irresistible power filled him with bitter repentance. On the other hand, we hear of the power of his discourse, and of the dignity and majesty of his appearance. "We saw his glory, a glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." We have thus enough in this respect to know that demeanor, gesture, tone, were not in contradiction, but in perfect harmony, with the divine nobility which beamed from his speech and action.\* With respect, however, to the alleged necessary se-

\* Even in the purification of the temple, at which Pécaut takes great offence, the result cannot be understood by a passionate, uncontrolled vehemence on the part of Jesus, but only from the awe-inspiring, majestic impression made by his person, for which the uncultivated and rough showed more susceptibility than highly-cultivated but spiritually-blunted minds (John 7 : 32, 45, 46). When Pécaut presumes to censure the purification of the temple, whether as to its form or substance, it is surprising that he combats the authority of Jesus, which those whom it concerned did not dare to do. For certainly they would willingly have punished him; but they must have had good ground to let the matter drop, after a feeble protest, in which their conscience must have convinced them of a gross neglect of duty. How important was this act of Jesus when taken in connection with the current accusation against him on account of the temple! He performs it as a token how deeply he loved the people of God and his sanctuary, and how truly conservative his action was! Just before it he had wept over Jerusalem, while he was flooded round with Hosanna-cries, and knew beforehand the ruin of the temple. But he works while it is day; he gathers and warns as long as possible. The desecration of the temple is the precursor of the profane treatment

crecy of his feelings of love, it is forgotten that the ethical, the more inward it is, has an essential and intimate relation to actual life; and will reveal itself actively and passively therein; and that it would be tantamount to asserting the impotency of the ethical idea, and of ethical power, if it were said that, to manifest one's self, to let the heart, as it were, be gazed into, is indeed the highest necessity of love, but cannot be effected on account of the invisible character of the ethical; or, what amounts to the same thing, by the incapacity of the material, corporeal world to express and exhibit the truly moral.\*

The opponents of miracles in former days often appealed to their lack of adequate evidence, and thus sought to make them worthless. The sinless perfection of Jesus would be equally in vain—nay, would not have been perfectly real—if it could not be made historically evident. Of the miracles this much is to be said, that their opponents, in seeking to ground their impossibility on their contradiction to all the known laws of nature, do thus just assert, that they are easily distinguished from ordinary events, and also that they receive their light in connection with their cause and their divine end, thus confirming their connection with the higher world. Still closer is the connection between the sinless perfection of Jesus and the possibility of knowing it. For that love is not love which remains shut up in itself, and which has nothing for others. If it is the essential predicate of light that it is for the eye, and will illuminate not only itself but all things else; or of mind, that it is for mind; it is still much more the essence of mind in its reality, that is, as a loving personality, to aim to be for others, that a fellowship of love may be formed. Redeeming love cannot perfectly satisfy itself without this real self-revelation of its inmost heart, as all our salvation is based upon the

which they would inflict on him, the antitype of the temple. He reproves that desecration, because whoever approves it would much more easily misunderstand his holiness and sin against him.

\* Compare the profound word of the mystic master (Suso): "To whomsoever inwardness grows into outwardness, to him inwardness becomes more inward; for to him inwardness grows in inwardness".

knowledge of being loved by the prevenient love of God in Christ.

Earthly material is not so intractable as to be incapable of expressing the ideal. Falsehood, it is true, can attempt to speak the language of love and truth; selfishness can, for its purpose, borrow or purloin the expression of the heart, or its noble sign-language. But that only proves, that we must inquire whether the language of love is borrowed, but not that there is no language or expression of love; for, were there none, it would occur to no one to borrow it from love.

The assertion that the holiness of Jesus can be historically evinced certainly implies the acknowledgment of the possibility of 'deciding with historical certainty (not indeed with mathematical certainty, the acknowledgment of which can be wrung from the most morally insensible, provided only he has understanding) whether the deeds and words of Jesus were really the expression and revelation of his heart, or hypocrisy and dissimulation.

We mean not to waste a word on the question, whether Jesus was a hypocrite and liar. Even Pécant, the acutest and most open opponent of the sinlessness of Jesus in modern times, readily concedes to Jesus a high degree of moral perfection. But he should see that he has thereby given up the right to appeal from the manifest moral character of Jesus to the fact that the feelings of the heart cannot be discerned, in support of his theory, that we cannot surely know the sinlessness of Christ; for the picture of high moral perfection which he himself sees in Jesus does not permit the assumption that Jesus sought to reveal one thing in word and deed, while another, a worse, was in his heart. For if Jesus was as sincere and pure as Pécant will have it, then hypocrisy was far from him, as it was his deepest abomination;\* and then we have the revelations of his heart in all the manifestations of his life.

We, however, arrive at the same result, from another consideration. Where falsehood and hypocrisy assume the ap-

\* Compare, for instance, Matt. 23 : 6, 2, 5, 16; 7 : 5; 15 : 7; 16 : 3; 21 : 18; 24 : 51; Mark 7 : 6; Luke 12 : 1; 13 : 15.

pearance of goodness, it always happens that, being inexperienced in the region of love and truth, it attaches itself involuntarily to custom, mimics what is in some circle regarded as exquisitely pious or strictly moral, be it even in the inventing of new artistic or striking forms, which suit the prevailing moral tone on the one hand, and excite astonishment on the other, but has neither courage nor strength for the simplicity of moral originality. For where would be the intended success of the deception if one did not, even in an exaggerated way, use, and pay his way with, the sign-language or coin which was already current? But now it is evident that, in this very sphere, Jesus broke with the traditional views and expectations as to what is to be esteemed just, and pious, and good, and with their representatives; that he came into violent collision with them; and that he, with creative originality, set forth in his teaching, life, and sufferings, an example of moral excellence, directly opposed to the prevailing one, appealing to the primitive moral sense in man, commending itself to susceptible minds (much like a genuine work of art), and over-mastering them. This was only possible so far as he himself was possessed and filled by the glory of the truly and essentially good, which he knew and brought to light, seeking nothing but its victory and prevalence.

We say then, far from love being powerless to reveal itself in this earthly world, amid its chaotic and distracted relations, that this world is the very place where its glory may manifest itself most brilliantly. The earth, with its frailty and sin, is in such a state, that the external majesty and power of the Son of God must necessarily be concealed and abide in mystery, and could not be revealed, at least in all their fulness; while, on the contrary, his sinless, holy love could nowhere more clearly manifest itself than just in conflict with the world's sin in behalf of righteousness. We add, it *has* revealed itself, but *only* to *susceptible* minds. There were and are blind persons who do not see this glory, much like as harmonies pass over the unmusical unheard, or like a disconnected volume of sound.

Christ's sinless perfection can be objectively known. It had the will and power to make itself known or manifest, as that

which it really was in its essence. He who calls it unknowable, lays the blame, as usually happens, on optical delusions, on the object, and not on himself. In opposition to coarse empiricism of every form we take for granted, that truth is not found merely in the sensible and palpable, but rather that the palpable itself cannot be apprehended and understood without mind, spirit, and spiritual principles; that, on the other hand, we are not limited in our knowing to the naked intellectual forms of logical or mathematical principles, and so shut up in thought within ourselves. But as it is given to the will, without losing itself, to have a being beyond itself in love, so is it given to knowledge; more precisely, it is given to the spirit of love to be self-conscious in itself, and yet, at the same time, to have a being in its object. True knowledge or wisdom is the love of thought, love incorporated with *thought*; as the ethical and the good is love incorporated with the *will*. As in contemplating a work of art, we seize the idea of beauty itself, but *in* the reality, so we maintain that in *that* life which stands before us as the highest ethical work of art, that is, in the life-portrait of Jesus, the idea of the good is capable of being apprehended by every one, as it is presented to every one, though not every one can appreciate it without some preparation; and it is presented there life-like, not as mere thought, but as reality. As we have this life before us only in written documents, it may indeed be asked, Is it reality or is it fiction? That we here find an exhibition of the very ethical idea in its glory is perhaps conceded. But is this representation only the moral idea made objective in the guise of reality, a mere poetic legend, whether intentional or unintentional; or is it the historical record of a real life lived upon earth? To this the simple counter question might suffice, where, in all history, is there a historical personage that has drawn such deep furrows in the inmost nature of mankind, as Jesus of Nazareth, whose historical existence no one doubts? But, still more directly, the historical evidence can strictly evince that the moral phenomenon of Jesus is historical reality, not fiction.

As we have already seen that the doubt whether Jesus's representation of himself may not have exhibited something better

than perhaps was personally in him, or that the mistrust about his inner truthfulness can only be proved or refuted by seeing what he himself really was by the actual facts of his life ; so too the sum of his life and character can alone furnish a decision on the point whether his character is a myth or historic reality.

In next proceeding to address ourselves to the consideration of these activities of his life, we believe we may safely make the assertion, that the contemplation of the living character of Jesus awakes in every true conscience the lively concrete idea of absolute purity and sinless perfection. We believe, too, that it can be proved on historical grounds that Jesus awakens this idea by his life recorded in the Gospel, and not merely by his words and deeds ; and further, that his followers did not invent his portraiture, but found it and looked upon it ; that they did not create it, but described it as well as they could. But yet we are far from the assumption, that real faith in the union of the ideal and the historical can be attained by demonstration. On the contrary, we reckon it as a reserved right of the Head of the Church and of his majesty, that it perpetually evinces itself as creative, and that he commits it to none but himself to reveal himself to his own, and to give them the assurance that he knows and loves them. To know him is in fact due to his perpetual self-manifestation, a power and virtue essentially inherent in himself, without which he would not be the Redeemer ; just as the holy Scripture could no more hold its normal position, if we ceded its *perpicuitas* or *semet ipsam interpretandi facultas* to any other court.

[TO BE CONTINUED.]



## ART. III.—BULGARIAN POPULAR SONGS.

By ELIAS RIGGS, D.D., Missionary of the A.B.C.F.M., at Constantinople.

[THE following communication from Dr. Riggs was read before the American Oriental Society at its recent semi-annual meeting in Princeton, N. J. To Professor W. D. Whitney, the Secretary of that Society, we are indebted for the permission to publish these admirable translations in the pages of this REVIEW.—EDS.]

THE following pieces are selected from a collection of Bulgarian popular songs recently published, *Bulgarski Narodni Pesni*, collected by Demetrius and Constantine Miladinov, Agram 1861, pp. 542, 8vo. I have rendered them in the measure of the original and very literally. The reader will be struck with the resemblance of these compositions to the song of Hiawatha, in which, if Mr. Longfellow has given us, as I suppose, a fair specimen of the style and composition of Indian Songs, the coincidence is truly remarkable. The measure, the absence of rhyme, the repetition of words from the close of one line in the beginning of the next, and the repetition of entire lines in a question and its answer, or in a promise and the story of its fulfilment, appear alike in both.

This collection consists of more than six hundred pieces, large and small, all professedly taken from the mouths of illiterate common people, and is one of the largest volumes yet printed in the Bulgarian language.

The measure of which the first two pieces are specimens is the one most used. Other songs exhibit lines of various lengths, from five to seventeen syllables. The themes too are various. Some are heroic, some erotic. Some exhibit religious legends, fables of the doings of fairies or dragons, or the contests of saints with monsters inhabiting pools or fountains. The whole present an interesting picture of the traditions and fancies prevailing among the mass of the Bulgarian people.

CONSTANTINOPLE, June, 1862.

ELIAS RIGGS.

## IVAN POPOFF AND THE FAIRY.

Our he started, Ivan Popoff,  
To go off on Easter Sunday,  
Easter Sunday, to his ploughing;  
He had gotten about half way  
When there issued out a fairy,  
A wild fairy of the mountain,  
And she stopped the way before him.

"Turn you, turn you, Ivan Popoff,  
Don't go out on Easter Sunday,  
Easter Sunday to your ploughing."  
Ivan handsomely her answered:

"Get away, away, you fairy,  
Or I'll down from off my courser,  
By your flaxen hair I'll catch you,  
And I'll tie you to my courser,  
To the tail of my swift courser,  
And I'll drag you like a harrow."

Then the fairy she was angry,  
And her flaxen hair she loosened,  
And she tripped up his swift courser,  
Longing his black eyes to swallow.

Then was angry Ivan Popoff,  
And he caught the wily fairy,  
By her flaxen hair he caught her,  
And he tied her to his courser,  
To the tail of his swift courser,  
And he dragged her like a harrow.  
Swiftly to his home he took her.

From afar he calls his mother:  
"Oh! come out, my dearest mother,  
For a bride to you I'm bringing,  
For a bride I bring a fairy,  
To relieve you, dearest mother,  
Wash the linen for my father,  
Comb the hair of little brother,  
Plait the tresses of my sister."

Then he locked up her right pinion  
In a parti-colored casket,  
And three years this bride lived with him,  
And a little son she bore him.  
Then she called a worthy sponsor,  
And her little son they christened;  
Then came in the sponsor's lady,

Thus accosted she the fairy :

"Fairy bride, now dance a little,  
Let us see a fairy dancer."

Thus replied to her the fairy :

"Listen to me, worthy sponsors,  
Let but Ivan Popoff give me,  
Let him give me my right pinion,  
Then I'll dance for you with pleasure."

"Ah ! but fairy bride, we doubt you,  
You'll escape, for you are faithless."

"If you doubt me, Ivan Popoff,  
If you fear that I'll escape you,  
Then the door securely fasten,  
Fasten too the gate securely,  
Then I'll dance for you with pleasure."

So the door secure they fastened,  
Fastened too the gate securely.  
But as she began her dancing,  
Quick she flew from out the chimney.

Then her mother-in-law called her :

"Fairy bride, but baby's crying,  
Crying to be rocked and suckled."

Thus to her the fairy answered :

"When for me my baby's crying,  
Baby's crying to be suckled,  
Tuck him close under the rafters,  
And a gentle dew I'll shed there,  
And I'll nurse my little baby.  
When for me my baby's crying,  
Baby to be rocked is crying,  
There upon the bed you lay him,  
And a gentle breeze I'll blow there,  
And I'll rock my little baby."

So her mother-in-law cheated,  
When she heard the baby crying,  
Baby crying to be rocked,  
Then upon the bed she laid him,  
But no breeze the fairy blew him,  
But she came herself, the fairy,  
Came and took away the baby,  
And she thus accosted Ivan :

"Ah ! but look here, Ivan Popoff,  
Did you think that you could hold me,  
Think that you could hold a fairy,  
Have a fairy for a mistress ?"

## ANNA THE CUCKOO.

SOMETHING white and something waving,  
On white Belashetzar's summit,  
Can it be the drifted snow-banks?  
Can it be the swan's white plumage?  
No 'tis not the drifted snow-banks,  
No 'tis not the swan's white plumage,  
But 'tis only one white tent there,  
Under which the youthful Stoyan,  
Youthful Stoyan sick is lying.  
Thus did he accost his sister:

"Hark, my sister dear, fair Anna,  
Go, dear Anna, bring me water  
From the cool and foaming Danube."

Anna thus her brother answered:

"Ah! my brother, youthful Stoyan,  
But I do not know the way there,  
Know the way to foaming Danube,  
Either going or returning."

Stoyan spoke and thus he answered:

"Listen, sister, my poor Anna,  
Cut a gash upon your finger,  
Cut and let the crimson blood run,  
Then as you go down the mountain,  
Mark the trees and rocks in passing;  
When you reach the foaming Danube,  
Fill your jug with its cool water,  
Then return as you descended,  
By the marks your way discerning."

Anna listened to her brother,  
Cut a gash upon her finger,  
Then she started down the mountain,  
Marked the trees and rocks in passing;  
When she reached the foaming Danube,  
Filled her jug with its cool water,  
Then on her return she started.

But alas! alas! poor Anna,  
Is it that the fine dew falling  
Has erased the marks you made there,  
All the marks of bloody crimson,  
Made on trees and rocks in passing?

So she lost her way, poor Anna,  
And she wandered down the mountain:  
With three days of weary walking,

Not a trace could she discover  
Of the way back to her brother,  
Back to her sick brother Stoyan.

Then she turned to Heaven, poor Anna,  
Sadly prayed: "O God of mercy!  
To a little bird now change me,  
Change me to a sky-blue cuckoo,  
Let me fly among the beeches,  
To my brother let me hasten,  
To my poor sick brother Stoyan."

And the Lord her prayer accepted;  
To a sky-blue bird he changed her,  
To a sky-blue bird, a cuckoo,  
And she still is singing: "*Cuckoo*."

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KING IVAN SHISHMAN.\*

In the dawning, listen to me, mother dear, dawning of the morning,  
Then it was that, listen to me, mother dear, there advanced an army,  
Ranks of horsemen, listen to me, mother dear, ranks of daring yeomen,  
And their sabres, listen to me, mother dear, like the sun in brightness;  
Fire gleams from them, listen to me, mother dear, through the verdant  
forest;

And their leader, listen to me, mother dear, is King Ivan Shishman;  
Thus he speaketh, listen to me, mother dear, he, King Ivan Shishman;  
God of forces, listen to me, mother dear, God, the great Creator,  
Kindly grant us, listen to me, mother dear, strength and noble daring,  
We shall battle, listen to me, mother dear, on the plain of Sofi,  
Shed our blood there, listen to me, mother dear, for the name of Christian,  
And will honor, listen to me, mother dear, there the faith of Christians.

\* The last King of the Bulgarians—slain in battle with the Turks in 1395.

#### ART. IV.—LABOULAYE ON THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

ÉTUDES MORALES ET POLITIQUES, par ÉDOUARD LABOULAYE, Membre de l'Institut, Avocat à la Cour Impériale de Paris, Professeur au Collège de France. 8vo. Paris. 1862. Pp. 389. Ibid. LES ÉTATS UNIS ET LA FRANCE. 8vo, pp. 72.

GERMANS discuss political affairs from the point of view of universal history; Englishmen from the standpoint of the British Isles; Frenchmen under the aspect of general culture and civilisation. In relation to our present national crisis, this difference between the French and the English has been displayed in a most marked manner, of course with exceptions on both sides. The cultivated mind of Great Britain, as a whole, has been inimical to the cause represented by the United States; the severance of this mighty Republic has been looked upon as a foregone conclusion. French writers, on the contrary, as a general rule, have stood fire in the belief that this country ought not to be dismembered—that the interests of humanity and the progress of mankind demand the continued union of these States. Even the recent bold proposition of the French government for an armistice is not advocated on the ground of a disruption; for France must naturally desire that this country remain one and powerful, as a counterpoise to England's naval supremacy. But, excepting this chimerical and unfriendly proposal, the voice of France, like that of Russia, like that of Germany, has been, on the whole, favorable to our continued unity.

The contrast is still more marked when we turn from the political to the moral bearings and sense of our conflict. On the high ground of moral progress and culture, the two ablest defenders of this country, in the time of its death-struggle



with the domineering and barbarizing slave-power, have been the two Frenchmen, De Gasparin and Laboulaye. Of the works of the former we have already given an account in the previous numbers of this REVIEW. Laboulaye is equally deserving of grateful recognition for the breadth of view, the manliness, and the humanity of his utterances, for a long series of years, in our behalf. And his words, being those of an eminent publicist, who writes with an almost judicial impartiality, if less impassioned than those of De Gasparin, may carry greater weight with many a candid thinker. And he is no novice in his utterances and predictions. For years, like De Tocqueville, he has carefully studied our history and institutions. For years he has been an eloquent and able defender, under even the imperial *régime*, of freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, freedom for all mankind. His varied learning, his professional reputation, his general philosophical and political views, as well as his mastery of the case, and his clear exposition of facts and principles, give him a rightful claim to be heard, as one speaking with authority on the momentous principles and issues involved in the conflict between freedom and slavery.

M. Laboulaye was born in Paris in 1811. Educated for the legal profession, he early obtained fame by a work on the *History of the Law of Real Estate, from Constantine to the Present Times*, published in 1839, and crowned by the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres. This was followed in 1840 by a life of the great German jurist, Savigny; in 1843 by an account of the *Civil and Political Condition of Woman in Ancient and Modern Times*—crowned by the Academy of Moral and Political Science; in 1845 by *Essays on the Criminal Law of the Romans, respecting the Responsibility of Magistrates*. In 1845 he was chosen a member of the Academy of Inscriptions; in 1849 he became Professor of Comparative Legislation in the Collège de France, of which he is one of the most illustrious members, his lectures being eagerly attended. He published *Contemporary Studies on Germany and the Slavic Nations* in 1855; on *Religious Liberty*, made up of eloquent and learned discussions, in 1858; on

*Literary Property in France and England*, 1858 ; an Introduction to the French translation of Channing's Works, discussing the question of *Slavery*, 1855 ; an edition of *Fleury's Institutes of French Law*, 2 vols., 1858. In the same year appeared the first volume of his *History of Political Institutions in the United States*, A.D. 1620—1783. Besides all this, he has contributed largely to periodical literature in the monthly reviews, and in the *Journal des Débats*. Some of these essays were collected in the works, above named, on Germany and on Religious Liberty. The volume referred to at the head of this article, *Moral and Political Studies*, is another collection, which, altogether apart from its bearing on our country, is worthy of being read by all students of philosophy and lovers of human culture and progress.

Of the seventeen papers which make up this volume, six are devoted to the United States, occupying about a third of the entire volume. The others are on the Divine Personality, Devotion, Mademoiselle de la Vallière, Christian Rationalism, the Western Monks, Philip II, the Near Horizons, the Letters of Everard, the Lottery, Bibliomania, and About a Catalogue. In these essays he shows an intimate acquaintance with the English and German literature, and a deep sympathy with all that concerns the religious, moral, and political benefit and progress of mankind. Modern infidelity, especially in its pantheistic form, he opposes with a keen logic and an elevated moral sense. He shows himself throughout a firm believer in God, freedom and righteousness. Of pantheism he discourses thus :

"The divine personality involves also our own ; and here it is that this question touches the depths of our souls. If God has neither will, nor liberty, nor consciousness ; if, in a word, he is not personal, we are indeed nothing. If there is in the world only one universal being of which we make a part ; if rock, plant, animal, man, are but different manifestations of this blind force, which does not know itself, what are we then but a drop of water in a torrent that rushes ever onward and never stops ? Talk to us of liberty, of virtue, of immortality ! all this may be our heritage, if we are dependent upon an intelligent and supreme goodness ; but all this is but an illusion, if we are an imperceptible atom in that Leviathan,

which we call the universe. In the midst of these phenomena, which pass in a flow, we no longer know where and what we are; as says the poet:

‘We are such stuff  
As dreams are made of, and our little life  
Is rounded with a sleep.’”

He then proceeds to discuss the various systems of atheism and pantheism—Comte, Spinoza, Hegel, and others, and displays a competent familiarity with the works bearing on this theme. Of Sir William Hamilton, he says that his system is in reality one “of philosophical scepticism”, since he makes God to be an object not of knowledge (science), but only of faith. “Without knowing it, Mr. Hamilton gives the hand to the school of sensualism, as well as to the pantheism of Hegel. . . . The only difference is, that in leaving us faith, he at the same time leaves us hope; he at least does not take from us the God whom our hearts need”. His critical examination of the system of Hegel we cannot follow in detail, but add a few of the closing sentences:

“After eighteen centuries, the wisdom of the day transports us back to the doubts of an expiring world. After eighteen centuries Christ speaks to us of God, of our souls, of salvation, of liberty, of duty, of justice, of truth, as if he were hearing our troubled voice, as if he responded to the cry of our troubled hearts. See what Hegel has brought forth in painful travail after a life of meditation and of research; study these tormenting constructions; follow his subtle reasonings, where words take the place of things; and now, take up the Gospel and read perchance a discourse of Christ; seek therein, not a dogma, but a philosophy; put fearlessly by the side of Spinoza and of Hegel the mild and serene person of Jesus. Where is the ideal of the true, the beautiful and the good? Where is the doctrine that can charm the greatest minds, and console the least? Where do you find the rule of life for man, the rule of duty, and of justice for the citizen? Where is life, where is hope?”

But in the midst of all the errors of speculation, M. Laboulaye preserves a profound and noble faith in the intimate union and alliance of philosophy and faith:

“In my view, Christians and philosophers are not sufficiently aware that the spiritual philosophy springs from the Gospel, and leads back to it those souls who feel the need of loving, as well as of knowing. Spiritual philosophers need Christianity; Christians need a spiritual philosophy. This

assertion may surprise these tranquil souls, who enjoy the peace of God and the Gospel, and fear tumult and discussion. But let them take heed; faith that does not reason and that disdains philosophy, is a faith insecurely poised, and exposed to more than one peril. . . . Bossuet and Fénelon were sufficiently Christian to have no fear of looking their faith in the face; sufficiently philosophic to see in the Gospel the highest and soundest of philosophies; the only system in which love and reason unite to lead us to God."

In illustration of his positions about the rights of conscience, and the relation of Church and State, we can only cite one or two passages from a lecture given at the Collège de France, February 5th, 1861:

"The Gospel, from its first days, has been propagated by raising up and quickening the human conscience. It is sometimes imagined that Europe was christianized as if by an overwhelming invasion of miraculous grace, without bringing the individual forces of the human spirit into action. This is a great mistake. The Gospel made its way, as all great political and religious convictions have done, by conquering to itself a free adhesion. It spread by gaining souls, one by one. Christ did not impose any merely external authority. He did not say, *be my disciple*, but, *will you be my disciple*? It was not outside of ancient society that Christianity developed itself, spreading itself alongside of it without touching it. We generally separate the first Christians too much from the world in the midst of which they lived. They were mixed up with it, and thus alone were they able to act upon it. In every society a strong conviction necessarily makes its influence felt. There are always a great number of people who have need of support, and who, by degrees, gather round a man of faith. In a free country this influence is not dangerous, for controversy despoils each opinion of the falsehood it contains, and truth alone abides. It is only under despotism that any opinion is certain to triumph, irrespective of its truth. Christianity triumphed, not simply because of the enlightenment it brought, for at the time in which it appeared, the Roman world was as enlightened as the world is now. Its philosophies were not defective in this respect, for the boasted scepticism and pantheism of our day are only the rejuvenescence of the religious faiths of that age of decadence. The souls of men wanted liberty, and the Gospel gave it. By freeing man from the dominion of the temporal, it restored his dignity, it formed his conscience, it taught him to die rather than renounce his faith. That was its glory."

"A return to the close alliance of the Church with the State has led, in France, to the persecutions of the Protestants. The eighteenth century, with its infidelity, grew out of that alliance, and in its turn the Church was oppressed. Finally, in our days, the great principle has been proclaimed

of the separation of the temporal and the spiritual, and we see churches founded upon this principle which ever abound and flourish increasingly."

But it is time for us to come to his writings upon the United States of America. In the preface to his last volume, he says:

"One of the greatest evils of our epoch is, that the Catholic Church, troubled as to its temporal interests, or menaced in its political institutions, distrusts modern ideas, and has only anathemas for those principles of 1789, from which our safety will one day come. This is a baleful misapprehension, from which religion is suffering no less than society. Nothing in the Gospel justifies this vain panic. Christianity is at once religion and the philosophy of liberty. It is in order to combat this error, and to annul this fatal divorce, that I have so often recurred to the institution of the United States. America, so badly judged in France, gives us the spectacle of a fruitful democracy that holds fast to the Gospel, and makes Christianity the essential condition of liberty. A people risking its fortunes upon the exorcism of slavery is the grandest sight that this nineteenth century has seen. Here is an example which ought not to be lost, and which I signalize for all pious souls, for all generous hearts, that do not despair of God or of the future."

The first of the six essays on our country is a general sketch, reviewing the works of Miss Bremer and of Pastor Grandpierre (1854); the second is on Education in America, noticing Everett's *Oration*, and Wimmer's *Church and School in North America*, published in 1853; the third grapples with the question of Slavery, *à propos* of Channing's works; the fourth is on the Presidential Message of 1856, and reviews the Kansas imbroglio; the fifth is on the Civil War in the United States, reviewing De Gasparin's first book, and Eyma's *American Republic*; the sixth on America and the French Revolution, is a discourse delivered at the Collège de France.

From these papers we select a few paragraphs giving M. Laboulaye's general views about our country, its institutions, and its prospects:

"A century hence, when the immense and fertile valleys of the United States shall contain a population of more than two hundred millions of men of the same language and race, secure upon a territory twelve times the extent of France, and twenty-five times as great as England, what will become of Europe, with its national divisions and jealousies, confronted with



this people, master of two oceans, and all-powerful in numbers and in union?"

"The nearer we come together the better shall we comprehend the solidarity of the two continents, and what I will call the European part played by America. While we attract this new society by the brilliancy of our civilisation, it draws us to itself by the spectacle of its youth, its audacity and its success. This reciprocal action is visible in the sphere of industry; there is no invention which does not at once pass beyond the seas and become a common benefit; it is the same, though less noted, in all that concerns science, letters, morals, politics, and religion; everywhere men try to march to the same step."

"From the political separation of Church and State, and the entire internal liberty of the churches, singular effects have resulted, setting at naught all previous calculations. As soon as believers alone were charged with the duty of supporting their own worship and propagating their faith, each one began to take a more lively interest in his own communion; each one made himself an apostle of his faith, and, at the same time, as a natural consequence of liberty wisely understood, each one has better respected the rights of others in proportion as he was jealous for his own rights. Hence the remarkable spectacle in each church of extreme ardor and infinite tolerance."

"Europe is not effete; it is in transformation; and in this difficult trial it may take example from the United States. The American people is not a new race; it is our own society upon a new theatre, in different circumstances. It is the same civilisation; but perhaps there they better understand the conditions under which liberty may be fruitful, and all that is still to be derived from Christianity and education."

"I do not believe that there is in history anything comparable with the prodigious growth of the United States; and in truth there is no spectacle which gives rise to more earnest reflections." After considering various theories propounded to explain this growth, namely, the democratic character of our institutions, the breadth of territory, the paucity of population, and finding them all insufficient, M. Laboulaye proceeds: "The Americans have for a long time known the secret of their greatness, for they brought it with them from England. For two centuries, while seeking for the most simple and the most popular political institutions, they still attached to these only a secondary significance, knowing that liberty depends rather upon the spirit of citizens than upon the frame of government. From the times of Louis XIV they have clearly seen, what we are beginning to suspect, that liberty is a force and nothing more, a force indifferent in its nature, and which may lead either to evil or to good. Compressed, it shines; left to itself, it ravages or fructifies, according to the hand which directs or uses it. The direction to be given to it was found by Americans on the day when they learned that the problem to be resolved is the same in the



case of a nation as in that of each individual, and that political liberty must be treated just like natural liberty, since it is the same liberty. Moral law, if we wish to live honorably, must not be put in an external observance or in a book, but in the heart of man. So political rules are not to be found in the mechanism of government, but in the soul of the citizen. It is only an internal guide that can prevent us from abusing liberty and destroying ourselves by that which ought to save us. This internal guide was found by the first colonists of America in their religion. . . . Those two sisters, religion and education, are the guardians of freedom in America. . . . The first axiom of politics is, that no liberty is possible without religion and without education."

But the most important part of Laboulaye's work is in the essays upon slavery and our present civil conflict. He has reviewed, with a clear knowledge of the facts, the whole history of slavery in this country; the efforts of reformers, giving special prominence to the works of Channing; the history of the later struggles, including the mortal strike in Kansas; the circumstances and results of our last Presidential election; the causes and varying aspects of the war, and its probable issue. In all he sees only one probable result — the triumph of freedom and the continuance of the Union.

"Let us", he says, "again recall the subject of the conflict that divides North and South. In the midst of the smoke and the tumult of battle, we are too ready to forget the right; we think ourselves wise and politic in recommending all parties to yield. By such counsel prudence is easily deceived. 'Justice and peace have kissed each other', says the Scripture; but the kiss of injustice is the kiss of Judas. It does not give peace; it gives birth to violence and death. Attempt to trace the condition of a treaty between the North and the South; I defy any one to come to an acceptable solution. It is because the question at issue is quite another thing than a question of justice. The South is not defending its independence, for this was not menaced. What it wants is domination. Who would then advise the North to abdicate? . . . What is at the bottom of this fratricidal war? It is slavery. On this point Europe, all the world, is agreed. Every body denounces that execrable institution; but after blaming it, they begin to talk very fast about the interests of commerce and of industry; they no longer speak of servitude, but of the free exchange of cotton."

"For forty years the South, faithless to its grand ancestral traditions, pursued, as they say in the United States, a *sectional* policy. It sacrificed everything to one interest; it plotted to raise slavery to the rank of a federal institution, to force the free States to respect, maintain, and propagate slavery for its own advantage. The election of Mr. Lincoln was a protest

against this invasion upon the North, and nothing more; but in this resistance the South read its arrest in the future. From the day when it could no longer command, it ceased to obey."

"War, without doubt, is a terrible scourge; let it fall in malediction on those who have unchained it. But it is also true that it is a noble and holy thing to fight in defence of country, justice, and humanity. This the North is doing. This war could be arrested by the South with a single word; let it but be content to be sovereign in its internal affairs, as it has been for eighty years; no one will outrage, no one will menace it. All that is asked, of it is, not to dismember the country by a sacrilegious ambition, but to yield—the North cannot do this without dishonor. It is imagined in Europe that interest will be stronger than honor, and that the power they call King Cotton will prevail over the claims of humanity; but I dare assert that such prophets are deceived. The sons of the Puritans are slow to move; but once enlisted in a cause, when the right is at stake, they will not recede. To believe that the first defeats will break them down, is not to know them; in all things they are patient, and go right through to the end."

Besides the essays contained in his volume of *Moral and Political Studies*, M. Laboulaye has also collected a series of papers on the *United States and France*, published originally in the *Journal des Débats*, reviewing in part the last work of De Gasparin, and Fisch's account of this country. In the introduction he sums up the case in three positions: 1st. That slavery, or rather the desire to perpetuate and propagate slavery, is the real cause of the rebellion. 2d. That the South had no right, constitutionally, to secede from the Union. 3d. That the political interests of France require her to remain faithful to the traditions of Louis XVI and of Napoleon; and the unity and independence of America are, for all Europe, the only guarantee of the liberty of the seas and of the peace of the world.

"In writing these pages", adds M. Laboulaye, "I have not once forgotten that I am a Frenchman, and not an American; though, to tell the truth, that is making a needless distinction. Until very recently, until we were acute enough to invent a new political theory, it was a maxim received on both sides of the Atlantic, almost an article of faith, that America and France were two sisters, united by a community of interests and by glorious memories. The North remains faithful to this friendship, and can it be that for the love of slavery we shall, after eighty years of mutual regard, break the only alliance which has never imposed upon us a sacrifice, or caused us a regret?"

He argues the question with reference to the point of intervention, or recognition of the South, opposing most vigorously any such policy. His hopes, as to the course of the French government, have been disappointed by the recent proposition of the Emperor, recommending to the chief European Courts, that they persuade this country to agree to an armistice of six months—so that the South may replenish its exhausted resources, and the North be arrested at the moment when its ample preparations are completed for assailing the rebellion at all exposed points. This modest proposal, wisely rejected, for the present, by England, will doubtless be renewed, unless our army and navy are vigorously pushed onward. Only our success can avert it. But, meanwhile, both the astute Emperor and the United States have before them a vigorous campaign; and if both are successful, their outposts may meet on the Mexican frontier. And then it may have to be decided whether Paris or Washington is to be most potent on this continent. The future alone can determine whether the Emperor of the French has not made a venture that will be equally hazardous to him at home and abroad. The arguments of M. Laboulaye against intervention show the light in which such a project is viewed by an enlightened and liberal publicist:

“This wise neutrality, which is imposed on us by our precedents, displeases a school which wishes France to have a hand in everything, at the risk of wearing and exhausting its country. These are the uneasy and restless men who propose to us not to intervene, but to recognise the South. Would this recognition procure us cotton? No; it would not give us a right to dispute the blockade, and it would not end the war. What would we gain by it? Nothing; except to lose the attitude of mediators and friends, which, at the proper time, would permit us to terminate the conflict. To recognise the South is to give it our moral support; it is to declare, in advance, that its pretensions are legitimate; it is to take sides and renounce being arbiters. What will avail us this measure, which will wound the North and compromise the future? ‘Recognition’, it is said, does not bind us to make war. This is a mistake. A great country like France makes no useless movement. The sequel of the recognition of the South is war with our ancient allies. The North will see in it a menace. For a long time already it has been troubled at this tempest pointed out to it on the horizon. ‘Every nation rent by civil war’, says Mr. Lincoln, ‘must expect

to be treated without consideration by foreign powers'. Let us add, however, that, right or wrong, it is from England that the North fears intervention; it still counts on the old and constant friendship of France."

"If the North does not yield to the first summons of England and France, will we go further? Have we calculated what the most successful war would cost, carried on at such a distance, in a vast country, with a brave and industrious people, who would defend their hearths with the energy of despair? What will be the losses and sufferings of the cotton manufacture, compared with the evils and burdens that will be incurred by an enterprise longer and more difficult than the Crimean war? If the honor of France were at stake, indeed, we should not hesitate; but the Americans have done us no harm; they have always been our friends. At this very moment it is to us that they place their hope. The neutrality of France is their salvation. In such conditions the war would never be popular; it would be in contradiction to the interests, ideas, and feelings of the country."

"Suppose that the North yields to the first menace; suppose that, through fatigue, it bows before an armed mediation; suppose that it does not take vengeance forever on the party calling itself a foreign power; suppose it suffers us to regulate the dismemberment of America—all impossible suppositions when we think that a youthful, patriotic, and ardent people are in question, which for a year past has been living under arms—when we have succeeded in this gigantic work, what shall we have done? We shall have given the lie to all our political traditions, weakened France and strengthened England, by crushing our most useful and faithful allies."

"There is a political interest involved here which is greater than that of our manufacturers, and which seems to be forgotten or designedly lost sight of."

The bearings of a dismemberment of our Union upon the relations of France and England, are also truthfully set forth in the following paragraph:

"England holds the maxim that its navy must always be twice as strong as ours; which is equivalent to saying that the English wish always to be in a condition to brave Europe united. Take away America, which holds England in check, and forces her to respect the rights of neutrals, and be sure that the first continental war will witness the reappearance of the ambition of former days, and of a prepotence from which we should be the first to suffer. The dismemberment of America is the restoration of the empire of the seas to our rivals, as the unity of America is the liberty of oceans and the peace of the world. This is what we must not weary of repeating to those who, for the sake of applying a more than doubtful remedy to the sufferings of a moment, would condemn us to begin anew the terrible trials of the past. If the United States, with their thirty million men, had existed in 1810, does any one believe that the continental

blockade would have been possible? If to-morrow they are crushed, does any one believe that this blockade would never be renewed, if, which God forbid! we should experience a disaster on the ocean?"

The arguments in this pamphlet against the pretended right of secession are put with great force, and a thorough knowledge of our constitutional history. Not less able is the advocacy of the position, that slavery is the real cause of the Southern secession and rebellion. That the North is fighting the battle, substantially for freedom, is also shown by incontrovertible evidence—the logic of facts, the necessity of the case. Then in burning and eloquent words, the true position of the South in relation to the public conscience of mankind, is thus depicted:

"While the North so proudly flung out its flag, what did the South? What hindered it from rivalling its enemies, in order to dispute with them the sympathy of Europe? Where are the measures taken in favor of the negroes? Where are the pledges of a speedy emancipation? For, in short, if the tariff is the true motive of the war, if the supremacy of the North is the only fear of the planters, a fine occasion is offered to throw overboard the fatal dead-weight of slavery. Show us, then, the programme and pledges of the South; these alone can give it the support of public opinion. The North acts; why does the South preserve a silence, the danger of which cannot be disguised?"

"Let not the South deceive itself. Its soldiers are brave, its politicians skilful; it holds back the cotton which Europe so imperiously needs; it flatters certain European jealousies and fears, by holding out the coming dismemberment of the United States; but in spite of all these favorable chances, the South will be deceived in its ambition. The new Roman empire which was to extend as far as Mexico; that new civilization, based on slavery, which they have promised us, is but a vanishing dream, a bubble which the wind will burst. To succeed, the South will require the aid of Europe; this aid it shall never have. Whatever may be the sufferings of commerce, whatever may be the calculations of diplomatists, there is one fact which overweighs all, and that is *slavery*. The victory of the North is the redemption of four millions of men; the triumph of the South is the perpetuation, the extension of slavery, with all its miseries and all its crimes. It is this consideration which causes more than one government to pause. The masses, whom great politicians despise, but whom they dare not brave; those fanatics who believe in the Gospel; those narrow minds who understand nothing but liberty; those simpletons who are moved at the sufferings of an unknown negro; that sentimental mob



which throws into the scales its love of right and of humanity — always carry the day at last. The world belongs to these simple ones, who, refusing to listen to the cunning combinations of politics, consider justice and charity above their own interests. *Public conscience* is the rock on which the South will be wrecked.

"Among us, in France, can the cause of slavery ever become popular? Our fathers went to America with Lafayette and Rochambeau to uphold liberty. It is one of our national glories; for this service rendered to the United States we are there considered as brethren and friends. Shall we blot out this glorious past? Shall the name of France be associated with the triumph of the South, that is to say, with the perpetuity of slavery? This cannot be. France, it is said, never fights for interest, but for ideas. I adopt the proud saying, and I ask: What ideas should we be fighting for in helping the South?"

"Whatever may be the course of events, there is a duty for the friends of liberty and French greatness to fulfil at this moment. It is necessary to speak, it is necessary to enlighten the country, it is necessary to show it the abyss toward which it is urged by those fair-spoken politicians who, through love of peace, would force us to war, and in the name of independence would enlist us under the banner of servitude. Christians, who believe in the Gospel and the rights of an immortal soul, even though clothed in a black skin; patriots, whose hearts beat for democracy and liberty; statesmen, who do not wish the return of the colonial policy which for two centuries stained the seas with blood; Frenchmen, who have neither forgotten Lafayette, nor the glorious memories which we left behind in the New World, it is your cause that is being resolved in the United States. This cause M. de Gasparin has defended for a year past with as much courage as talent; it is our duty to range ourselves around him, and to hold with a firm hand the old French banner on which is written *Liberty*!"

This is noble and eloquent language. It may well inspire us with a firmer faith, not in our righteous cause, but in the welcome we shall receive if we but succeed in this deadly struggle, from the friends of liberty and justice all over the world. And we rejoice that now, as in the times of our Revolution, such words of counsel and of cheer come to us from the land of Lafayette. And these words have about them a Christian spirit and a moral tone higher than was reached by any of the political writers of France in the period immediately preceding its Revolution. And thus they indicate, not merely the progress of liberty, but progress in right views of liberty—that it can be secure and permanent only as founded



in Christianity, and pervaded by the Christian spirit and Christian ideas.

And thus is our conflict itself illumined by a higher light than that of mere natural reason. It is a part of the historic process by which the kingdoms of this world are to become the kingdoms of our Lord. The victories of truth and righteousness, of liberty and law, are the victories of an everlasting kingdom.

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ART. V.—BAPTISM FOR THE DEAD. 1 COR. XV, 29.

By REV. HERVEY D. GANSE, New York.

THE true interpretation of any passage, whether difficult or easy, must be consistent with its grammar and with its context. The natural method is to consider the context first; for, in reading, we come to the passage through the expressions which have preceded it, and if it do not readily yield a sense, we instinctively glance down to the next plain sentence, in hope that it will throw its light back upon the obscure one. Yet, so soon as a passage gets a reputation for difficulty, especially if it be brief and easily remembered, there is a temptation to pluck it out of its connection, and to manipulate its mere terms into some possible meaning. Let us be careful to avoid this mistake, and make our approach to this difficult verse through its context.

The particular discussion, to which the text belongs, begins at the 12th verse: "Now, if Christ be preached that he rose from the dead, *how say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead?*" The following verses, down to the twenty-fourth, are a direct assault upon that bold and dangerous assertion. But for whose advantage? Is the Apostle's audience made up of the deniers of the resurrection themselves, or of those who are in danger of being misled by them, or of both? The following indications will decide this ques-

tion. St. Paul cannot have had the unbelievers exclusively in his mind, since he carefully discriminates between them and others whom he, at least, addresses equally. The sceptics are at most "*certain among you*". That is, the Church is addressed in the second person, while he describes the doubters in the third. The same he does at the end of the discussion, in the thirty-third and thirty-fourth verses—"Be not deceived. Evil communications corrupt good manners". "For some have not the knowledge of God." Unquestionably the *τινες* of his last assertion were the *τινες* of the twelfth verse, and the persons addressed in the second person in both these verses, and all through the intermediate discussion, were not those very unbelievers. Nay, there is proof that the discrimination of these verses was kept up throughout, and that the false teachers were not directly addressed at all. Twice the Apostle speaks of "your faith", and once of "your rejoicing, which I have in Christ Jesus". Whatever may be the meaning of that last somewhat obscure expression, it must imply the true piety of those whom it concerns. But the deniers of the resurrection had neither faith nor piety; for it is to be observed that Paul treats their denial of the resurrection as though it were a denial of all immortality. "Then they that are fallen asleep in Christ are perished." "If in this life only we have hope in Christ", etc. But how had the denial of the resurrection of the body limited their hope to "this life only", unless it followed upon that denial that there was to be no future life? The same estimate of their doctrine appears in the closing appeal: "Why stand we in jeopardy every hour? If I have fought with beasts at Ephesus, what advantageth it me?" "Very much", might the doubter reply, if his doubt concerned only the resurrection; "you shall live for ever in spiritual happiness". The Apostle could not have failed to see so great a flaw in his argument. It follows clearly that the "some among them" who denied the resurrection—whose "evil communications" were to be shunned—who "had not the knowledge of God", were outright infidels, whether Sadducees or Pagans—wolves in sheep's clothing, who aimed to

destroy the flock. To these men St. Paul did not speak of their "faith" and Christian "rejoicing".

But the scope of the reasoning itself makes it most evident that it was addressed, not at all to those who denied the resurrection, but to the pious Corinthians, who were in danger from their reasonings. If we leave our obscure text aside for a moment, there is not an argument adduced in the whole discussion that a radical doubter concerning the resurrection, would not have laughed to scorn. Paul reasons to the consequences of the denial, and his opponents would have consented to them all. "Our preaching is vain"; "Your faith is vain"; "We are false witnesses of God"; "Ye are yet in your sins"; "They that are fallen asleep in Christ are perished"; "We are of all men most miserable"; "Why stand we in jeopardy every hour?" These are not the weapons of mere logic with which to confound an adversary. Unless those, to whom they were addressed, had a pious sympathy with the reasoner, the words were wasted. So, too, of that grand picture of the great consummation, which begins at the twentieth verse, and reaches down to our text. "But now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first fruits of them that slept." To an outright denier of the resurrection that is mere assertion. Only to a true believer is it the sublime and most persuasive announcement of Christ's apostle. To such a believer every stroke of the glowing pencil brings out the vivid future more distinctly, till he sees Christ in the midst of his risen people, all enemies beneath his feet, death destroyed, and the consummated kingdom given to God and the Father. The scope of the Apostle's reasoning, then, is very plain. He is counter-acting in the minds of the Corinthian Christians the influence of a most mischievous infidel error, and that by an appeal not to mere intellect, but to the most exalted sympathies of Christian faith.

It is in the midst of this appeal that the text occurs. Now, if every manuscript had shown a hiatus at this point, we might still have assured ourselves of one thing; namely, that when the text was complete, that verse was in sympathy with all the rest, and, like them, appealed to the highest Christian con-

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sciousness of those who first read it. But the manuscripts are complete, and so well agreed in their reading, that any material departure from the accepted text is sheer conjecture. We pass then at once from that graphic description of the final glory of Christ and his people, which reaches from the twentieth verse to the twenty-eighth, to this question: "Otherwise, what shall they gain who are baptized for the sake of the dead? If the dead rise not at all, why are they even baptized for their sake? And why", he proceeds, with questioning evidently intended to be of the same general spirit, "and why stand we in jeopardy every hour?"

Now the favorite interpretation, especially of the German commentators, fastens at once upon the grammar of the text, and insists that ἐπὶ τῶν νεκρῶν "for the sake of the dead", must be "*for the advantage of the dead*", since such is the natural and ordinary force of the preposition. We answer confidently, it cannot be. The kind of feeling that prompted and responded to the whole strain of argument, both before and after this verse, has nothing in common with the idea of any human act done *for the advantage* of those already dead. Masses for the advantage of the dead, said by the Papists now, are just as good a proof of the resurrection, as baptism for the advantage of the dead could have been in Paul's day. Imagine, then, a modern writer, who might be capable of rising to any such strain of sincere and grandest argument, marshalling into the midst of his thrilling appeals the question: "What shall they gain who say masses for the dead, if the dead rise not at all?" To say that there were Papists in the community to which he wrote, would only double the impossibility of such reasoning. His cause could gain nothing from such halting evidence. Would he then gratuitously put that monstrous practice upon a footing with the most genuine and exalted exercises of piety?

It is claimed, indeed, that the text is an *argumentum ad hominem*, or *argumentum ex concessis*. But the passage is not in the vein of these logical devices. Those who might have made such admissions were in no way before the Apostle's mind. His work was not the confounding of an adversary.

but the building up of saints, and he needed no such stubble to eke out his broad and firm foundation.

Yet, it is not strange that exact commentators should be drawn to this interpretation; for if it does not consist with the scope of the argument, scarcely any of the interpretations, which attempt to displace it, meet the grammatical demands of the text half so well; and those demands are very distinct:

First of all, the passage is complete in its parts. There is no appearance of an ellipsis, and it is therefore a grave objection to any interpretation that it supposes one. Βαπτίζόμενοι ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν may mean "baptized for the dead", or "baptized in place of the dead"; but it cannot mean "baptized for the resurrection of the dead", or "for the kingdom of the dead", nor "baptized in order to take the place of the dead". To make any such addition to Paul's words, is to confess that we can make nothing of them as they stand. If we hold ourselves, then, to the precise terms of the text, we find that they are, all of them, words in ordinary use and of well settled meaning. And therefore, the farther we warp them from that meaning, the more improbable our interpretation becomes.

1. Βαπτίζόμενοι and βαπτίζονται naturally indicate ordinary Christian baptism. The radical idea of the word, of course, only covers the outward rite. But unvarying usage makes the word itself cover more. So 'crowning' a man is literally setting a crown upon him; but, according to all usage, the word includes both the act and its significance. The 'enlisting' of a soldier is strictly the writing his name in a list; but usage makes it that writing which devotes him to a soldier's life. So the 'baptizing' of Christians is the washing that devotes them to a Christian life. Out of more than thirty instances in the New Testament where Christian baptism is spoken of, there is not one in which the word has any lower sense. At this point, then, the notion of a vicarious baptism offers violence to the text itself, as we have seen it does to the context; for it supposes a second application of the rite in form under circumstances that could leave no room for its essence. As if such an expression as enlisting ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν

should be claimed to indicate the mere show of enlisting made by living men in the name of dead men. Now, a qualifying phrase might be used that should be unequivocal enough to lower βαπτίζόμενοι to such a meaning. But until the phrase is clearly proved to have that power, the assumption of such a meaning does violence to the word.

2. ὑπὲρ, with a genitive, occurs in the New Testament one hundred and thirty-four times. Setting aside our own obscure passage, there are only three instances among all these where it does not need to be translated by some such phrase as "on the part of", or "in behalf of", or "on account of". That is, it indicates not the mere circumstances of an act, but the interest in which the act is performed. The three exceptional cases referred to constitute a class by themselves, and can shed no light upon our text. They are, Romans ix, 27; 2 Cor. i, 8, and viii, 23; in each of which passages ὑπὲρ is construed with a verb of knowing or speaking, and is therefore thought to stand for περί, and to mean "of" or "concerning". A study of these several passages, we think, will not sustain this representation, but will show that, in these cases too, ὑπὲρ was used instead of περί, just because it included the idea of interest "in behalf of" the object of knowledge or speech. But even if this be not so, and if classical usage be summoned to prove that ὑπὲρ, with such verbs, is used in the loose sense referred to, still it needs some such a verb, in each instance, so to lower the sense of the preposition; and with any other verbs it must bear its ordinary meaning. So in English, such a preposition as "about" or "concerning" may be definite enough to describe the relation of thought or speech to its subject; but it would be very loose to speak of rendering a service "concerning" a friend, or of being baptized "concerning" the dead.

Βαπτίζόμενοι ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν, then, according to all New Testament usage, must mean "baptized for the sake of the dead". But in what sense "for their sake"? The notion of a vicarious baptism assumes that the meaning must be "for the advantage of" the dead; and it is very clear that such is the most common sense of ὑπὲρ with a genitive. Thus, in the writings of



Paul, this construction occurs nearly a hundred times, and about seventy times it clearly indicates the advantage of the object for which the action is had.

But in many, even of these instances, a secondary sense of the word comes in. Since what one does for another's advantage, he commonly does from love to him, *ὕπὲρ* is made to cover the love of the actor as much as the advantage of the object. Thus, when Peter says, "I will lay down my life *ὕπὲρ σου*", he means two things, "for thy advantage" and "for love of thee". If the first meaning were excluded, the other would remain. So in all those passages of Paul which describe sufferings endured for "Christ's sake", or for his "name's sake", there is at least as distinct a regard of the affection which welcomes and sustains the suffering, as there is of the service which it may render to Christ. But leaving aside all instances in which *ὕπὲρ* may be thought to have this pregnant meaning, there remain in the writings of Paul, at least, twenty instances in which it indicates only the motive of the actor, and not at all the advantage of the object. That is, the object of the preposition is regarded as *prompting* the action, but not as *being served* by it. Thus Paul says: "For this thing (the thorn in the flesh) I besought the Lord thrice", 2 Cor. xii, 8, which surely does not mean "for the advantage of" the thorn, but "on account of" it. In nearly every other instance, the motive is identified with love or gratitude. "That the Gentiles might glorify God *for* his mercy"—Rom. xv, 9. "I beseech you *by* the coming of the Lord"—2 Thess. ii, 1. "I thank God *for* you all that your faith is spoken of", etc.—Rom. i, 8.

This last form of expression is often used. Now, if certain of those Christians, on whose account Paul gave thanks, had been known to have died, it would have been as good Greek, and as good piety, to say *ἐνχαριστῶ ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν*, as to say *ἐνχαριστῶ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν*. And, in either case, the preposition would have meant "on account of" or "for the sake of", but but by no means "for the advantage of". Just so Naomi, in the Septuagint, speaking to her daughters-in-law, says: "My heart is grieved *ὕπὲρ ὑμῶν*—on your account".

New Testament usage, then, gives us a choice between two

well-settled meanings of *ὑπὲρ* with a genitive, namely, the commoner sense of "for the advantage of", and the less common sense of "on account of". If we consult Paul's use of the word, it gives us, irrespective of the scope of the verse, about one chance out of four, that he used it in the latter sense. The scope of the verse, of course, might easily raise this chance to a certainty.

This second sense of *ὑπὲρ* is assumed by Diestelmann, in the *Jahrbücher f. deutsche Theologie*, and he explains "on account of the dead" to mean, on account of the kingdom and glory of Christ who is dead, and of all those who have died or shall die in him. If the supposition of so considerable ellipsis be no objection to this interpretation, the usage of *ὑπὲρ* surely will warrant it.

There is also warrant enough, as we think, for translating *ὑπὲρ*, "in place of". But we will need to remember what that expression means. Careful investigation of all those passages in the New Testament which are thought to demand such a sense of the preposition, will show that it never indicates mere substitution, but only substitution for the advantage or credit of the party whose place is taken. "Baptism *in place of* the dead," then, would be vicarious baptism; and "baptism *in order to take the place of* the dead" would be baptism in order to vicarious duty; a sense which, if possible, is more objectionable still.

The notion of a baptism "*over* the dead" cannot be reconciled with the New Testament usage of *ὑπὲρ* with a genitive.

We cannot but count the interesting and elaborate exposition of Professor Kendrick in the *Christian Review* as offering equal violence to Paul's words. For even if *ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν* could mean "in reference to the dead", that expression would fall far short of meaning, as Professor Kendrick claims, "baptized into relation to the dead, baptized so as to be allied to the dead, reckoned among the dead rather than among the living". He refers to no usage of *ὑπὲρ* in the sense of "in relation to" except that by which it describes "the relation" of speech or thought to a subject; and the New Testament at least furnishes no other. But even in that case the relation is be-

tween the speech and its topic. So far as the speaker is concerned, the *ὑπὲρ* establishes no relation whatever; it only grows out of the fact that he is already, as Professor Kendrick justly represents, "an interested party". It does not appear then that "the fundamental idea in all such cases of *ὑπὲρ* is that it brings the parties into close relation with its object". To say that a man speaks in relation to the dead is far from saying that he speaks himself *into* a relation to the dead. And so to say that a man was baptized in relation to the dead, whatever that expression might mean, would be very far from saying that he was baptized *into* relation to the dead.

But there is no usage of the New Testament that will suffer βαπτιζόμενοι ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν to mean anything less than "baptized for the sake of the dead", in some sense or another. The whole drift of the question, besides, shows that the baptized set out voluntarily to *gain* something; for *τι ποιήσουσιν*, in the 29th verse, means far more than the bare *τι* of the 30th; and the phrase "for the dead" in the Greek, as in our version, unequivocally marks the *motive* to that voluntary act, and not an *obstacle* in the way of it.

3. The adjective νεκρῶν and νεκροὶ occurring three times in the passage, must cover the same idea each time, except so far as the presence or absence of the article defines that idea. Τῶν νεκρῶν will naturally cover the special dead, in whom the baptized are interested. Νεκροὶ, without the article, are all the dead whose resurrection the false teachers sweepingly denied; ὅλως οὐκ ἐγείρονται. St. Paul assails that denial by claiming the resurrection of those special dead baptized for. According to the natural import of his words, "the dead" of the first member of the passage are thought to have a prospect of rising, so that those who are baptized for their sake cannot admit that no dead rise. As though we should say, why procure medicine (or do whatever else) for the sake of the sick, if sick men never get well? In any such question the sick are persons, the distinct hope of whose recovery prompts the care bestowed on them. So in the text the dead are persons, whose rising among the other dead is to reward those who shall have been baptized for their sake. This meaning at least lies on the

face of the passage, and any other meaning is elaborated and unnatural.

Now this condition of the text is fully met by the theory of a vicarious baptism. The dead who omitted to be baptized, have the omission supplied by friends, who in the resurrection rejoice in the results of their kindness. But no accidental correspondence with inspired language can sustain such a monstrous idea. And yet its friends may fairly demand that the interpretation which claims to be the true one shall come as near to the Apostle's words as their false one does.

There arises thus another decisive reason for rejecting the interpretation "baptized in reference to the dead" or "in anticipation of death". For in the view of that interpretation the dead of the first clause, so far from being definite persons, are as nearly as possible an abstraction. And since the *νεκροὶ* of the second clause are surely persons, the same adjective in a sentence of twenty words passes from abstract (with the article) to concrete (without it), and then back to abstract again; unless, indeed, with many critics we read *ἀντὶ* in the last clause, which would summarily prevent such an inconsistency.

The interpretation "baptized for the resurrection of the dead" confessedly dispenses with the idea of any special dead whose resurrection is anticipated in the baptism, and as Professor Kendrick has well shown, reduces what Paul put in the tone of a thrilling appeal into the bald truism, that those who were baptized because they expected a resurrection, will be disappointed if there shall be no resurrection.

If the Apostle could have had reference to a baptism intended to furnish substitutes who should merit a reward for the dead, such a baptism, surely, would anticipate a resurrection of those departed friends, and so far conform to the text. But if in spite of the settled sense of *ὑπὲρ* the reference could have been to mere substitutes, who in no way should serve the dead, such substitution would involve no hope of seeing those dead again. According to that interpretation, the hope of the baptized would concern their own resurrection, and thus leave the

repeated question, "why are they then baptized for the dead?" almost pointless.

4. But one of the clearest requirements of the text remains to be noticed. Baptism for the sake of the dead, whatever it may have been, could not have been practised by all Christians. Paul speaks of the subjects of it in the third person, as *οἱ βαπτίζοντες*, and again he asks: *τί καὶ βαπτίζονται*; why are they even baptized for the sake of the dead? The emphasis of *καὶ* in this last expression is very marked, and it indicates clearly that the baptism in question was singular enough to be a matter of remark. Indeed in some degree it must have borne comparison with Paul's own exposure of himself to martyrdom; although that comparison did not need to hold in the abstract danger or self-sacrifice of the two acts as some argue, but only in their notoriety and in their power to appeal to universal Christian feeling in proof of the resurrection. No interpretation that fails to recognise the exceptional character of this baptism, can claim to consist with the natural import of the verse. Here again, as we cannot but see, the theory of vicarious baptism fits the text.

But the other most popular interpretations are quite at war with it. "Baptism in anticipation of death" is common to all Christians, and Prof. Kendrick in candor admits that his interpretation labors at this point. The same is manifestly true of "baptism in hope of the resurrection of the dead", and of "baptism on account of the kingdom of the dead". "Baptism in order to take the place of the dead" will not be open to this objection, if "the dead" be supposed to be certain near friends or eminent martyrs, and the substitutes the special witnesses who have been won to duty by the sight of their constancy. But this interpretation of *ὑπὲρ*, as we have seen, enlists the substitutes not only in the place of the dead, but in their behalf.

Let us now put the grammar and the context together, and see how many elements must enter into an interpretation of this passage, that shall do no violence to either.

The baptism in question must have all the ordinary significance of Christian baptism, and also an additional element, by

which it may be said to be distinctively "for the sake of the dead". It must anticipate the resurrection of those dead for whom it is had, and that so confidently and so justly, that a mere allusion to the act will thrill all Christian hearts with a sympathetic conviction that there must be a resurrection; just as Paul's after allusion to his own steadfastness under persecution awakened an instinctive sympathy with his hope of rising again.

Our own attempt to meet these demands of the text we make with interest rather than with confidence. Let us suppose then that there was in St. Paul's day, as there has not failed to be at any time since, a considerable class of Christians who, assuming the vows of baptism with true evangelic feeling, were known to be moved to that act in a large degree by their affectionate regard of Christians recently departed, whether relatives or martyrs or both; and so to have been "baptized for the sake of the dead". Then three things need to be considered:

1. That the deference which might have been shown by any to such an appeal, would have been in full accordance with the highest motives that ever lead to baptism. A loving regard of the pious dead is one of the most marked products of evangelical religion. In this very chapter Paul proves the resurrection to a Christian heart, by showing that according to any other doctrine "they that are fallen asleep in Christ are perished". The same Apostle was careful to say to the Thessalonians: "I would not have you to be ignorant, brethren, concerning them which are asleep, that ye sorrow not even as others which have no hope. For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring with him". The rest of the glowing passage, 1 Thess. iv, 13-18, which is too long to quote, carefully provides for the reunion of the parted friends who "together" are to "meet the Lord in the air". Nor was the recollection of such departed saints intended to be a mere sentiment. "That ye be followers of them who through faith and patience inherit the promises", Heb. vi, 12. "Whose faith follow, considering the termination of their lives" (ἐκβασιν τῆς ἀναστροφῆς),



Heb. xiii, 7. Indeed if grace in Christian life and speech is meant to have persuasive power with men, can that power ever be greater than it is in recent recollections of the faith and triumphs of our pious dead? There is nothing excellent in our nature that does not kindle under such an appeal when God's grace points it; and there is nothing excellent in the Gospel that does not find freer access to a heart so moved. We need not say how well adapted the persecutions of that age must have been to give unusual impressiveness to such appeals. Let us conceive of the faith of a beloved parent uttering itself in songs from the stocks or the stake; when the last note of triumph should have been hushed, would it leave his children believers or unbelievers, timid or decided? Nay why should the effects of such spectacles be limited to the kindred or near friends of the martyr? The very constancy of the sufferer creates a regard of him in the heart of a stranger, and every such death is the increase of the Church. It is very safe to assume then that in Paul's day new converts as well as old may have been drawn to Christian duty in part, at least, by a regard of the pious dead.

2. If this were the meaning of the text it would perfectly serve the purpose of the Apostle's argument. Let us remember his appeal is made, not to cold intellect, but to the intelligence of a Christian *heart*. "Men tell you", he says, "that there is no resurrection of the dead. Then Christ is not risen; your faith is vain; we are false witnesses; your dead are perished, and you are losing all the comfort of this life, in the hope of another which you will never reach". This exhausts the appeal to their pious sympathies, and he rises to a higher level: "But Christ is risen, his kingdom is prepared, and shall, by and by, be complete; the saints shall rise at his coming; all enemies shall be destroyed, and Christ's whole work being done, the Father shall resume his delegated authority, and fill all the redeemed with his own glory." Now this grand delineation does not fail to take hold of Paul's inmost feeling, and he will have it do as much for his readers. But he has gone over all the ground of Christian consciousness already. What shall he do? In effect, he repeats himself—

that is, he drops the general and didactic language which he has used before, and by two vivid questions launches the eternal truth into their very souls: "If there be no such kingdom of Christ and his people, what a folly is theirs who suffer the love of the faithful dead to win them to Christian vows and duty! If there be no resurrection, why are men even baptized for the sake of the dead?" This is the very thought of the 18th verse, "Then are they that are fallen asleep in Christ perished". It is only put into keener words. Just as the argument of the 19th verse—"we are of all men most miserable"—bursts out in the second question: "And why do I expose myself to danger of daily death, if I am not to live again?" The two connected verses are two glances into the future glory; the one through our attested affection for those who have already died in the faith, the other through the confident hope which we nourish for ourselves. In all Christian consciousness these two emotions belong together; and the one serves the argument as well as the other. Even if it were certain that Paul did not choose to appeal to such an emotion, the yearning of an affectionate heart after the parent or friend whose faith it is seeking to follow, is an instinctive assertion of a future life too strong for mere reasoning either to confirm or to disturb.

3. But now we have to meet the question, does the expression, *βαπτίζομενοι ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν*,—"Baptized for the sake of the dead"—fairly cover the act and motive which we have suggested? After the experience of eighteen centuries it will be safe to confess that the expression is compact and obscure. Its fundamental difficulty lies in the fact that Christian baptism, which has its own distinctive motive in faith in Christ, is here referred to some contingent motive covered by the phrase, *ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν*. That difficulty increases in proportion as we hold baptism to its narrowest idea of a mere *rite*: and diminishes in proportion as we include in baptism the idea of a *profession*. To say that a man receives the sacred washing itself for the sake of the dead, amounts to vicarious baptism, and confuses all our notions of that holy sacrament. But to say that a man assumes the duties and dangers of a

Christian life for the sake of the dead may be only to bring a real though subordinate motive of Christian action into unusual prominence. Now let us suppose for a moment that the knotty phrase, *ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν*, had never been written in the text, and that Paul had spoken absolutely of *οἱ βαπτιζόμενοι*. It is safe to say that in that case every reader, whether Jew, Gentile, or Christian, would have understood by "the baptized" just what we now understand by "church members". So Paul elsewhere speaks of "one Lord, one faith, one baptism", Eph. iv, 5, where the thought of the rite is quite subordinate to that of the practical Christian life to which it was the introduction. The rite was the door of the church; "the baptized" were those who had passed through the door and were within. Thus we meet the solecism, "baptized *into* a baptism", Acts xix, 3; an expression which sets the rite and the profession almost in contrast. We only claim that the baptism of the text shall cover both ideas, giving to the latter just so much prominence as the argument and the circumstances assign to it.

We must remember then that the persecutions of those times could not but connect with the act of baptism the most serious regard of its external relations. It was a matter of outward danger as really as of inward faith. Then if there was any special consideration that was known to overbear that thought of danger, and to fire a courage that rejoiced to meet it, it was according to all the laws of speech to assign that consideration as a motive to the baptism. How prominent that motive would be made by any writer would depend upon the part it was to bear in his discussion. If St. Paul were expounding the *nature of baptism*, he might not allude to such a motive, nor think of it. If, on the other hand, he were proving that Christian instinct looks for a resurrection, his mind might most naturally fasten, first on the living sympathy which surviving Christians have with the departed, and next upon the readiest and most striking proof of that sympathy, whatever it might be. It might be the assumption by some survivors of all the duties and dangers of the piety that had so impressed them; and in that case his argu-

ment would require him to claim that some men are even baptized (*καὶ βαπτίζονται*) for the sake of the dead. There are hundreds of men in our churches to-day who are ready to use this very language, with the sole difference already insisted upon, that where New Testament usage spoke of "being baptized", we now speak of "joining the Church".

Should a youth, for example, who had listened in silence to infidel flings at the hopes of the pious dead, at length break forth, "It was for the sake of my dead mother that I joined the church, and you will not convince me that there is no resurrection", would the words shock us or thrill us? Or if a Christian minister, in impassioned appeal, should say: "Have not some of you become Christians for the sake of the Christian dead, and will you give up your hope of meeting them?" who would think of technical criticism where the sense is so plain and so honest? Add, then, that material element of persecution which in our day is quite wanting. Make Paul the preacher, and let him say to his Corinthian hearers: "You have taken this step of greatest danger, you have even been baptized for the sake of your dead, and what will you gain if your dead never rise?" Would such an appeal have degraded baptism?

But our interpretation assumes that the taking of such a step for such a motive was a thing so common and well known, that the briefest allusion to it would appeal to all hearts with a thrilling power. This assumption we do make, and if it be too great, we have lost our cause.

How very soon persecutions and martyrdom began in the Church, no one knew better than Paul. Stephen's death followed close upon that of his Master. Nor was his case a solitary one, for "a persecution arose" at that time, and Paul, speaking of "many of the saints", says, "when they were condemned to death I gave my voice against them". But Paul's conversion did not relieve the Church of danger. The martyrdom of James followed that of Stephen, and nothing short of a miracle saved the life of Peter. What dangers beset Paul himself, after his conversion, we know not only from the Acts, but from his epistles. Such words as "I die

daily", "in deaths oft", "daily delivered unto death", "we are killed all the day long", could be written by no candid man except in the view of perpetual peril of life. And these words were all written either in this epistle, or within a year of its date.

Now we have no reason to believe that every case of early Christian suffering and martyrdom has found a record in the Acts. We catch but a glimpse of the "many" whose death Paul compassed. There may well have been many others of whom we do not see even so much. Timothy was exposed to peril of which the only hint is in Paul's declaration that he had been "set at liberty", Heb. xiii, 23. And the martyrdom of James the Less, though occurring within the period covered by the Acts, is narrated by Josephus, but not by Luke.

Moreover, we have distinct reason for believing that such scenes had no more been excluded from Corinth than from other cities. When Paul first appeared there, Gallio alone saved him from injury and possible death. That the enraged Jews, doubly excited by the circumstance of that failure, and spurred on as we know they everywhere were by the Sanhedrim at Jerusalem, would always find an equal check upon their fury, is by no means to be assumed. Upon the other hand, Paul in this very argument ascribes the preëminent temporal "misery" of the early Christians as much to the Corinthians as to himself. Within the five or six years of their Church's existence, there might well have been not only sufferers but martyrs among themselves—their "sleepers in Christ" having "fallen asleep" as Stephen did.

But at the very least they knew of such deaths and of their fruits. For it is not too much to say that no feature of that ancient piety was more striking than the zeal that flamed up under persecution. Men soon came to pant for martyrdom. By the boldest assaults upon the prevailing paganism, they challenged the violence of their enemies. They became their own accusers, and courted their fate with an eagerness that confounded their heathen observers. Early in the second century a Roman proconsul needed to drive the self-accusers from him, exclaiming: "If you wish to die, cannot you find

precipices and ropes?" (See Tertullian, quoted in Mosheim's Commentaries, p. 235.) This surely was the frenzy of piety; and Christian zeal must have grown into that excess. And yet Ignatius, who was living when our text was written, as he approached his martyrdom about fifty years later, betrayed an almost equal eagerness to reach his "crown of glory". It was a contagion, and men felt it from the first. The death of Stephen was shortly followed by the conversion of a "great number". Paul's "bonds" made Christians "bolder", and Peter's death "glorified God". The persecutors soon came to understand this, and therefore, as the Acts of the Martyrdom of Ignatius inform us, Trajan was unwilling that he should suffer at Antioch, lest the sight of his fortitude might increase the number of Christians. Gibbon, with whatever motive, describes only fairly the effect of every such spectacle when he says: "On these melancholy occasions there were many among the Gentiles who pitied, who admired, and who were converted. The generous enthusiasm was communicated from the sufferer to the spectators; and the blood of the martyrs, according to a well-known observation, became the seed of the Church". (*Decline and Fall*. ch. xvi.) "Nothing", says Maitland,\* "could have been devised better adapted to display the power of the new faith than submitting its professors to martyrdom. . . . The executioner often caught the flame, gazed upon the dangerous spectacle of the power of true religion till his heart burnt within him, and fairly overwhelmed by the triumph of faith and hope, hastened to undergo the death which his hands had inflicted on another". "Crucify us, torture us", exclaimed Tertullian, in his Apology, "when you mow us down, we increase as in a harvest. The blood of Christians is their seed".

Now we are careful to admit that these delineations belong especially to the age which followed that of Paul. We must therefore lower the coloring till the picture shall suit the very times of the text. The number of the martyrs will be less, and the zeal of their sympathizers will be calmer. But the power of Christian piety in a steadfast sufferer, whose face

\* *Church in the Catacombs*, p. 100.



men see "like the face of an angel", belongs to the first century as much as to the second.

Let us conceive, then, of converts nerved to duty by such a sight, and seeking at the hands of the Christian teachers the baptism that should expose them to equal dangers. If they were asked to explain the choice which they had made, would it not be most natural for them to refer it to the influence of "the dead"? A child or near friend of the departed could by no means fail to do this. Then, if those who had witnessed their profession should afterwards find a class of Christians described as *οἱ βαπτιζόμενοι ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν* would they not have before them an act and a motive which those words would exactly cover? We venture to believe that if two classes of men could have been equally distinct in the view of the Corinthian church; namely, a class which in fact, but without warrant, received the mere *form* of baptism in the name of the dead, and another class who had been led to baptism itself by their regard for the dead, the expression of the text in its place in Paul's argument, would have indicated the latter class rather than the former. One has only to throw into the words the fervor that pervades all the passage, and they describe that class in the most natural sense of every syllable. The "baptism" is real; "the dead" are real, and the one is "for" the other. Nay, this baptism of sympathy and affection is ten-fold more truly "for the advantage of the dead" than any vicarious baptism. It does not indeed contribute to their safety — an impossible and absurd idea. But it does offer a tribute to the dear idea of the departed as it lives in the heart of the survivor; and it aims directly at that final meeting which the memory of past affection foreshadows as a joy in store for the friends that have gone, as well as for those who have set out to follow them. If a father, who had exhausted all argument upon an undecided child, should turn his last conscious look upon him, and exclaim, "*ὑπὲρ ἐμῶν*", "for my sake", the expression would be good Greek and full of meaning. Whatever tender and persuasive suggestion might be embraced in such words, when taken at their most obvious sense, we find in the similar expression of the text.

But if this be the meaning of Paul's words, why did not the early Christians so understand them? We have no reason to think that they did not. The earliest historic interpretation of the text is Tertullian's, which dates about a century and a half after the writing of the epistle. He, in a single sentence, so far admitted the notion of vicarious baptism as to say that it would not conflict with his pending argument. But if he had formally adopted that view of the passage, and if half of the church of his day could be known to have gone with him, such an interpretation could not stand. Neither Paul nor his argument, nor Christian piety, has any fellowship with it. But now we find another interpretation which, if the book\* containing it be Origen's, as is thought, is about as old as this allusion of Tertullian. We know that the book is ancient, and it may have been written in Origen's day, even if not written by himself. According to this interpretation the baptism was had *over* the dead. Now let us assume, for argument's sake, that the earliest and purest church held the view of the passage which we have been presenting. Then we know that the regard of martyrs soon ran to excess; that their graves became places of superstitious resort, and that baptism and other acts of worship were performed over them. We know, besides, that the phrase *ὑπὲρ τῶν νεκρῶν*, while according to New Testament usage, it excluded the idea of a local relation—"over the dead", according to classical and conversational usage admitted that idea. Under these circumstances it would be most natural that the very affections which, in Paul's day, might have welcomed the risks of baptism for the sake of the dead, should come to seek the consecrating sacrament over the very graves of the martyrs, and that the meaning of the text should be warped to suit such a practice. If we relieve that interpretation of what is clearly a superstitious gloss upon Paul's words, a living intelligible sentiment remains, namely, a regard of the pious dead which anticipated their resurrection and so prompted to baptism. This is the very sentiment which we find in the text. If it

\* *Dialogus de Recta in Deum Fide.*

had no place in the earlier church, whence grew the later superstitious practice?

But we do not need to insist upon this coincidence. It is enough to claim that there must have been in the bosom of the most ancient Church an accepted sense of this text, which did not come out in the writings of the earliest fathers. The lapse of time and the growth of superstition might withdraw attention more and more from that real but delicate meaning of the passage, until when, in the fourth century, Chrysostom and others began fairly to study it, the equivocalness of the mere language and the prevalent perversions of it may have misled them utterly from its original sense. Indeed there must have been a meaning of the text in the earliest times of the Church, which the historic interpretations of a later day have not handed down to us. Unless this be true, alas! for the text. If that original sense shall ever be discovered, it must be through such methods of candid investigation as we have sought to employ.

We are far from feeling that this interpretation relieves so obscure and compact a passage of all difficulty; but yet we claim that it is fairly consistent with every word of the text, with all the drift and dignity of the Apostle's argument, with the known circumstances and impulses of the times, and with universal Christian feeling. It carries the argument home to the strongest and most sensitive instincts of sanctified affection, and makes the denial of the resurrection treason against human sympathy and human love. Just this it is, and an appeal to pious feeling could not place the heresy in a more odious light.

This is our view of the letter of the text, with which an interpreter has chiefly to deal. But now, if any one shall insist that here, as so often elsewhere, Paul suggests more than he says, we are glad to admit it. We will still hold the sense of the text to the exact limits of its grammar, and make "the dead" the special dead who furnished a motive to the baptized. But it is clearly impossible for any such thought to be separated from the conception of Christ's great heavenly kingdom. No surviving Christian locates his departed friend in a solitary

world. Special affection binds the believer to a few of the dead, but faith relates those few to all the rest, and so, in effect, affection for the dead we love most, embodies for us the whole heavenly glory. All this must have been in the mind of Paul when he passed in a breath from the delineation of that glory, to this question concerning the special dead. He embodied them within it, just as the faith that braved his own dangers foresaw himself in the midst of that company. It was thus that either argument carried with it the hope and the proof of the resurrection of all the saints. And thus, too, all those great thoughts concerning the dead and risen Saviour, and the glorious company of his people, which other interpretations have labored to fasten upon the terms of the text are, according to our view, awakened and defined by its affectionate spirit.

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#### ART. VI.—CAIRNES ON THE SLAVE POWER.

THE SLAVE POWER ; ITS CHARACTER, CAREER, AND PROBABLE DESIGNS : Being an Attempt to Explain the Real Issues involved in the American Contest. By J. E. CAIRNES, M.A., Professor of Jurisprudence and Political Economy in Queen's College, Galway ; and late Whately Professor of Political Economy in the University of Dublin. 2d edition. New-York : Carleton, Publisher, 413 Broadway.

THIS is by far the most able and satisfactory work on the American contest which has yet appeared in England. As an exposition of the character, history, and designs of the Slave Power, it is a master-piece of candid and thorough discussion. The matter and the manner of it are alike admirable. It is, indeed, a refreshing oasis in the moral desert of British speculation and dogmatism concerning America. Professor Cairnes enjoyed already the reputation of being one of the first writers on Political Economy in Great Britain. This book will not only enhance his reputation as a political economist, but will also place him high among the best social and political philosophers of the age. Instead of the wretched

sciolism, ignorance, and immorality, which have characterized so large a portion of English writings and opinions about our national struggle, this treatise bears throughout the marks of careful, conscientious study and profound reflection; while the ethical tone is eminently pure and earnest. Professor Cairnes is "far from being an admirer of democracy as it exists in the Northern States", but he is evidently an ardent admirer of justice, freedom, humanity, and the other great principles of Christian civilization involved in this contest. We hail his work, therefore, with sincere thankfulness; and, although differing with him on some points, and especially as to the probable issue of the struggle, we heartily commend it to all our readers. Would that a copy could be placed in the hands of every voter in the United States who is able to read it! We are glad to see that a new edition, carefully revised by the author, is soon to appear. Let it be republished in a cheap form and sown broadcast over the land; let special pains be taken to have it read by our public men, both in civil life and in the army and navy; and also by our leading merchants. We know of no work better fitted to diffuse and to render still deeper and more vivid the conviction of the loyal American people that the cause for which they are fighting is not their own merely, but that in a preëminent sense it is also the cause of Christian progress and civilization the world over.

With these remarks we proceed to give our readers some extracts from the work, illustrative of its general aim and character. The main scope of the argument is to show that the SLAVE POWER (which Prof. C. defines as "that system of interests, industrial, social, and political, which has for the greater part of half a century directed the career of the American Union, and which now, embodied in the Southern Confederation, seeks admission as an equal member into the community of civilized nations") "*constitutes the most formidable antagonist to civilized progress which has appeared for many centuries, representing a system of society at once retrograde and aggressive, a system which, containing within it no germs from which improvement can spring, gravitates inevitably toward barbarism, while it is impelled by exigencies*

*inherent in its position and circumstances to a constant extension of its territorial domain"* (p. 26).

To establish this startling proposition the author enters at once upon an elaborate and searching analysis of the institution of slavery, pointing out its different fortunes in the North and South, rejecting the common explanations of this phenomenon, which attribute it to climate, race, or diversity of character in the original settlers, and asserting the true solution of the problem to be economic. Slave labor is given reluctantly; it is unskilful; it is wanting in versatility. These are its defects. But slave labor is susceptible of complete organization—it can be combined on an extensive scale and directed by a controlling mind to a single end. This is its merit; and this is why it has so flourished in the South in spite of its inherent defects.

But it must not be inferred that because, under certain conditions, slavery is economically profitable it is, therefore, conducive to at least the material well-being of countries in which these conditions exist. This does not follow—and to show that it does not, the author discusses at length the internal organization of slave societies and points out the varied and fatal obstacles which it puts in the way of industrial development and general well-being. He thus concludes the chapter: "To sum up in a few words the general results of the foregoing discussion: the Slave Power—that power which has long held the helm of Government in the Union—is, under the forms of a democracy, an uncontrolled despotism, wielded by a compact oligarchy. Supported by the labor of four millions of slaves, it rules a population of five millions of whites—a population ignorant, averse to systematic industry, and prone to irregular adventure. A system of society more formidable for evil, more menacing to the best interests of the human race, it is difficult to conceive" (p. 63).

Having examined the internal organization, the author proceeds to discuss the tendencies, internal development, and external policy of slave societies. All these points are treated with signal ability. In considering the first-mentioned, he notes the radical differences between American slavery and



the institution as it existed in the ancient world. There is the vital fact of the difference in color between the American slave and his master ; a difference fraught with the most disastrous consequences. Another difference arises from the vast growth and extension of international commerce in modern times—

“ So long as each nation was in the main dependent on the industry of its own members for the supply of its wants, a strong motive would be present for the cultivation of the intelligence, and the improvement of the condition of the industrial classes. The commodities which minister to comfort and luxury cannot be produced without skilled labor, and skilled labor implies a certain degree of mental cultivation, and a certain progress in social respect. To attain success in the more difficult industrial arts, the workman must respect his vocation, must take an interest in his task ; habits of care, deliberation, forethought, must be acquired ; in short, there must be such a general awakening of the faculties, intellectual and moral, as by leading men to a knowledge of their rights and of the means of enforcing them, inevitably disqualifies them for the servile condition. Now this was the position in which the slave-master found himself in the ancient world. He was, in the main, dependent on the skill of his slaves for obtaining whatever he required. He was, therefore, naturally led to cultivate the faculties of his slaves, and by consequence to promote generally the improvement of their condition. His progress in the enjoyment of the material advantages of civilisation depended directly upon *their* progress in knowledge and social consideration. Accordingly, the education of slaves was never prohibited in the ancient Roman world, and, in point of fact, no small number of them enjoyed the advantage of a high cultivation. ‘The youths of promising genius’, says Gibbon, ‘were instructed in the arts and sciences, and almost every profession, liberal and mechanical, might be found in the household of an opulent Senator’. Modern slaveholders, on the contrary, are independent of the skill, and therefore of the intelligence and social improvement of their slave population. They have only need to find a commodity which is capable of being produced by crude labor, and at the same time in large demand in the markets of the world ; and by applying their slaves to the production of this, they may, through an exchange with other countries, make it the means of procuring for themselves whatever they require. Cotton and sugar, for example, are commodities which fulfil these conditions ; they may be raised by crude labor, and they are in large demand throughout the world. Accordingly, Alabama and Louisiana have only to employ their slaves in raising these products, and they are enabled through their means to command the industrial resources of all commercial nations. Without cultivating one of the arts or refinements of civilisation, they can possess themselves of all its material comforts. Without employing an

artisan, a manufacturer, a skilled laborer of any sort, they can secure the products of the highest manufacturing and mechanical skill" (pp. 68, 69).

Then there is the difference of the slave-trade :

"Trading in slaves was doubtless practised by the ancients, and with sufficient barbarity. But we look in vain in the records of antiquity for a traffic which, in extent, in systematic character, and above all, in the function discharged by it as the common support of countries breeding and consuming human labor, can with justice be regarded as the analogue of the modern slave-trade — of that organized system which has been carried on between Guinea and the coast of America, and of that between Virginia, the Guinea of the New World, and the slave-consuming States of the South and West" (p. 71).

The chapter on the internal development of slave societies is exceedingly impressive. The rude industrial state of the *mean whites*, and the absurdity of looking to *them* for social amelioration, are vividly set forth. Can we look to the slaves or their masters? It were equally absurd. The condition of the slaves, as such, is utterly hopeless: it contains no germ of promise. And as to their masters, what prospect is there of emancipation in a government based upon slavery as its "corner-stone"? Ultimate barbarism—not freedom and civilisation—is the inevitable goal of Southern slave society.

The chapter on the external policy of slave societies is full of power. We give a portion of it :

"In free societies, the paths to eminence are various. Successful trade, the professions, science and literature, social reform, philanthropy, furnish employment for the redundant activity of the people, and open so many avenues to distinction. But for slaveholders these means of advancement do not exist. Commerce and manufactures are excluded by the necessities of the case. The professions, which are the result of much subdivision of employment where population is rich and dense, can have no place in a poor and thinly peopled country. Science and literature are left without the principal inducements for their cultivation, where there is no field for their most important practical applications. Social reform and philanthropy would be out of place in a country where human chattels are the principal property. Practically, but one career lies open to the Southerner desirous of advancement — agriculture carried on by slaves. To this, therefore, he turns. In the management of his plantation, in the breeding, buying, and selling of slaves, his life is passed. Amid the moral atmosphere which

this mode of life engenders, his ideas and tastes are formed. He has no notion of ease, independence, happiness, where slavery is not found. Is it strange, then, that his ambition should connect itself with the institution around which are entwined his domestic associations, which is identified with all his plans in life, and which offers him the sole chance of emerging from obscurity?

"But the aspirations of the slaveholder are not confined within the limits of his own community. He is also a citizen of the United States. In the former, he naturally and easily takes the leading place; but, as a member of the larger society in which he is called upon to act in combination with men who have been brought up under free institutions, the position which he is destined to fill is not so clearly indicated. It is plain, however, that he cannot become blended in the general mass of the population of the Union. His character, habits, and aims are not those of the Northern people, nor are theirs his. The Northerner is a merchant, a manufacturer, a lawyer, a literary man, an artisan, a shopkeeper, a schoolmaster, a peasant farmer; he is engaged in commercial speculation, or in promoting social or political reform; perhaps he is a philanthropist, and includes slavery-abolition in his programme. Between such men and the slaveholder of the South there is no common basis for political action. There are no objects in promoting which he can combine with them in good faith and upon public grounds. There lies before him, therefore, but one alternative: he must stand by his fellows, and become powerful as the asserter and propagandist of slavery; or, failing this, he must submit to be of no account in the politics of the Union. Here then again the slaveholder is thrown back upon his peculiar system as the sole means of satisfying the master passion of his life. In the society of the Union, no less than in that of the State, he finds that his single path to power lies through the maintenance and extension of this institution. Accordingly, to uphold it, to strengthen it, to provide for its future growth and indefinite expansion, becomes the dream of his life—the one great object of his existence. But this is not all; this same institution, which is the beginning and end of the slaveholder's being, places between him and the citizens of free societies a broad and impassable gulf. The system which is the foundation of his present existence and future hopes, is by them denounced as sinful and inhuman; and he is himself held up to the reprobation of mankind. The tongues and hands of all freemen are instinctively raised against him. A consciousness is thus awakened in the minds of the community of slaveholders that they are a proscribed class, that their position is one of antagonism to the whole civilized world; and the feeling binds them together in the fastest concord. Their pride is aroused; and all the energy of their nature is exerted to make good their position against those who would assail it. In this manner the instinct of self-defence and the sentiment of pride come to aid the passion of ambition, and all tend to fix in the minds of the slaveholders the resolution to maintain at all hazards the

keystone of their social order. To establish their scheme of society on such broad and firm foundations that they may set at defiance the public opinion of free nations, and, in the last resort, resist the combined efforts of their physical power, becomes at length the settled purpose and clearly conceived design of the whole body. To this they devote themselves with the zeal of fanatics, with the persistency and secrecy of conspirators.

"The position of slaveholders thus naturally fosters the passion of ambition, and that passion inevitably connects itself with the maintenance and extension of slavery" (pp. 97, 98).

The career and designs of the slave power form the subject of the two following chapters. They are written with great force, and evince an extraordinary familiarity with our political history during the last thirty years.

In his concluding chapter the author shows the impolicy of European intervention, the duty of neutrality and the obligation to render us moral support. He also considers the possible modes of settlement, and suggests one of his own, which he thinks would involve an ultimate victory over slavery. His plan is to recognise the Confederacy with the Mississippi for its western boundary. We trust and believe that a much better plan — even that of a regenerated, free, and unbroken Union — is in the decree of Almighty Providence.

G. L. P.

## ART. VII.—BELIEF OF THE INDIANS IN INFERIOR SPIRITS.

By J. A. VAN HEUVEL, Esq., Ogdensburgh, N. Y.

THE Indian nations of America, besides acknowledging a Supreme Being, believe also in good spirits subordinate to Him to whom they offer prayers and supplications.

"The Indians", says Lafitan, "believe not only in a Supreme Being, but also in spirits inferior to him. Their number is not fixed. Their imagination sees them in all things in nature; but especially in all such as are wonderful, whose origin is not known and have the character of novelty".\*

"To all their inferior deities", says Charleroi, "the Hurons, Iroquois, and Algonquins, make various kinds of offerings. To propitiate the god of the waters, they cast into the streams and lakes tobacco and birds that have been killed by them. In honor of the sun, and also of inferior spirits, they consume in the fire a part of everything they eat. Strings of wampum, ears of corn, the skins, and often the whole carcasses, of animals are seen along difficult and dangerous rocks, and on the shores of rapids, as so many offerings made to the presiding genius of the place".†

Mr. Bancroft, in his *History of the United States*, thus remarks on this part of the Indian belief: "The red man sees a divinity in every power. Every hidden agency, every mysterious influence is personified. A god dwells in the sun and in the moon, and in the firmament; a god reddens in the eastern sky; a deity is present on the ocean and in the fire; the crag that overhangs the river has its genius; there is a spirit in the waterfall; a household god makes his abode in the

\* *Mœurs des Sauvages*, vol. i, p. 153.† *Travels in Canada*.

Indian's wigwam, and consecrates his home. So the savage deity, broken as it were into an infinite number of fragments, fills all place and all being. . . . Hennepin found a beaver-robe hung on an oak as an oblation to the spirit that dwells on the Falls of St. Anthony. The guides of Jontel, in the southwest, on killing a buffalo, offered several slices of the meat as a sacrifice to the unknown spirit of that wilderness. As they passed the Ohio, its beautiful stream was propitiated by gifts of tobacco and dried meat, and worship was paid to the rock just above the Missouri".\*

Tobacco is an offering especially made to the inferior spirits. "There is", says an early traveller, "an herb in Virginia called uppowee, which is tobacco and is held in such estimation that they think their gods are extremely delighted with it, for which reason they make hallowed fires, and cast some of the powder therein for a sacrifice. Being in a storm upon the waters, they cast some up into the air; all done with strange gestures, stamping, and sometimes dancing, clapping of hands, holding them up, looking to the heavens, and uttering strange words and noises".†

The adoration of these inferior deities is the ordinary worship of the American Indians. To the Great Spirit or Supreme Being their addresses are made only on particular great occasions.

Harmon, in his Journal, says of the Indians generally, "offerings are sometimes made to the Supreme Being, but rarely. They occasionally supplicate of him success in their important undertakings.

Lederer observes of the Indians of Virginia: "Okee is their name for the Creator of all things. To him the high priest offers sacrifices; but their ordinary devotion is to lesser divinities, to whom they suppose sublunary affairs are committed".

It is, perhaps, from this that the early French Catholic missionaries who, Lafitan complains, did not make themselves

\* *History of the United States*, chap. xxii.

† *Purchas' Collection*.



sufficiently acquainted with the religion of the American Indians, have expressed an opinion that they had no belief in God, and paid no worship to him, of which Mr. Bancroft gives several instances. "As to the knowledge of God", says Jontel of the southwest, "it did not seem to me that they had any notion. True we found upon our route some who, as far as we could judge, believed that there was something exalted which is above all; but they have neither temples nor ceremonies nor prayers marking a divine worship". Le Jeune says: "There is among them very little superstition; they think only of living and revenge; they are not attached to the worship of any divinity".

But these accounts of the Jesuits are certainly without foundation, and could have arisen only from a very imperfect examination. It is true the American Indians have no temples or religious ceremonies for the worship of the Great Spirit or Supreme Being; but that they acknowledge him and make "prayers to him; marking a divine worship", which Jontel denies, has been most abundantly shown. The contradiction of the statements of the Jesuits, by Lafitan, who had most thoroughly inquired into the religion of the Indians, is indeed, of itself, a sufficient refutation of them.

The American Indians have images or idols of their inferior spirits. "The Iroquois", says Charleroix, "make *Manitous*, or carved images, of their good spirits which they carried with them wherever they went. Kitchi-Manitou is their name for the Great Spirit. There is a Manitou of the rivers, the lakes, etc. To these manitous they have recourse when they are in any danger, when they go on any enterprise, and when they would obtain any extraordinary favor".\*

"I have seen", says Heckewelder, "the Chippewas on the lakes pray to the Manitou of the Waters that he might prevent the swells from rising too high while they were passing over them. In both cases they threw tobacco in the air or strewed it on the water".†

"The Hurons and Iroquois", says the Bishop of Meaux, "in

\* *Travels in Canada.*

† *History of the Delawares.*

their march, encamp a long time before sunset, and commonly leave before the camp a large space surrounded by palissadoes, or rather a sort of lattice, in which they place their manitous facing toward the spot to which they are going. They invoke them for an hour, and the same time when they decamp. After this they think they have nothing to fear; they suppose that the spirits take upon themselves to be sentinels, and all the family sleep quiet under their supposed influence".\*

In this worship, of the American Indians, of inferior deities, we see an idolatry of the heathens of the old world. Dr. Leland observes: "The belief that God did not concern himself with mankind in their affairs, but committed the arrangement of them to inferior deities, obtained among many of those pagan nations who retained the idea of a Supreme Being, which was the source of the prevailing polytheism. As men fell from the worship of the One True God, the providence they acknowledged was the providence of the deities they adored. It was parcelled out among a multitude of gods and goddesses, among whom they think the administration of things to be distributed. To them, therefore, they offered up prayers and sacrifices for obtaining the good things they stood in need of, and averting the calamities they feared".†

Dr. Hinds, in his *Early History of Christianity*, thus explains the origin of this idolatry: "That the Israelites did not consider polytheism as implying a disbelief in the unity of God, will hardly be denied. That the heathen originally adopted it under the same impression, is also highly probable. But what, it may be asked, could have suggested to the early world a system so strange, and apparently incongruous, as polytheism? . . . A doctrine in the Bible, we think, gave rise to it. A belief in angels and ministering spirits appears in the earliest records of God's dispensations; nor can there be any difficulty in fixing on this article of belief as the point from which religion first began to diverge into error and superstition and impiety. Men, for instance, attributing whatever

\* *Origin of the American Indians.* By John McIntosh, M.D. Quebec.

† *Necessity of Revelation.*

blessings they received from God to the intermediate agency of his good angels, would (if neglectful of the appointed preservatives against error) fall into an undue regard and reverence for these ministers of good. A kindly season, the rains which caused their crops to grow, the sun which ripened it, would become associated in their effects with some invisible superintendent, the agent and the creature”.

It is doubtful whether in ancient idolatry, in which the whole world was divided among a multitude of gods and goddesses, absolute independent power was given to each in his particular sphere, or that every one was considered only the minister of the Sovereign Power through whose mediation and intercession gifts and favors were obtained from him. But in regard to the American Indians, it appears from several authorities that the latter is the idea entertained by them of their inferior spirits.

“To the inferior spirits”, says Harmon in his Journal, “the offerings of the Indians are commonly made; and to injure anything wantonly is considered highly insulting to the Great Master of Life, *who is the secret object of their adorations*”.

Of the Delawares or Lenni Lenape, Loskiel says they sacrifice to a hare because, according to report, their first ancestor was a hare; to Indian corn they sacrifice bear-flesh, etc.; but they positively deny that they pay any adoration to the good spirits, and affirm that they only worship the true God *through them*.\*

In a very distant quarter we find the same idea among the American Indians. Martyr, the contemporary of Columbus, in his very authentic work on the New World, says: “The Indians of Hispaniola had hung about their necks little idols called Zemís, which they revered as intercessors for them with the Great Spirit”.

No one of the writers from whom these extracts are taken appears to have considered the conformity of this belief of the American Indians with the doctrine of Mediation, the foundation of the Christian religion.

\* *History of the Missouris.*

In ancient times the existence of two principles, Good and Evil, producing the varied character of human affairs, prevailed extensively in the Old World.

"Men", says Dr. Leland, "unable to account for the evil in the world under the administration of a Good Being, believed that there was an evil and opposing principle continually endeavoring to thwart his designs. Plutarch, who gives his assent to this doctrine, says it was the general sentiment of the most famous and ancient nations, and of the wisest and gravest persons among them; that it obtained among the Persians, and that it may be traced in the astrology of the Chaldeans, in the mysterious and sacred rites of the Egyptians, and even among the Greeks. This belief found its way, in early times, into the Christian church and gave rise to the sect of Manichæists".\*

The same mythology exists universally among the American Indians.

Of this belief among the tribes of North America we omit any account as it appears in their manner of curing the sick by expelling the evil spirit, which is well known, being related by all travellers, and will be tedious to repeat.

A few instances in nations south of them will be mentioned.

The Caribees of the West India Islands, Rochefort says, believed in an evil spirit whom they called Maboya, and said that he often appeared to them in hideous shapes, and they showed marks on their bodies of the bruises he had given them.†

Of the Indian tribes on the Orinoco, Gamilla says there is not one that does not believe in an evil spirit, to whom they attribute all the calamities that occur to them.‡

The Galibis of Cayenne call the evil spirit Ironcan (the Caribees of British Guiana above them call it Hyorocan). They ascend at break of day a high mountain, turn to the east, and invoke Tamouzi, their name for the Supreme Being, then to the west, and pray with fervor to Ironcan; but they

\* *Necessity of Revelation.*

† Rochefort, *Histoire des Antilles*, book ii, chap. 10.

‡ *History of the Orinoco*, chap. 28.

said to the missionaries, that they did not pray to Ironcan with a good heart, but because he is powerful and wicked.\*

"The Brazilians", says De Lery, "believe in a devil, not that they worship him, but are tormented by him. Even in speaking of him they tremble. Sometimes in the form of a bird, in another in that of a beast, they grievously torment them".†

It is chiefly in diseases that the power of the evil spirit is endeavored to be counteracted. Among all the American Indians is an order of priests who unite in their office the practice of the medical art, and are believed to have intercourse with the Good Spirit, and in curing the sick call in their aid his influence to expel the evil spirit, who is supposed to have taken possession of the patient. They have in their hands a rattle, called by the Algonquins Chichikoné, by the Brazilians and other Southern nations Maracca. The chichikoné is made of a gourd with a handle fixed to it; the maracca of the Southern Indians is formed of the calabash, a fruit of the shape of a melon, with a stick thrust through it, the upper part of which is decorated with feathers. In both cases, the contents are removed, and seeds or pebbles placed in to make a rattling sound when shaken. The ceremonies of the priest when called to cure the sick are very similar among all the Indians of North and South America, and substantially the following: With the rattle in his hand he moves about the patient, who is lying on a bed or hammock, leaping and dancing with a variety of motions, shaking the rattle and uttering some unintelligible words to induce the Good Spirit to expel the evil spirit from him, employing meanwhile, doubtless secretly, medical remedies which he carries with him. Then drawing from his mouth a thorn, a bone or splinter of wood, exhibits it and declares it was the cause of the sickness which is now removed.

The ceremonies of the Caribees of the West India Islands have something peculiar, as particularly related by Rochefort in his account of them. When a person is taken sick, and all the remedies used for his recovery are unavailing, he sends for

\* Barrere, *Histoire de la France Equinoctiale*.

† Purchas' Collection.

a boyer or priest, who first endeavors to procure the appearance of the chemin or Good Spirit of the patient; for which purpose he makes an altar in a corner of the cabin of three of their small tables called matoutons, one laid above the other, on which he places an offering to the chemin of cassava, the bread of the Caribees, and a bowl of ovicon, their favorite drink. The fires have been all put out and the lights extinguished, so that there is perfect darkness in the cabin. The boyer then enters and vociferating some uncouth words, stamps on the ground and smokes a roll of tobacco, blowing the smoke upwards, then rubs the tobacco in his hands and scatters it in the air. On this a dreadful sound is heard, supposed to come from the chemin, and he is believed to be entering the cabin, through the roof. Perfect darkness being in the cabin, those in it do not perceive the deception practised. The boyer then inquires of the chemin the cause of the illness of the patient, whose answer gives hopes of his recovery, which is doubtless made by the boyer with a counterfeited voice. This he announces to the patient, and then passes his hand over the part of his body where the pain is felt, rubs it and pretends to extract from it a thorn or bone, etc., which he says was the cause of his illness. If the patient does not recover, he has various reasons at hand to account for it. He says that the evil spirit had taken such firm hold of his body that it was not possible to expel it, or that there was another boyer who was unfriendly to him (the patient), or that sufficient gifts had not been made to the chemin. If he is restored, as an acknowledgment to the boyer, he prepares a feast, at which the first place is given to him, and an offering of cassava and ovicon is provided for the chemin.\*

In the smoking of tobacco, in this ceremony, to call down the chemin, we have another instance of its being an offering made by the American Indians to inferior spirits. But the calumet was not used, which is exclusively an instrument of the North American Indians. Instead of it, it is seen that a roll of tobacco was employed.

\* Rochefort, *Histoire des Antilles*, book ii.



The chichikoné or maracca appears to be of a sacred character, and an instrument through which the answers of the Good Spirit are given.

In the ceremony of the Brazilians for infusing the spirit of courage, those assembled formed themselves into three rings, in each of which were three or four Caribees, who were their priests, each having a maracca in his hand, which he continually shook, from which they said the spirit would speak. De Lery, from whom we take this account, says, Toupan, their name for the Supreme Being, goeth about to reveal secrets to these Caribees, who possess the interpretation of dreams, and are also esteemed as wizards that confer with spirits. They say that a spirit came from the remotest parts of the world who gave the maracca power to make answers to questions.\* Stade, who was taken prisoner by the Brazilians, and ascribes his captivity to the prediction of the maracca,† thus relates the manner in which it was consecrated: "After the ceremony for infusing the spirit of courage, the paygi or priests order every one to carry his tamaraka to the house where it was to receive the spirit of speech, who sticks its stem (or handle) in the ground, and all offer to the chief paygi arrows, feathers, and earrings, who then blows petum (tobacco) on it, puts it to his mouth and says, Nee Kora, speak if thou art within; and follows a squeaking voice, which I, says Stade, thought the wizard did, but the people ascribed it to the tamaraka. Then the paygi persuade them to make war, saying that those spirits long to feed on the flesh of captives. This done, every one takes his rattle and builds a house to keep it, and places meat and drink before it, which the Indians believe they eat, and ask of it such things as they need, and these he says are their gods".‡

The Indians about Auzerma in New Grenada, called the Spaniards, when they first saw them, Tamaraka, as if it signified a superior being.§

\* Purchas.

† *Southey's History of Brazil*, vol. i, p. 187.

‡ *Purchas' Pilgrimage*, p. 1038.

§ *Southey's History of Brazil*, vol. i, note 44.

Narvaez, one of the earliest navigators to Florida, says, in some places, as we passed, we saw the physicians or magicians with rattles of gourds which they suppose to have come from heaven, and to have great virtue in them.\*

From the view which has been given of the religion of the American Indians, two conclusions may be drawn.

First, that they were derived from the old world. This might *à priori* be admitted, as the Scriptures inform us that all mankind are sprung from one pair, and that the only survivors of the deluge which destroyed the world were Noah and his three sons, who, with their immediate descendants, having collected on the plain of Shinar, in Central Asia, on their attempt to build a tower "whose top should reach unto the heavens", were by a divine command frustrated in their attempt and their language confounded, on which they dispersed in different directions over the earth. It is pleasing, however, to find the derivation of the people of the American continent from the other hemisphere shown by the similarity of religious ideas in both sections of the globe, confirming the Scripture account of the Human Species.

Second. We learn from the same view what was the first religion of the world. Dr. Hinds remarks, that two Greek historians observe that it is from uncivilized barbarous nations that this knowledge can be best obtained. "Can we do otherwise", exclaims Ælian (Book ii, chap. 31), than commend the wisdom of the barbarians? Among them no one followed atheism. With them there are no controversies about the gods, nor questioning whether there are such things or not". "The barbarians", says Diodorus Siculus, "go on in one course, firm to their principles; but the Greeks, who consider philosophy a gainful profession, are for setting up new sects and opposing things to theory on the most important subjects, so that the people only acquire the habit of doubting".

The American Indians acquaint us with what was the primitive religion of mankind in these respects.

1. They worship only one God, whom they term the Good

\* Purchas, vol. i, book viii, chap. 7.

Spirit, who governs all things. Among nations of the old world, when idolatry was introduced among them, gods and goddesses were multiplied without number. Hence the first commandment in the Decalogue, "I am the Lord thy God, thou shalt have no other gods before me".

2. The American Indians have no statues or images or any representation whatever of the Supreme Being. Such was the case at first in the ancient world; but when religion became corrupted, there was this other prohibition in the Decalogue, "not to make any graven image, nor to bow down to them nor serve them".

3. The American Indians have no temples or altars for the worship of the Supreme Being. They worship him in the open air under the canopy of heaven. They ascend to the tops of high mountains to pray to the Great Spirit.

In all these particulars there is a resemblance between them and the ancient Persians. "The Persians", says Herodotus (Book i, sect. 151), reject the use of temples, of altars, and of statues. The tops of the highest mountains are the places chosen for sacrifice. The Supreme Being who fills the wide circuit of heaven is the object to which their addresses are made.

## ART. VIII.—POLITICS AND THE PULPIT.

By REV. WILLIAM ADAMS, D.D., New York.

PUBLIC attention has been frequently directed of late to what is generally understood by "*preaching politics*". We propose to state a few principles, of permanent use, pertaining to this subject. Confused and inconsistent notions concerning it are entertained by many. Some are very jealous of any allusions from the pulpit to matters affecting the state. Others insist that the pulpit shall be out-spoken and explicit in the advocacy of their own favorite policy. So long as the ministry is a power in the world, its influence will be deprecated or invoked in aid of all objects where power is coveted. Few men have objections to the preaching of politics, so long as it is their own politics which are preached.

A clergyman preaches a discourse which he thinks is demanded by the perils of the country. The doctrine he advocates is distasteful to certain conductors of the political press, who forthwith censure him for transcending his proper vocation. He is accused of meddling with subjects which do not belong to his profession. He is distinctly informed that if he ventures to intrude into such an arena, his high and holy calling will be disgraced, and the white robes of his office will be sullied by the missiles with which he will certainly be pelted by excited men. Ere long the pulpit speaks again, from another quarter and in another tone. It promulgates doctrines now which happen to be agreeable to the very men who before censured the clergy for presuming to speak at all on such subjects, but who now congratulate themselves, the country, and religion itself for such wise, wholesome, and timely counsels. 'Now the ministry is doing its proper work. It does not stand aloof from those practical concerns which affect the

well-being of society, but as God's most beneficent agent, it is shedding the light and authority of heaven on the interests of time'.

Herein is a manifest inconsistency. Silence and speech at the same time, and in regard to the same subject, cannot both be right. That is no pendulum which swings only on one side. Surely there must be some fixed principle pertaining to the subject which ought to be ascertained, otherwise the Christian pulpit is destitute of all dignity, exposed by turns to flattery or contempt.

As to the *chief and distinctive object* of the Christian ministry there can be no diversity of opinion. It is to announce those truths which affect man in his highest relations—to God and immortality. Unlike other teachers who, beginning with the lower ascend to the higher, the Christian ministry are appointed to proclaim those truths which relate to the *supreme* interests of our race. In the act of doing this, irrespective of all earthly distinctions, ignoring all those strata and conditions of society which the Apostle intends by "knowing man after the flesh", the teachers of religion are by an insensible and indirect process contributing most to that secular prosperity which others make their direct and exclusive endeavor. Elevating man in the scale of character, by introducing him to an immediate fellowship with his Maker, you are sure to confer importance on all which concerns his relations to his fellow-men and this present life. We need not expand this thought, that intelligence, freedom, law, order, enterprise, commerce, arts, industry, wealth, follow in the train of the Christian religion. Any tyro in history and geography will admit as much. He who preaches then, as he is bidden, repentance toward God and faith toward our Lord Jesus Christ, employing himself with those distinctive and germinant truths which are his peculiar themes, is contributing more than he knows to the welfare of states, and the true prosperity of nations. In this sense, political reforms are embosomed in the doctrine of justification by faith and national progress is insured by Christian devotion.

True religion should pervade the whole of man's being.

The Sabbath, the closet, the church, are not its exclusive sphere; his business and his politics belong to it as well. By politics we understand his relations to the state. It cannot be admitted that these and other secular interests, as they are called, are too common and unclean for contact with religion, since the broad requirement of the Scripture is that whether we eat or drink, or whatever we do, we should do all to the glory of God: and if political duties and relations are not to be pervaded by the spirit of religion, then are we involved in the practical solecism, that there is a large part of our existence which is necessarily irreligious; and still farther the necessity is entailed of a sufficient number being detached, even in the millennium, to rig and work the ship of state, an ungodly crew, beyond the suspicion of all sanctity and piety. This common distinction between the secular and the religious is a convenience of speech for certain purposes, but it conveys a falsity, since in the better generalization of the New Testament religion covers the whole extent of our being, the countless variety of our interests and relations; just as the sea fills all the bays and inlets and creeks with its in-flowing waters.

From these general principles, in this form, there can be no dissent. The difficulty is in the application of the latter principle on the part of the ministry, in an official capacity, to *specific cases*.

Perhaps it will help us in reaching the truth on this subject, if we refresh our memories with a few historical facts. The time was, in our ancestral land, when, Church and State being combined in one organism, the clergy with few exceptions were little more than the tools of the throne. "Tuning the pulpits" was a very significant expression, as used by Queen Elizabeth, to describe the subserviency of courtly chaplains in advocating the royal will. We are conscious of pitiful regret for the times and the men, when it was not uncommon, if a preacher expatiated with anything of freedom, for a gruff Tudor voice from the royal pew to bid him return from his "ungodly digression and keep himself to his text".

Life cannot always be cramped and fettered, and at length there arose an order of men who claimed the right to declare



the truth of God, in utmost freedom, accountable only to its divine Author.\* The assertion of religious liberty necessarily prepared the way for personal and political liberty, and Hume himself, tory and sceptic as he was, was compelled to admit that English Puritanism was the root and life of all true English freedom.

The colonization of New England was a *religious* movement; and to subtract from it the direct and positive influence of church and ministry, would be like taking out the bones and soul from the human body. Those colonists have been often censured and ridiculed for the ecclesiastical requirements which they exacted in political relations and magistracies. The truth is, that at that time every nation in Christendom required religious conformities of those who officiated in affairs of state. That which was peculiar and novel on the part of the Puritan colonists was that their ideas of the church and of religion went beyond the outward form, to a heart-renovation;—a new test which repelled and disgusted the adventurers who had no sympathy with spiritual religion.

So the foundations of our national life were laid. There are two distinct periods in our national history; when the agency of the clergy was very conspicuous, the object of reprehension or encomium by different parties. The first of these was at and during the Revolutionary war, and the formation of a new government, independent of Great Britain. The second was from the change of politics under President Jefferson, culminating in the war of 1812, and extending down, with a gradual diminution of prejudice and violence, to a time within the memory of most of our readers. Consulting these several periods we shall find much to admire, and much to censure; many mistakes, many fidelities and proofs of wisdom.

When troubles arose between the American Colonies and the British Government the whole structure of society was shaken, and men of all professions and pursuits were com-

\* What Jeremy Taylor has called the "liberty of prophesying" in his famous *θεολογία εκλεκτική*.

pelled to avow their sentiments and choose their position. At this distance of time it is common to suppose that the action of the American people was unanimous in advocating independence from the British throne. This was far from being true. The people were divided among themselves. The crown officers and many of the leading and opulent citizens were opposed to separation from Great Britain. The result was invective, reproach, and violence — distracted counties, towns and parishes. The idea of multitudes was to resist what they held to be unjust and oppressive on the part of the British Crown; to demand the sanctity of charters — the right of representation; but not to sever themselves as integral parts of the British realm. In this assertion of colonial right and justice, the clergy with wonderful unanimity sympathized; but God intended more than they at first foresaw. The rock once loosened from its bed was destined to roll on notwithstanding all obstructions. The idea of national independence gained familiarity and force; and at length the struggle began. There was a necessity that the clergy, in common with all other citizens, should adopt one side or the other. Some for a while hesitated to commit themselves to what appeared to be *irreligious* rebellion. Their scruples were founded on religious grounds. The Episcopal Church, with some notable exceptions, was particularly conspicuous in this position; indeed, some of the early pamphlets relating to the Revolution inform us that the hostility to Great Britain cherished by the Congregational and Presbyterian ministers was imputed to a sectarian origin, as being moved by the fact that the Episcopal Church was sustained and established by the parent country. The precise state of many among the American people, in the incipient stages of the Revolution, will better appear from a few examples.

Dr. Jonathan Mayhew, one of the best names of New England, at that time the pastor of the West Church, in Boston, published a thanksgiving sermon in May, 1766, on the occasion of the repeal of the Stamp Act, from the text: "Our soul is escaped as a bird from the snare of the fowlers, the snare is broken and we are escaped". This discourse, full

of patriotism, is pervaded with the idea that justice had been done, the wrong redressed, and the difficulty adjusted. It was dedicated to William Pitt. On the 22d of June, 1775, Dr. William Smith, Provost of the University of Pennsylvania, preached a sermon in Christ Church, Philadelphia, in which he "pants for the return of those halcyon days of harmony during which the two countries flourished together as the glory and wonder of the world"—and while demanding that Britain should do justly with her colonies, he affirms that the idea of independence from the parent country is "utterly foreign to their thoughts, and that our rightful sovereign has nowhere more loyal subjects, or more zealously attached to those principles of government under which he inherited his throne". Another instance yet more to the point. Dr. Duché, of Philadelphia, is known as the divine who opened the Continental Congress, in 1774, with prayer. In 1776 he was appointed Chaplain to the Congress, but at an early stage of the war he manifested a decided opposition to independence, and in a long letter to General Washington endeavored to dissuade him from the cause to which he was pledged. Dr. Zubly, of Savannah, in 1775 a member of the first Provincial Congress of Georgia, preached a sermon in that year at the opening of that body, impregnated with the spirit of patriotism and liberty, but strongly discountenancing the independence of the colonies. These examples will suffice to show how great was the hesitation on the part of many, and this on ethical and religious grounds, to a severance of the body politic. As Christian men they dreaded schisms in church and state. The discourses from which we have drawn our illustrations were delivered in the *beginning* of the war, when ethics were not yet classified and adjusted by facts. With a very few and notable exceptions—such as the witty and eccentric Dr. Byles of Boston, whose connection with his congregation was dissolved in 1776 because of his toryism—who was denounced in town meeting as an enemy to his country, and afterwards tried before a special court on the charge of praying for the King; receiving visits from British officers, and remaining in the town during the siege—who, in his own

words, was "guarded, re-guarded and disregarded" — the vast body of the unpretentious ministry of the country advocated the Revolution, in public and private, on Christian principles. They justified the war on religious grounds. They believed that human rights and liberties would gain by its success. They had the sagacity to foresee its issue: Among the most faithful of religious men, modest and pains-taking in their parishes, there was no concealment of their sympathies. Many of them went as chaplains into the army; among them Dwight — *clarum et venerabile nomen* — and he retains in his lyrical collections that paraphrase of the Psalms which is now dropped out of our books, as judged to be obsolete:

"Lord, hast thou cast the nation off,  
Must we forever mourn;  
Will thou indulge immortal wrath,  
Shall mercy ne'er return?  
Lift up a banner in the field  
For those that fear thy name,  
Save thy beloved with thy shield,  
And put our foes to shame.  
Go with our armies to the fight  
Like a confed'rate God,  
In vain confed'rate foes unite  
Against thy lifted rod.  
Our troops shall gain a wide renown  
By thine assisting hand,  
'Tis God that treads the mighty down  
And makes the feeble stand."

Scarcely was there a battle-field in the Revolutionary war, where the clergy were not present, as chaplains or surgeons, to cheer and bless. Their patriotism was a thing of general admiration. They reasoned themselves and the country out of all hesitancy and scruples, as they knew how to reason. They abounded in what Sir John Hawkins calls "precatory eloquence"; calling down the blessings of the Almighty upon the country; and the depth and sway of their influence in achieving the independence of the colonies cannot be too highly extolled. Withal, it was with them a time of great personal privation and hardship. They shared in the largest

measure the calamities of the country. They practised the extremes of frugality to eke out their scanty subsistence. They were exposed to violent opposition in their distracted parishes. But they were, as a body, brave, patient, meek, pious, patriotic, and learned — an honor to any land. Under God, we owe it to the ministry of that day that the morals of the country were not hopelessly wrecked in the convulsions of the Revolution. The profession emerged from the war with increased credit and honor, and with the confidence, respect, and gratitude of the people. The war over, they led the nation in song and thanksgiving on the shores of the sea they had crossed, and forthwith addressed themselves to their appropriate work, in conservation of the liberties which the Revolution had helped to secure. A few here and there were left in a most pitiful predicament. In tacking ship they had missed stays, and were stranded on a lee shore. In proof that no human ministry is infallible, some had misjudged the case, and were forced to suffer the consequences. What was the state of feeling in those parishes, where the minister retained either loyalty to the British crown or a professed neutrality, may be inferred from a single incident. Rev. Dr. Burnet, of the Presbytery of New York, was settled in Jamaica, L. I., and at the return of peace felt himself obliged to resign his charge. At the close of his farewell service, he gave out the 120th Psalm. Whether the muscles of the choir were equal to its musical intonation, or the minds of the people to its devout response, tradition does not inform us :

“ Hard lot of mine, my days are cast  
Among the sons of strife,  
Whose never-ceasing quarrels waste  
My golden hours of life.

“ Oh! might I fly to change my place,  
How would I choose to dwell  
In some wide, lonesome wilderness,  
And leave these gates of hell.

“ Peace is the blessing that I seek :  
How lovely are its charms !

I am for peace ; but when I speak  
They all declare for arms."

We come now to the second period referred to, when the preaching of some of the clergy on political affairs was of a most notorious character. A change had taken place in political parties, and it was so marked that the clergy could not conceal their sentiments. With few exceptions, they had been on the side of Washington, and bore the name of Federalists. When this unanimity was disturbed by the election of Mr. Jefferson to the Presidency, they inveighed against it in some instances with a tremendous emphasis. It must be borne in mind that party spirit was then at fever-heat. Families and neighborhoods were set at variance—church-members of different parties refused to pray together, and young people from families of different political preferences would not dance at the same assemblies. Never before or since did the spirit of party prove itself so ardent and violent. It was a new experience for the country. The clergy thought that it portended worse than it proved. The people of New England especially looked with horror upon French infidelity—French revolutions—which they had associated with the new party in our own land. The French Republic had just before decreed the abolition of all religion, and the enthronement of Human Reason. All Christendom was convulsed with terror. In 1798 President Adams appointed a day of national fasting. Doubtless this association was in part the cause of the hostility which they manifested towards Mr. Jefferson and his party. The clergy stood aghast, thinking that the country was ruined. They thought that they would be unfaithful to a solemn trust, if they did not lift up their voice in testimony. It amuses us, at this distance of time, to read what they said and did. Some of the sermons of that day have a historic renown. Such, for example, as what is known as the Jeroboam Sermon of Dr. Emmons. It was on the day preceding the annual Fast-day in Massachusetts, in the year 1801, that the acute metaphysician of Franklin sat in his study, greatly perplexed what to preach on the ensuing day. What he did preach was never forgotten. It was just after the inauguration of Mr. Jeffer-



son, and Jeroboam was made that day to play a parallelism which would have astonished himself. The curious analogy is a rare specimen of long-drawn, solemn and withering rebuke. After it had been extended through nearly two hours, it hardly needed at its close what, according to the phraseology of the day, was called an "improvement", which was given in these words: "It is more than possible that our nation may find themselves in the hand of a Jeroboam who will drive them from following the Lord, and whenever they do, they will rue the day and detest the folly, delusion, and intrigue which raised him to the head of the United States".

We are referring now to facts which need some explanation; for which much may be said in apology, but nothing in justification as a model of duty for ourselves. The mistake was that in the intensity of feeling which then prevailed there was no discrimination between what was ethical and what was partisan. Opposing the new administration on one point, because of its supposed affinity with French Atheism, some fought it at every point, *pugnis et calcibus*—embargo, gun-boats, alien and sedition laws, no matter what—wherever it showed its hand or head.

These political antipathies were long-lived. They culminated during the war with England, in 1812. But they cropped out long after whenever they could claim a show of decency. Some of the sermons preached during that period were of a most extraordinary character. No physical appliances of dried orange-peel or caraway-seed were necessary to keep audiences awake, under those pulpit deliverances. One denounces Napoleon Bonaparte as the "first-born of the devil", and Thomas Jefferson and James Madison his twin brothers. Another takes for his text the 8th verse of the 109th Psalm: "Let his days be few; and let another take his office". The "Bramble" sermon of Dr. Osgood, of Medford, (founded on the parable of Jotham, Judges ix, 14: "Then said all the trees unto the bramble, Come thou, and reign over us"), is as famous as the Jeroboam sermon of Dr. Emmons. There was no circumlocutory preaching in those days. Velvet phrases and uncertain inferences were alike discarded. It is reported of one minister, that for a considerable time he was accustomed to

pray for the Chief Magistrate that God would "gently and easily remove his servant by death". It will be remembered by many of our readers that on a certain year a worthy gentleman in Massachusetts, after being a candidate of the Democratic party for Governor for twenty years, was finally elected to the office by a majority of one vote. It will also be recollected by all whose early life was passed in that State, that the custom prevailed, whenever the Governor issued his annual proclamation for thanksgiving, of sending by the sheriff of the county a copy of the same, on a large hand-bill, to be read from every pulpit, which document invariably closed, after the signature of the Governor, with the pious exclamation, "God save the Commonwealth of Massachusetts!" On the year referred to the newly-elected magistrate issued his proclamation in the usual form. It is said that a venerable clergyman, of the old party, laid the broad sheet over his reading-board, and after performing the professional duty of reciting it, with an ill-disguised aversion, actually announced the official signature with this significant intonation: "Marcus Morton, Governor? God save the Commonwealth of Massachusetts"! It is for an important purpose that we have referred to a few of those notorious incidents which belong to the history of the American pulpit.

Admit that such acts and expressions on the part of the ministry were mistakes, never to be imitated; much should be said for their exculpation. In the first place, the instances of such distinctively political preaching were comparatively few. The very notoriety which these have attained is in proof that the great body of the ministry, whatever may have been their private sentiments, addicted themselves faithfully to the great concerns of their office. In many instances, those who had practised this method of political preaching lived to express their personal regret for the same. The late Rev. Dr. Lyman, of Hatfield, at the installation of his successor, used language truly pathetic in the acknowledgment of what he regarded as a great mistake in his own ministry. Another thing to be said in their vindication is, that such utterances were not on the Sabbath-day, but perhaps without exception, on Fast-days, or Thanksgiving-days, or what was

always celebrated in New-England by a sermon—Election-day. Still another thing should be said. The clergy of that period had been educated to regard themselves as the “moral police and constabulary of the country”, and silence, sudden and complete, was more than could be expected of mortal man, when on the losing side, after a lifetime of explicit and applauded testimony. Nor must we forget to add that, in times of high political excitement, the words of a minister, in prayer or sermon, receive a construction from interested and jealous parties which they were never intended to bear. Minds surcharged with political partisanship will pervert, and exaggerate, and apply the simple utterances of a minister, in a way which might well astonish him. Rev. Dr. David Ely, of Huntington, Connecticut, is described as one of the most prudent, faithful, spiritual pastors of his times. In a season of great political excitement, it was reported by persons hostile to him that he had preached on political subjects in a neighboring parish. It was thought proper to trace the report to its source. The neighboring parish was visited and the inquiry made: “Did Dr. Ely preach politics when here? Yes. What did he say? Well sir, if he did not preach politics, he prayed politics. What did he say? *Say?* he said, ‘Though hand join in hand, yet the wicked shall not go unpunished’.” Seasons there are when auditors are so magnetized with partisan passion, that they put their own sense on the language of a preacher, exaggerating or misapplying it, so that in the presence of such a suspicious and watchful jealousy he stands no chance at all, unless he adopt the resolution of the Psalmist on a certain occasion: “I will keep my mouth with a bridle, while the wicked is before me”.

This rapid survey of a very extended historic period, with its motley assemblage of incidents, may help us in our undertaking to state some of the principles which should govern the Christian ministry in their official relations to political concerns. Starting from that which we hold to be the grand design of the Gospel and its appointed heralds—to save the souls of men—whatever their nationality or their politics, we hold that everything pertaining to the sphere of *morals* belongs to the province of the Christian theologian and

preacher. We emphasize the word which helps us to discriminate between what has been right and what wrong in the practice of the pulpit. What is distinctively *ethical* may be discussed in its proper time and place on Christian principles. There are ethical principles which should govern our conduct in political relations. There are many things pertaining to what are called politics which involve no special relation to morals, concerning which a minister may have his personal preference, but which it would be highly indecorous for him to introduce and urge officially. The relations of morality and immorality to political economy are many; but we would hardly judge that theories of free trade, and taxation, and naval architecture, and embargoes, were the proper material for pulpit instruction. Are we required to give the rule which should govern a minister in his treatment of those political questions which are directly related to morals? None can be given, beyond this—they should be presented according to the *proportion of faith*; in the right season; and in the right manner. The whole gradation must be left to the GOOD SENSE and ENLIGHTENED JUDGMENT of the preacher himself. If he is lacking in these qualities, no number of specific directions would be of any avail. Topics in the whole range of moral relations from the highest to the lowest, belong to his sphere—but the order, frequency and emphasis of their discussion must depend on seasons and necessities, which cannot be defined in advance.

Some things, however, may be made more specific. Happily we live in a country where there is no alliance between church and state. No political power, organized or unorganized may prescribe and dictate what a minister shall preach. This freedom, however, has two sides or aspects; for neither may a preacher prescribe or dictate to his hearers what they shall think or do, except in those cases where he has the authority of the Supreme. We touch at once the secret of popular jealousy in regard to pulpit utterances. These have been made, sometimes, with arrogance and assumed authority. There was a time when the clergy wore big wigs and an imposing official dress; and it was expected that their opinions would be received with deference by a reverential parish.

"For still they gazed and still the wonder grew  
That one small head could carry all he knew."

The time has come when opinions do not prevail because uttered *ex cathedra*. If an incumbent of the pulpit indulges in crude thoughts, immature judgments, ebullitions of feeling, and false reasoning, he must expect animadversion, correction, and refutation. Another cometh after him and searcheth him. No one would curtail the freedom of the ministry, but the ministry must remember that there is a freedom and right of judgment for the pews as well as the pulpit. We should not for a moment hold controversy with a man whether he ought or ought not to assert and promulgate the will of God, when *he knows it*—and to challenge the obedience of all men to that supreme authority. But when he assumes the same tone and manner of authority in reference to matters unwritten, involved and debatable, we may surely ask him to exhibit his credentials. We will be the first to submit to his dictation when we have actually seen the seal of heaven in his hand, and are satisfied on the capital point of his divine legation.\* The occult principle which has occasioned all the rancor and hostility excited by the interference of the pulpit is this assumption of divine authority in behalf of what is nothing but an individual opinion. If the man who derives his opinion, simply, by his own confession, from the personal study of the Scriptures and who has enjoyed none but ordinary aids, who can advance no pretensions which others may not also challenge, is entitled to speak in the tone and to exercise the authority of a prophet or apostle, then what was the necessity of the extraordinary powers wherewith prophets and apostles were endowed? A vast distinction is there between the prodigious pretensions of the zealot demagogue and the modest expression of an individual judgment.

Every minister of the Gospel is entitled to the same freedom of opinion and preference on all subjects as other men. Paraphrasing the language of Shylock, he may say: "I am a minister: hath not a minister eyes? hath he not hands, organs,

\* Isaac Taylor.

dimensions, senses, affections, passions? fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer as other men? if you prick us, do we not bleed? if you tickle us, do we not laugh? if you poison us, do we not die? and if you wrong us"—we will not add with the Jew "shall we not revenge", but we will say, "shall we not show you how to bear it"? This freedom of judgment allowed him, no minister has the right to protrude officially his private opinions and preferences in regard to matters which do not affect the sublime moralities of his vocation. Especially to indulge in personalities, in partisan advocacy or military criticisms in the pulpit, whatever right or liberty he may claim elsewhere, is a public scandal and wrong. It would seem to be the doctrine of some preachers, because *they* had certain opinions in regard to men and measures, therefore, they are bound on all occasions to avow them, going through the world, like the iron man Talus in the drama, with his iron flail battering down whatever opposes their private sentiments. The meanest thing which crawls on the earth is a man who, for his private advantage, will follow and cringe and swallow his own opinions; but the noblest form of manhood is he who holds his personal opinions on things indifferent in reserve for the sublime end of another's advantage—as the Apostle himself has expressed it: "I become all things to all men, if by any means I might save some"; that nobility and grandeur of Christian motives imparting versatility of address, and deportment in the use of his varied faculties and opinions, lest he should frustrate that object—the salvation of the soul, which was his disinterested and lofty intention.

It is time that we cease from general rules and proceed to what is more specific and practical to our own affairs. Never was there an occasion when the counsels of religion were more needed, and the clear strong voice of Christian faith and courage more essential in the vanguard of the nation. A fortunate thing it is for our country, in this solemn crisis, that its clergy of all denominations, unlike the clerical party of Continental Europe, regarded with suspicion as enemies to liberty and



progress, are known to be eminently patriotic, and as a body are possessed of the confidence and respect of the people. If the great events of our time, absorbing thought, and eliciting national energy; events which are rapidly consuming hecatombs of lives and millions of treasure, and threatening to involve the peace of the world, do not afford an occasion for the teachers of religion to lift up their voice in the name of God and humanity, then must we confess ourselves utterly unable to conceive of any conjunction of earthly interests to which Christian truth and motive are applicable.

If war, considered as an act of lawful magistracy, employed in defence of national rights and national existence be not justifiable on *religious* grounds, then our wisdom and duty are to oppose it and denounce it as utterly reprehensible. "It is certain that two sections cannot engage in hostilities but one party must be guilty of injustice; and if the magnitude of crimes is to be estimated by a regard to their consequences, it is difficult to conceive an action of equal guilt with a wanton violation of peace. Though something must generally be allowed for the complexity and intricacy of national claims, and the consequent liability to deception, yet when the guilt of a gratuitous and unjust war is clear and manifest, it sinks every other crime into insignificance. If the existence of war always implies injustice, in one at least of the parties concerned, it is also the fruitful parent of crimes. It reverses, in regard to its objects, all the rules of morality. It is nothing else than a temporary repeal of the principles of virtue. It is a system out of which almost all the virtues are excluded and in which nearly all the vices are incorporated. Whatever renders human nature amiable or respectable, whatever engages love and confidence is sacrificed at its shrine. In instructing us to consider a portion of our fellow-creatures as the proper objects of enmity, it removes, as far as they are concerned, the basis of all society, of all civilization and virtue; for the basis of these is the good will due to every individual of the species as being a part of ourselves. From this principle all the rules of social virtue emanate. Justice and humanity, in their utmost extent, are nothing more than the practical application of this great law.

The sword, and that alone, cuts asunder the bond of consanguinity which unites man to man. As it immediately aims at the extinction of life, it is next to impossible, upon the principle that every thing may be lawfully done to him whom we have a right to kill, to set limits to military license; for when men pass from the dominion of reason to that of force, whatever restraints are attempted to be laid on the passions will be feeble and fluctuating".\* All this is to demonstrate the tremendous crime which attaches to those who inaugurate war gratuitously, and in the absence of such an absolute necessity as is imposed by real benevolence. This admitted, there are wars which are justifiable to Christian ethics. "The magistrate", says the Word of God, "beareth not the sword in vain". It is to be wielded in defence of what is good,—for the conservation of a well-ordered society. It is not an inference, but the explicit assertion of Scripture, that government is God's ordinance, and as such *must* be obeyed, and those who do it violence, putting in jeopardy the dearest interests of society, must be punished. Evil doers must be smitten, not with a feather, but with the sword, otherwise vaster mischief will ensue to the many in the total overthrow of society, than by the extinction of the few. An army is only the instrument of magistracy, the reduplication of official weapons.

We are engaged in a contest, not as some abroad suppose for the holding of so much territory, but for the conservation of our national existence, and in such a cause we may appeal to something higher than honor, the aid and blessing of that religion which has given its sanction to lawful magistrates and constituted governments. So long as this one object is kept in mind, distinct and unalloyed by malignant passions, we may leave our appeal with the Almighty, going forth to battle, with faith and prayer, for justice and humanity. What greater evil could befall—we will not say our own land, but all lands—than the success of ambitious and wicked men, misleading communities, dragging States into the vortex of war at their own passionate will, without rebuke or punishment? Let us stand, therefore,

\* Robert Hall.

in the evil day the more steadfast, because calm in the confidence of what is right.

It has been objected, and that by two different classes of men, that the sacred Scriptures fail to inculcate patriotism: the one sceptical as to the Christian morality, the other seeking an excuse for inaction or indecision in national concerns. By the latter it is alleged that inspiration does not insist on this sentiment, because it is a *natural* sentiment like that of the affection between parents and children. To which the reply is, that the Scriptures do inculcate emphatically on parents and children to love each other most earnestly; and he must be a poor interpreter of the Old Testament who does not detect love of country in the most inspiring odes which have been given to the Church for its use to the end of time. "The duties which result from the relation in which a people stand to their rulers are prescribed in the New Testament with great perspicuity, and enforced by very solemn sanctions; and when these duties are faithfully discharged by each party, the benefits derived from the social compact are so justly appreciated, and so deeply felt, that the love of country is less liable to defect than to excess. In all well-ordered polities, if we may judge from the experience of past ages, the attachment of men to their country is in danger of becoming an absorbing principle, inducing, not merely a forgetfulness of private interest, but of the immutable claims of humanity and justice. In the eyes of an enlightened philanthropy, patriotism, pampered to such an excess, loses the name of virtue—it is the bond and cement of a guilty confederation. It was worthy the wisdom of our great Legislator to decline the express inculcation of a principle so liable to degenerate into excess, and to content himself with prescribing the virtues which are sure to develope it, as far as is consistent with the dictates of universal benevolence".\*

In exhorting, in the name of religion, to love of country, the Christian ministry would give the instruction not in the form of the popular expression, "Our country, right or wrong"—for that is the very blossom and consummation of

\* Sermon on Death of Dr. Ryland, by Robert Hall.

the blind and excessive passion of which we have spoken ; but our country to be loved always out of a pure heart fervently, and, because of that love, avoid and correct what is wrong, lest wrong lead to ruin. Our country, be it remembered, stands not in the rear but in the van of the grand army of nations. Behind us are great historic forces ; before us are great duties, great hopes, great destinies. The drama of History is not complete. We have our own peculiar work to achieve, and that work is related alike to the past and the future of the world. We are acting now, not merely for ourselves and our children, but in the interest of all contemporary nations, and in behalf of all the nations that ever shall be organized on the earth. The question now to be decided is — and there is not an aspirant for freedom, nor an agent of despotic and irresponsible power in any part of the world, who does not watch the issue on the very tiptoe of expectation — whether any people are capable of self-government ; whether the passions of men can be so curbed and moderated that of their own accord free citizens will subject their private will to the public welfare, preferring the order and sanctity of law and government to personal ambition and private resentments ; whether a free, equitable, and benignant government shall spread its protection over all classes alike, or whether it shall be stricken, stabbed, revolutionized and overthrown for the pleasure and promotion of a few. This is the core and heart of our crisis. Others may misinterpret it, misunderstand it ; but we should all comprehend it, intelligently and calmly, pledging ourselves heartily to its issue.

Nor can we, if we would, blink the fact that we carry explosive problems in our own bosom, especially related to that unhappy race on whose ebon faces the sad experience of centuries has sculptured the cast of patient subjection. We know not a subject which has more points of contact and relationship with the proper province of the Christian ministry than the existing condition and prospects of the African race. First of all, he who questions the unity of the human race, by denying those bronzed in hue a place in the common brotherhood, aims a blow higher than he knows, at the very

structure of Christianity. That there is one parentage, one race, one historic necessity, one and only one Redeemer for all mankind, is the very alphabet of our creed. Then again comes in the doctrine of the New Testament, that while there is something better than liberty, even a relationship to Christ which lifts a human soul so high that it may be oblivious to the ordinary distinctions of earthly condition, yet on the same authority we learn that freedom is better than slavery, and so is, if it may be, to be preferred and used. These things we should say are axioms in social and theological science. If it were our object to express ourselves in strongest terms on this subject, we would agree to confine ourselves to the language used by the fathers of the Republic, especially those who were personally related by birth and inheritance to a system which they pronounced and reprobated as a tremendous evil, social, political and moral.\*

We see not that it would conduce to any advantage just now to attempt any explanation of the causes which have led

\* Henry Laurens, for two years President of the Continental Congress, and afterward appointed Minister to Holland, wrote to his son from Charleston, S. C., 14th August, 1776: "You know, my dear son, I abhor slavery. I was born in a country where slavery had been established by British kings and parliaments, as well as by the laws of that country ages before my existence. I found the Christian religion and slavery growing under the same authority and cultivation. I nevertheless disliked it. In former days there was no combating the prejudices of men supported by interest: the day, I hope, is approaching, when, from principles of gratitude as well as justice, every man will strive to be foremost in showing his readiness to comply with the golden rule."—*Collection of the Zenger Club*, p. 20.

Mr. Jefferson, when in France in 1786, in a note to M. Demeunier, whom he had furnished with copious materials for his article on the United States, about to appear in the great *Encyclopédie Méthodique*, uses this language: "What a stupendous, what an incomprehensible machine is man, who can endure toil, famine, stripes, imprisonment, and death itself, in vindication of his own liberty, and the next moment be deaf to all those motives whose power supported him through his trial, and inflict on his fellow-men a bondage one hour of which is fraught with more misery than ages of that which he rose in rebellion to oppose! But we must await with patience the workings of an overruling Providence and hope that that is preparing the deliverance of these our suffering brethren. When the measure of their tears shall be full; when their groans shall have involved heaven itself in darkness,—doubtless a God of justice will awaken to their distress, and, by diffusing light and liberality among their oppressors, or, at length, by his exterminating thunder, manifest his attention to the things of this world, and that they are not left to the guidance of a blind fatality."—*Jefferson's Writings*, vol. ix, pp. 278, 279.

to a very different theory; or to hurl recriminations to and fro at those who were responsible for the change. We must look at facts as they are. Whether the conservation and extension of slavery be merely the pretext or the cause of the war; whether any who enlisted in the war can plead provocation in the form of fanatical acerbities, is not now the question in debate, though we cannot but regret that the temper which governed our fathers, regarding this as a common concern, to be tolerated as a necessity for a season and removed as soon as it could be—a temper which was merged and blended in a blessed patriotism—was not continued and perpetuated; though we often frame to ourselves a picture of what this country might and would have been if all its different sections could have looked and acted on this subject in the charitable spirit of a family community of interest and honor, and a small portion of the immense treasures now expended in war could have been fairly appropriated for the removal of the mischief. So it was not to be. Our regrets cannot recall the past, and the issue is made and joined. This war is not in our interpretation and intention for the abolition of slavery, though that event seems to be involved in its issue. The responsibility of such an issue is with those who inaugurated the war, not unwarned of its inevitable consequences. The contest on our part is for the conservation of the national life, and the preservation of that constitutional government which, under God, is the only barrier between us and universal chaos. We know of nothing between us and that object which should obstruct our end. We intend to love nothing, conserve nothing, consult nothing, occupying intermediate ground between us and the life, honor and constitution of the country. Whatever interposes itself between us and that grand and sacred end which religion sanctions, must take care of itself. So clear is our conviction on this point that if our voice could claim any regard, we would say to government and to the people: Avoid all collateral issues; let alone debatable questions; abstain from everything which leads to partisan distinctions. Leave all that you can to be reformed and settled by legal and prescribed processes. Be cautious not to divide the country by



needless debates. The grandest opportunity which ever a nation had has been passing over us for burying out of sight the petty names and partialities of party in a noble, magnanimous and Christian patriotism. Whatever lawful magistracy may pronounce essential to success in the execution of its beneficent work, let it be *done*, wisely, promptly, thoroughly, but save us from endless and unavailing theorizing and resolving and speculating and debating.

Lift high the bright banner which symbolizes Unity, Constitutional law, National honor and integrity, dearer to us now that the blood of our citizenship has sanctified every fold and star. Avoid every suspicion of political jealousy and ambition. Weaken not the "red right arm" of magistracy by suffering party rivalries to invade our armies. The very animals in the time of a deluge, seeking refuge in the same caves, forget their ancient antipathies. Common dangers, common sufferings, common necessities, ought to unite us at that point where unity is essential to the preservation of life.

Well may we be jealous of all encroachments on constitutional liberty. If perils and evils there are in connection with liberty, the cure of them is more liberty. Powder is consumed harmlessly on the surface of the ground which accumulates tremendous power when driven into the chamber of a gun under superincumbent wads. Above all things, whatever comes to pass, let us hold ourselves firm in the faith that there is an essential difference between what is right and what is wrong, between good government and wild revolutions, and as God lives, that which is right will ultimately prosper. We do not flatter ourselves and our readers with the promise of a speedy or immediate issue of the strife. The future is hid from our inspection. No words of empty boast or defiance have we in regard to menaces from across the sea. We are neither over-sensitive nor indifferent. Willing or unwilling, all nations are related by manifold bonds which mountains and oceans cannot destroy. What is of real and permanent value to us as a nation, will prove the same to all other nations in the end. We are very calm and confident as to the *final* issue. Intermediate suffering there may be, perhaps beyond all which we have ever imagined. The fires may wax

hotter which heaven shall see to be needful to burn up our dross and weld us into a purer and firmer nationality. Thus far the suffering, it would seem, in largest measure has fallen on those who inaugurated the war. Wonderful indeed is the prosperity of these Northern States. We are startled into fear and trembling when we think of it. Drained and depleted, but instead of fainting in prostration, producing and exporting enough to feed the world! Let us not be high-minded, but fear. Let us improve the time of trial for the cultivation of all that is honorable, heroic, charitable, patient, and good. It has been the theory of many that the effect of these distresses through which we are passing must be to elevate our aims, make us less selfish, increase our patriotism, and make us more thankful for our blessings. God grant that it may be so! Whether the trial shall develop these results is not yet decided, nor the perfect result brought out. It is the effect of affliction on thoughtful natures to enrich and mellow the heart; and now is the time for us all to lay up treasure in heaven by acts of sympathy and charity and sacrifice and fellowship of suffering.

Hilarity is not becoming this hour of suffering, but cheerfulness is, and patriotism, and hope and love and faith in God. What a day will that be, when prejudice, passion, and falsehood shall all disappear; when there shall be no more occasion for war, because there is no more of lawlessness and crime; when there shall be no breaking in nor going out; when there shall be no more complaining in the streets; when that deepest of all questions, underlying the relations of employers and employees, the question of races, shall be solved in the harmony and love of the latter day; when all the cities which gem the shores of the sea, and all the valleys and cottages which brighten the landscape of our beautiful country, shall be cheerful with the music of industrial freedom; when confidence and goodly fellowship shall displace suspicion, rivalry and jealousy; when Peace, with her olive boughs and dove-like tones, shall bless the land, and all the people shall go up to the temples of religion with their songs of melody, thanksgiving, and praise. The Lord grant it in his own time!

## Theological and Literary Intelligence.

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ANTIQUARIAN RESEARCHES. *Jerusalem Underground*.—An account of Signor Pierotti's discoveries in the subterranean topography of Jerusalem has been published. Employed by the Pasha as an engineer, he has discovered that the modern city of Jerusalem stands on several layers of ruined masonry, the undermost of which, composed of deeply bevelled and enormous stones, he attributes to the age of Solomon, the next to that of Zorababel, the next to that of Herod, the next to that of Justinian, and so on till the times of the Saracens and Crusaders. He has traced a series of conduits and sewers leading from the "dome of the rock", a mosque standing on the very site of the altar of sacrifice in the Temple, to the Valley of Jehoshaphat, by means of which the priests were enabled to flush the whole temple area with water, and thus to carry off the blood and offal of the sacrifices to the brook Kedron. The manner of his explorations was very interesting. He got an Arab to walk up through these immense sewers, ringing a bell and blowing a trumpet, while he himself by following the sound was able to trace the exact course they took. About two years ago he accidentally discovered a fountain at the pool of Bethesda, and, on his opening it, a copious stream of water immediately began to flow, and has flowed ever since. No one knows from whence it comes or whither it goes. This caused the greatest excitement amongst the Jews, who flocked in crowds to drink and bathe themselves in it. They fancied it was one of the signs of Messiah's coming, and portended the speedy restoration of their commonwealth. This fountain, which has a peculiar taste, like that of milk and water, is identified by Signor Pierotti with the fountain which Hezekiah built, and which is described by Josephus. The measurements and position of most of these remains accord exactly with the Jewish historian's descriptions. Some of the Signor's conclusions are disputed, but no one has succeeded in so disinterring the relics of the Holy City.

CODEx SINAITICUS.—The most remarkable literary novelty of the day is the claim of the notorious Constantine Simonides that he himself wrote this famous codex, in 1839, at the solicitation of "the venerable Benedict", his worthy "uncle". Simonides, as usual, gives names, dates, facts in abundance. It was copied by him, he says, to be presented to the Emperor Nicholas I, together with remains of the Apostolic Fathers. His letter is given in full in the *Journal of Sacred Literature*, for October. It seems strange that he should have kept so entirely silent about it for three years, and until Tischendorf had published the main facts respecting the manuscript, on the basis of which some acquaintance with the ms. might be claimed.

Man and the Gorilla.—In the Zoological Section of the British Association at its late meeting, Professors Owen and Huxley had a lively debate on the relations of man to the lower order of animals; Mr. Owen taking the ground that man should be placed in a distinct sub-kingdom by him-

self, and Mr. Huxley flatly replying that Mr. Owen in no way represented the real nature of the problem under discussion. This personal controversy attracted a great deal of attention. Mr. Huxley claimed that in the course of former controversies with Mr. Owen he had exposed the mistakes of the latter, and had established the fact that the structural differences between man and the highest ape are of the same order, and only slightly different in degree from those which separate the apes one from another. In conclusion he expressed his opinion of the futility of discussions like this. In his opinion, the differences between man and the lower animals are not to be expressed by his toes or his brain, but are moral and intellectual. No definite result ensued from the controversy. Gardner Wilkinson writes to the *Athenæum* (Oct. 11): "Resemblance of form has evidently little to do with resemblance of intelligence; for though the head and hair of the canine species are so unlike those of man, no chimpanzee, gorilla, or other ape, is to be compared in point of intelligence with the dog".

*Nullification.*—Professor De Morgan in the *Notes and Queries* says, that the first use of the word nullify was by the English clergy, about 1621, in application to the mathematician Harriot, who rejected the Old Testament; they said he *nullified* the Word of God. This was evidently in allusion to the phrase—Math. xv, 6—making the word of God of *none effect*.

*The "Essays and Reviews" in Court.*—The controversy raised by this noted book is still going on—some two hundred books, pamphlets, and articles having already appeared. Several cases connected with it have been, or soon will be, decided in the ecclesiastical courts of England. The first, already decided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, is that of the Bishop of Winchester against Rev. D. I. Heath, since 1846 Vicar of Brading, Isle of Wight. The judgment runs thus:

"Reviewing, therefore, the whole case, their lordships decide that Mr. Heath has maintained and affirmed doctrines directly contrary and repugnant to the Articles.

"He hath done so: First, by maintaining that justification by faith is the putting every one in his right place by our Saviour's trust in the future, and that the faith by which man is justified is not his faith in Christ, but the faith of Christ himself. Secondly, by maintaining that Christ's blood was not poured out to propitiate his kind and benevolent Father. Thirdly, by maintaining that forgiveness of sins has nothing at all to do with the Gospel; and fourthly, by maintaining that the ideas and phrases, 'guilt of sin', 'satisfaction', 'merit', 'necessary to salvation', have been foisted into modern theology without sanction from Scripture, and do darken and confuse the clearest of the otherwise most intelligible and comforting statements of Holy Writ."

But the chief cases, not yet finally adjudicated, are those of the Bishop of Salisbury *vs.* Williams, and of Fendall *vs.* Wilson, on which Dr. Lushington rendered a judgment (allowing an appeal to the Privy Council) on June 25th. The following is the substance of Dr. Lushington's judgment:

I. In ecclesiastical prosecutions in England, the court will not determine whether litigated opinions are in *contravention of God's Word*, but only whether they are in *contravention of the Articles of the Church of England*.

II. The decision in the Gorham case is reaffirmed, that in *all matters not settled by the standards of the Church of England, liberty of expression is allowed*.

III. In reference to the articles of the Church of England, the following

positions taken in the *Essays and Reviews*, are declared to be heretical, and subject to ecclesiastical censure:

1st. To say that the Bible is "*an expression of devout reason*", which is declared inconsistent with the Sixth Article.

2d. To deny a *particular, vicarious Atonement*, and to make "propitiation" to consist in a mere "recovery of peace".

3d. To describe the Articles in a *non-natural* sense, though, oddly enough, not to advise others to do so.

4th. To deny that every person brought into the world deserves God's wrath and damnation, and that there is no distinction between covenanted and uncovenanted mercies.

5th. To assert that, after an intermediate state of discipline, all will be saved.

IV. On the other hand, it is declared *not* to contravene the Articles to hold—

1st. That the moral element in the prophecies predominates over the literal prognostications.

2d. That the greater part of the alleged Messianic prophecies do not apply to the Messiah.

3d. To deny that the Book of Daniel was written by Daniel, but not that it is canonical.

4th. To declare that the fourth Gospel was the latest of all the genuine books.

5th. To speak of the Apocalypse as "a series of poetical visions", which is declared not to deny the Apocalypse to be a part of Scripture.

6th. To deny the Pauline origin of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

7th. To state that the Biblical account of the deluge is "figurative".

In addition to these positive points, several litigated expressions are passed over by the judge with the comment, that though he thought their *tendency* heterodox, yet he could not, on account of their obscurity, declare them, in a criminal case, in contravention of the Articles.

In concluding, the Judge said: "I cannot leave these two cases without adding a few words in conclusion. I have discharged my duty to the best of my ability. I am aware that these judgments will be severely canvassed by the clergy and by others. Be it so; thereby it may be ascertained whether they are in accordance with law; and accordance with law ought to be the sole object of a court of justice. It may be, that on the present occasion some may think that, so far from having gone too far, I have taken too limited a view of powers entrusted to me, and consequently have failed to apply a remedy where a remedy might seem to be wanted. I can only say that I have shaped my course according to the authority I am bound to follow—the authority of the Privy Council."

In reference to this judgment, Dr. Rowland Williams writes:

"The position involved in all my writings, and illustrated in my essay, is, that an ingenuous freedom from disguise, in respect of views of the Bible accredited amongst scholars, may be permitted without violence to the theology of the Church of England, though softening modifications of that theology may ultimately result. The counter-position of our Episcopate is, that all possible statements in the domain of Biblical criticism must be fashioned with a view to the safety or convenience of formal theology; and that every scholar who refuses to be corrupted as a critic, may be calumniated as a clergyman. Upon this antagonism of principles, the interlocutory judgment of the Court of Arches pronounces that the clergy are not obliged to falsify the evidence for the canon, or the origin or meaning of Holy Writ, so long as they respect the landmarks of those doctrines



which I have taught with a fidelity and clearness unsurpassed by living man. The practical result is that no clergyman will again be prosecuted in England for refusing to misrepresent the origin of the Book of Daniel and of the Psalms, for abstaining from distortion of Hebrew Prophecy, and from calumny of the Hebrew race. Hence, literary misrepresentation is so far checked that, although Bishops will still make it a passport to their favor, they can no longer enforce it by law. Glory be to God, who brings strength out of weakness, and that to the least worthy of his servants, if we have thus far broken the rod of falsehood, brandished in right reverend hands!"

Dr. Lushington's judgment has been published in full; and also the very able argument of Mr. Stephen, in favor of Dr. Williams; the latter makes a volume of 355 pages. Professor John Grote, of the University of Cambridge, has also published an Examination of the Judgment.

One striking point in this decision is, that Dr. Lushington ruled that neither the Bible nor the opinions of the Bishops had any place in court in such a question of doctrine. Only the Articles and formularies, in their plain, grammatical sense, were admitted. So that, after all, a lawyer with no theological training, might decide in the first instance what is the doctrine of the Church of England.

#### SWITZERLAND.

PROF. C. J. RIGGENBACH has published in a separate form his Report to the Evangelical Alliance on *Rationalism, especially in German Switzerland*—a candid review of present movements.

M. Ernest Naville has published an article in the *Bibliothèque Universelle* of Geneva, to show that Rousseau did not commit suicide; but that in the latter part of his life he became a believer in a positive revelation. In proof he cites from a fragment of Rousseau, recently published, called *An Allegory*.

A new translation of the Scriptures into French is in the course of publication at Lausanne, by a Society: a large portion of the Old Testament has appeared.

M. Bungener, of Geneva, has published a work on *Calvin, sa Vie, ses Oeuvres et Ecrits*, which is highly eulogized. Dr. Merle D'Aubigné's last volumes are devoted to Calvin and his Reformation.

#### ITALY.

ARCHBISHOP LIVERANI, well known as an opponent of the temporal sovereignty of the Pope, is publishing a collection from mss. called *Spicilegium Liberianum*. Among these are 12 Sermons of Jerome and Ambrose; 37 Homilies of Bede; a Homily by Leo the Great, etc. Of special interest to English readers is a narrative of the trials of Thomas à Becket, from unpublished letters; also a petition of Henry II to Alexander III for the canonization of King Edward. This last was vainly sought for by Baronius, for his Annals. The collection embraces documents prior to A.D. 1208.

The directors of the National Museum of Naples have resumed the publication of the deciphered papyri of Herculaneum, in a volume entitled *Herculaneusium Voluminum quae supersunt Collectio Altera*. They are



not of much value, consisting chiefly of fragments of Epicurean writers. one Philodemus being the most voluminous.

The Royal University of Naples was opened for students, Nov. 18, 1861. It consists of five Faculties — Philosophy and Literature, Jurisprudence, Medicine, Natural Science, Mathematics. The professors number 56; among them are Cavalier Sacchi, Professor of Mineralogy, Guiscardi of Geology, Spaventa of Law, Scubriani of Philosophy, Seticulbrini of Italian Literature. The last three have been for years in exile.

Count Carlo Arribavene, exiled from Venetia by the Austrians, has published, in London, a work entitled *Italy under Victor Emmanuel*. It contains a narrative, mainly from the Count's personal knowledge, of the circumstances of war and peace attending the formation of the new kingdom of Italy, up to the fall of Gaeta.

There are twelve daily papers in Turin, a city of not more than 160,000 inhabitants. At Naples, Milan and Florence the same mania for newspapers is exhibited. Parma, a town of 40,000 inhabitants, has three dailies, and Modena four.

In the Ambrosian Library at Milan there is a ms. referred to by Mai, in *Spicilegium Romanum* (vol. iv, p. 247), as containing an account of Constantine, and of the acts of the Councils of Nice, Ephesus and Constantinople. The late Prof. Robiati had in view the editing of it. Prof. Oehler obtained a list of the contents of a portion, the heads of chapters, etc., which he published in the late number of the *Zeitschrift f. wiss. Theologie*. It is believed to be the third book of the History of the Council by Gelasius, supposed to be lost.

Dr. Chiesi, editor of the *Buona Novella*, is preparing an Italian Hexapla of the New Testament, consisting of the versions of Diodati, Brucioli, Malermi, Pagnini and Vatablo. He has also written a useful book, with the title *Who has falsified the Bible, the Protestants or the Catholics*.

The Pope has commissioned the celebrated German priest, Augustin Theiner, member of the Congregation of the Oratory, and Prefect of the Secret Archives of the Vatican, to draw up a report on the work of Dr. Dollinger, Canon of Munich, entitled *Church and Churches*.

The extracts made from Savonarola's marginal notes to the Bible, found in the Magliabecchian Library of Florence, are to be published, in part, by Villari, the biographer of Savonarola. A transcript was made by request of Mr. Charles Topling.

#### GERMANY.

*The Zeitschrift f. die historische Theologie*, Heft 4, 1862, continues Rippold's exhaustive sketch of the life and opinions of Henry Nicholas, founder of the so-called Family of Love. Dr. Ebrard, of Erlangen, begins a thorough reëxamination of the History of the Culdees, from the sixth to the eighth centuries, devoting this article chiefly to an account of their practice in the celebration of Easter, coming to the conclusion that we find among the Culdees the last appearance of the time and mode of celebration prevalent in the earliest church, in the East to A.D. 380, and in the West to A.D. 450. Dr. Baumgarten, of Rostock, gives two documents upon his noted controversy.

In the *Theologische Zeitschrift*, Lutheran, edited by Dieckhoff and Kliefoth, May to August, Kliefoth continues his investigations upon the symbolism of numbers in the Scriptures, criticising, especially, the views of Bähr. G. W. Brandt, in an account of the life and labors of Eric Jansson,

presents interesting sketches of the later ecclesiastical movements in Sweden; the Consistorial Councillor, Münchmeyer, contests Kraussold's position, that the ecclesiastical regimen of princes is *jure divino*; J. E. Huther contributes exegetical illustrations of the epistle to the Philippians; Prof. Bachmann praises Keil and Delitzsch's new work on the Pentateuch as learned, orthodox and timely.

The *Zeitschrift f. Lutherische Theologie* is henceforth to be edited by Guericke and Delitzsch. The 3d and 4th parts, 1862, contain the following articles: Rudelbach's Confessions, embracing his school-years, 1805-10, giving interesting details about the course of study in the Danish schools. K. Ströbel on the Revision of the Lutheran Bible, criticising the Cansteeen translation and Stier. L. de Marées, Preaching in the Old Testament. J. R. Linder, Interpretation of difficult Passages in the Old and New Testament; among them the contested passage on the Baptism for the Dead, 1 Cor. xv, 29. His interpretation is: "If the dead do not rise, how useless it is to be baptized; if this baptism is after all only for the good of the dead, who can derive no benefit from it." Dr. Laurent, on Queen Candace (Acts viii, 27): his conclusion, based on Æthiopic researches, is that Candace ruled in a district north of Meroe; that Napata, not Meroe, was her chief city: that the name of the eunuch was not Indich or Judich, but is lost: and that Candace was not Queen of Æthiopia, but a queen in Æthiopia. A queen of that name is also spoken of as ruling in Alexander's times, and another B.C. 22. E. Engelhardt gives a valuable account of the witnesses for the Reformation in Bavarian Suabia.

*Theologische Quartalschrift. 3d Heft. 1862. (Roman Catholic.)* 1. Hefele on the peace between Frederick Barbarossa and Pope Alexander III, Venice, 1177. 2. Welte, the Apology of Melito of Sardes—translated from Cureton's *Spicilegium Syriacum*, 1855. The Apology is addressed to Antoninus, and contains valuable illustrations of Christian opinion. Cureton and Welte accept it as genuine; but this is contested by Jacobi, in his edition of Neander's Lectures on the history of Christian Dogmas. Renan has also published this Apology, with a Latin version, in the *Spicilegium Solesmense*. 3. Langen on the Jewish Sanhedrim and the Roman procurators, contending that the Jewish court lost the power of life and death in religious matters under the Roman rule. 4. Nolte, Extracts from an unpublished Chronicle of George Harmatolus.

*Zeitschrift f. Wissenschaftliche Theologie. Tübingen, 3d Heft, 1862.* Hilgenfeld on the Epistles to the Thessalonians contends, against Baur, for the Pauline origin of the First Epistle. Baur allowed only four Epistles, viz. Galatians, I, II Corinthians and Romans (excepting the last two chapters), to be genuine. M. Uhlemann on Gog and Magog, a learned and able dissertation, which will be translated for a future number of our REVIEW. Egli, Criticism of the Text of the Septuagint. L. Paul, the Doctrine of the Trinity in the writings of Theophilus of Antioch. With all the obscurity of his views, it is shown that Theophilus in several passages distinctly recognized the personal character of the Logos. Paul shows incidentally that the Gospel of John is cited by Theophilus (who wrote about A.D. 175), as an undisputed work. The 4th *Heft* contains only two articles. K. Furrer, a sketch of the life of Rudolf Collin, a Zurich reformer and classical teacher, born 1499, died 1578; and Hilgenfeld on Gnosticism and the Philosophoumena (ascribed to Hippolytus), reviewing the works of Möller and Lipsius, of which an account was given in the last number of the AMERICAN THEOLOGICAL REVIEW. Hilgenfeld gives up the position, which he with Baur once defended, that Cajus, the Roman presbyter, was the author of the Philosophoumena. Gnosticism as there portrayed, he

views as freed from the elements of dualism and emanationism, which characterized its oriental forms.

The *Journal of National Psychology and Philology*, edited by Lazarus and Steinthal, has completed its second volume. Among the papers of general interest are Steinthal on the Saga of Prometheus, on Superstition, on the Characteristics of Languages, and on Greek Individuality; Lazarus on the relation of the Individual to the Generic; Lübke, the Gothic style and the Nationalities; Tobler, the Poetic Treatment of the animal world.

The third *Hef* of the *Jahrbücher für Deutsche Theologie*, 1861. Dr. Burk on the terms, Wisdom and Knowledge (*γνῶσις*) in the Scriptures. Ehrenfeuchter, The Stages of Church Instruction. Hasse, The Pathology of the Christian Hope. Schultz, The Doctrine of Justification by Faith, in the Old and New Covenant. The first article makes an ingenious distinction between wisdom and knowledge—the former term signifying the direct act of the mind in relation to the object, the latter, an indirect or reflexive act, as determined by the object—and applies this to what the Scriptures say about both the divine and the human intelligence. Ehrenfeuchter's catechetical essay is excellent. Hasse gives a sketch of all the abnormal forms of Hope, which are grounded on unscriptural ideas of human nature and destiny.

Luther's *Opera Latina*, now republishing at Frankfort, edited by Irmischer and others, are offered at a very low price—for the first twenty volumes, five thalers; for the next six, three thalers; twelve more will complete the work, at one half thaler per volume.

The first important German work on natural history, called the *Book of Nature*, by Konrad von Megenberg, which was reprinted seven times in the course of the fifteenth century, has been newly edited by Franz Pfeiffer, in Vienna, in the original Bavarian idiom of the author.

In Germany, the Protestants have 1500 bookstores, the Catholics only 24 of any account; the former have over 200 journals, the latter only 30. Among the latter are the *Zion*, founded in 1832; *Wiener Kirchenzeitung*, 1848; *Tübinger Quartalschrift* (the ablest) 1819; *Katholik*, 1821; *Archiv für Kirchenrecht*, 1857. The *Historisch-politischen Blätter*, of Munich, edited by Jörg, aided by Döllinger and Binder, have wide influence. Michelis has begun a monthly called *Natur und Offenbarung*, against the materialists.

Austria, with a population of 35,795,000, has only 472 booksellers. Its journals number 130 political and 281 of all other kinds, in 14 languages.

In Germany, were published in 1861, 9,398 works, (9,496 in 1860): Theology 1,394, carries the palm in numbers; Jurisprudence 936, etc. Of Slavonic and Hungarian works there are 152, (in 1860, 116).

*University Students*: Vienna, 2,250; Berlin, 1,542; Munich, 1,280; Leipsic, 887; Breslau, 850; Bonn, 836; Göttingen, 751; Halle, 720; Tübingen, 719; Würzburg, 651; Heidelberg, 588; Erlangen, 583; Jena, 454; Königsberg, 419; Giessen, 385; Friburg, 318; Greifswald, 293; Marburg, 254, and Kiel, 178.

One of the most important measures for which Austrian Protestants are indebted to their government is the reorganization of the Protestant Theological Seminary, or, as it is called, the *Protestant Theological Faculty of Vienna*. Until the reign of the present Emperor, it seems to have been the design of the Austrian government to exclude from it every eminent scholar. Recently, the Theological Faculty and the Protestant churches in general have applied to the government to incorporate the Faculty with the University of Vienna. This petition, as was to be expected, has met with the most violent opposition on the part of the Catholic bishops and the Ul-

tramontane party, and the Archbishop of Vienna has even threatened to prohibit all students of Catholic theology from attending the lectures of the University in case the Protestant Theological Faculty should be recognized as a part of the University. But his threats and opposition have had little effect. The most numerous of the Faculties of the University, that of Philosophy, at its last meeting, voted with an immense majority in favor of admitting the Protestants—and little doubt is felt that the Government will soon pronounce the incorporation.

The Old Lutherans, who have been so violent against the Union, are becoming divided among themselves on doctrinal points and on union with Rome. One of their leading periodicals, the *Monatsschrift für die Evangelische Kirche Preussens*, edited by Wangemann, complains of the sluggishness and divisions of the party. The Romanizing tendency is represented by the *Hallisches Volksblatt* and the *Neue Preussische Zeitung*; the opposite by the *Neues Zeitblatt für die Angelegenheiten der Lutherischen Kirche*, edited by Dr. Munkel in Oiste, near Verden, and by the bi-monthly periodical, *Theologische Zeitschrift*, edited by Kliefoth and Dieckhoff. Dr. Kahnis, who has been recognised hitherto as one of the leaders of the Old Lutherans, in his recent Dogmatics has avowed such unorthodox views on the canon, inspiration, Trinity, etc., that Dieckhoff is out against him in a series of severe articles in the *Theologische Zeitschrift*.

A full collection of the Acts and Documents in the controversy between the Greek and Latin churches at the period of their separation in the 11th century, is given for the first time by Cornelius Will, in his *Acta et Scripta*, etc., published at Leipsic, in an elegant 4to volume of 272 pages.

D. F. Strauss, the author of the life of Jesus, has published a work on Reimarus, probably the real author of the *Wolfenbüttel Fragments*, which were edited by Lessing. In it he eulogizes the rationalistic tendencies, but criticises Reimarus for still retaining belief in Christ and the immortality of the soul. A volume of Strauss's miscellaneous essays and reviews has also been recently published.

The 157th part of Herzog's Real-Encyclopädie, comes down to Ubiquity. Piper contributes an exceedingly valuable article on what he calls Monumental Theology, that is, theology as set forth and illustrated in monuments and works of Christian art, inscriptions, etc. Prof. Landerer has a very able essay on Aquinas and his theology. Peip on the Trinity is also a thorough and speculative discussion.

Johann Ludwig Uhland, one of the foremost of the lyric poets of Germany, died recently at Tübingen, where he was born on the 20th of April, 1787. In 1815 he published the first collection of his poems; some of which, on political topics, had already had a great influence on public sentiment in Germany. He gave up legal practice in 1830, and became extraordinary professor of the German language and literature in the University of Tübingen. Several of Uhland's songs have been translated into English by Professor Longfellow; and in 1848 a translation of other of his poems, with a memoir, was published in London. Since 1848 the poet had lived in retirement.

#### FRANCE.

M. Renan has published a pamphlet upon his suspension from teaching, entitled *The Chair of Hebrew in the College of France: Explanations with my Colleagues*. He arraigns the action of the Government, and then

proceeds to expound his views—denying the supernatural and miracles. "He offers us," says the *Revue Chrétienne*, "faith in our father, the abyss." He says: "The historical sciences presuppose that no supernatural agent has ever troubled the march of humanity; that there is no free being, superior to man, to whom may be ascribed an appreciable part in the moral guidance, any more than in the material ordering of the universe". He has drawn down upon himself the opposition of the deists (Simon, Saisset and Larroque), by his declaration, that "there has not been established any fact, either in nature or history, manifestly proving the existence of a will higher than that of man". *A Life of Jesus*, by Renan, forming the first part of a work on the *Origin of Christianity*, is also announced as soon to appear.

Pastor George Fisch has republished his articles on the United States in a volume, with large additions on our political history. Laboulaye says of the work in the *Journal des Débats*: "These solid pages, *breves quidem sed succiplenae*, give the secret of the American life and greatness". Fisch says: "There are happily in the North millions of men who believe that God governs in the affairs of the world, and who, at every new reverse, ask what is the lesson to be drawn from it. Since the Richmond battles they hear more distinctly the cries and groans of the poor negroes".

The *Revue Chrétienne*, in its recent numbers, has four excellent articles by B. Pozzy, on the Unity of the Race, on the basis of the work of Quatrefages; two articles on the Lyric Poetry of France by Rosseeuw Saint-Hilaire; a sketch of the Life and Last Days of Francesco Spiera, who became a Protestant in the early Italian reforms, recanted, and afterwards suffered dreadful torments of conscience; an able criticism of Hugo's *Les Misérables* by Secrétan, and an account of the Last Days of Lefèvre d'Étaples, by Jules Bonnet. On the attitude of England in respect to this country, the editor, De Pressensé, says: "The book of De Gasparin has aroused great wrath in England, expressed without bounds, in journals which profess to be Christian, and yet are enlisted in a revolting campaign in favor of the South, thus serving the worst passions of their country. . . . We are compelled to say, without holding the majority of English Christians to be responsible for these outrages, that their position on this great question is lacking in firmness and clearness. It is high time for these Christians to protest energetically against the sophisms, which have falsified public conscience, and which are only in place in the mouth of the foes of all right and of all progress". In the October number the editor hails the President's Emancipation Proclamation as the best omen of the war.

The Basque language has always been a puzzle to philologists—as to where it should be classed. William von Humboldt thought he detected affinities with some idioms of South America. Prince Louis Lucien Bonaparte has recently published at Paris, a work, showing its relation to the Finnish. And from M. Hyacinthe de Charency, a volume is announced, with the title *De la Langue Basque et de ses Affinités avec les Idiomes d'Oural*.

*New Edition of Calvin's Works.*—A critical and complete edition of all the works of Calvin is at last projected. Three Professors of Theology at Strasburg, Reuss, Kunitz and Baum have undertaken it, and they are now at Geneva examining all the manuscripts of Calvin in the library of the city. This edition will comprise much material never before published. It is supposed that it will extend to thirty or thirty-five volumes, 4to, in double columns. The beginning is to be made with the Institutes,



in three texts, viz. the original edition, in Latin, Basle, 1536—most rare; the folio edition of Strasburg, 1539, in which the work received its definitive form; and the French translation by Calvin, about 1560. These will all be annotated by the editors, and subsequent variations noted.

The *Bulletin* of the French Protestant Historical Society for August gives indisputable evidence, from the parish registers of Caen, that the father of the French poet Malherbe was a member of the Reformed Church. It has hitherto been disputed.

At the last examination for the baccalaureate in the Faculty of Letters, Paris, out of 465 candidates, 260 were refused; 170 were marked *passable*; 13 *assez bien*; 2 *bien*; and only one *très-bien*—*Corresp. Littéraire*.

A Paris letter says: "It is curious to see the heterogeneous elements of which the papal army of *littérateurs* is made up. M. Proudhon does not profess Christianity. M. Drouyn de L'Huys believes in transmigration of souls, and other theories held by French dreamers, which are in direct opposition to all the Catholic dogmas. The majority who rejected Jules Favre's motion for the evacuation of Rome are Voltairians. M. Guizot, who represents the temporal power of the Institute, is a Protestant of the Evangelical school. M. Cohen, late the principal editor of *La France*, is a Jew, and although he declared in the columns of that journal that the Papacy is the great conservative principle of modern society—goes every Saturday to the synagogue, and is a scrupulous observer of the law of Moses and the ordinances of the rabbis."

An important collection of documents, relating to the Seven Years' War and the military events of the last years of Louis XV's reign, has lately been received by the Dépôt de la Guerre, and is now being classified for consultation. They were formerly in the possession of Bernadotte, and have been given up to France by the Swedish government.

It is proposed to publish a nineteenth-century "*Encyclopédie*," to renew the famous undertaking of the eighteenth. The project has been taken up by a capitalist, a political economist and a projector—namely, M. Isaac Péreire, M. Michel Chevalier and M. Duveyrier, so that it looks like business. These gentlemen, who began life with St. Simonianism, still retain its bold spirit. One feature in the "*Encyclopédie*" will be that, instead of an alphabetical arrangement, its subjects will be placed in a continuous order, according to their rational connection.

Two translations of Shakspeare are now appearing in Paris: one, a revision of Guizot's, first published in 1821; another by a son of Victor Hugo. French critics are comparing the two, and award the praise of greater fidelity to the latter; e. g. the line "Chewing the cud of sweet and bitter fancies," reads in Guizot "Se nourrissant de pensées tantôt douces, tantôt amères;" in Hugo, "Mâchant l'aliment doux et amer de la rêverie."

Charles Jourdain is publishing an extensive work on the *History of the University of Paris* in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It will be in four parts, folio, costing seventy-two francs: the first part is out.

A new edition of E. Haag's *History of Christian Dogmas*, in two volumes, is announced. The author is one of the editors of *La France Protestante*. It is said to be a careful and conscientious collection of the main facts, with a somewhat rationalistic bias.

Abbé Glaire is publishing a new French version of the Bible. The New Testament has appeared. It is the first French translation authorized by the Church of Rome. De Sacy's is the one in common use. There is also one by De Genoude. Abbé Glaire is Dean of the Theological Faculty of Paris,



and has written an *Introduction to the Bible*, 1843, a *Hebrew and Chaldee Lexicon*, an *Arabic Grammar*, and a *Vindication of the Scriptures*.

A bibliographical work is announced at Paris, which, if well executed, must be of great value to the student, viz. A. Potthast, *Bibliotheca Historica Medii Aevi*—a bibliographical guide for the history of Europe, from A.D. 375 to 1500. The first part is out—price 10 francs; the second is promised soon. It gives a full Index to the *Acta Sanctorum* of the Bollandists, and an account of all the sources for European history.

*Theology*.—Abbé Jager, *History of the Catholic Church in France, from its Origin to the Concordat of Pius VII.* Vol. 1. The work is to be in eighteen volumes. A new *History of the Jesuits* by Daurignac, in two volumes—the first is out. G. F. Astié, *The Two New Theologies in the Midst of French Protestantism*. Cardinal Gousset, on the *Temporal Sovereignty*. Nourrisson, *The Sources of the Philosophy of Bossuet*. B. Poujoulat, *History of the Popes, and Account of the Roman Question*. 2 volumes. Athanase Coquerel, *History of the Reformed Church of Paris, from inedited documents*. First Part. 1512–1594. Waddington, *History of Protestantism in Normandy, 1685–1797*. Adolphe d'Avril, *Documents on the Eastern Churches in Relation to the Holy See*. It is proposed to republish the *Acta Sanctorum* of the Bollandists, in fifty-four folio volumes, 1200 pp. double columns, at twenty-five francs the volume.

The Secretary of Prince Napoleon, M. Hilbaine, has just published a work entitled *The Pontifical Government judged by French Diplomacy*. It is divided into three parts: I. Diplomatic despatches from the time of Louis XIV to that of the French Revolution; II. Documents of the period of Napoleon I; III. Documents of the Governments of Louis XVIII and Charles X. The tenor of this diplomatic correspondence is summed up by M. Hilbaine as follows: "The judgments given at all these different periods, as to the temporal power of the Pope, is *unanimous*. On that point the representatives of France at Rome are of the same mind in the seventeenth century as in the eighteenth, and in the eighteenth as in the nineteenth. The statesmen of the ancient monarchy; those of the First Empire, which had revived the altars of the Church; and those even of the Restoration, whom no one will accuse of irreligion—all declare that such a *régime* cannot endure, and that it is a danger for Catholicism."

#### GREAT BRITAIN.

*The British and Foreign Evangelical Review*, October, contains: 1. Jeremy Taylor, from the *Presbyterian Quarterly*; 2. Guizot on the Signs of the Times; 3. Hengstenberg on Sacrifices, sharply criticising his views; 4. Stendel on the Inspiration of the Apostles—an excellent article, transferred from the *Christian Review*; 5. Modern Humanitarianism; 6. The Pharisaism and Sadduceism of Modern and Primitive Christianity; 7. Astié on the Two Theologies; 8. The Controversy on the alleged Platonism of the Fathers, translated from the German *Journal of Historical Theology*, a very valuable article; 9. The Three Generations of Puritanism—a good account of the works of many eminent Puritans.

*The British Quarterly Review*, October.—1. Muir's Life of Mahomet—an excellent account, on the basis of this best of the biographies of the founder of Islam. 2. The Letters of Mendelssohn. 3. Arndt and his Sacred Poetry. 4. Gibraltar and Spain. 5. French Protestantism—a good historical summary. 6. Mediæval Preaching—with copious extracts

from English metrical Homilies of the Fourteenth Century, edited from mss. by John Small, of Edinburgh. 8. Hallucinations and Illusions—on the basis of De Boismont's treatise. 9. The Church of England in 1862—What next? This article shows the position into which the Church is thrown by Dr. Lushington's decision in the cases of the Bishop of Salisbury v. Williams, and of Fendall v. Wilson, and gives an account of the state of parties. The conclusion reached is: "That such is the condition of the law in our Established Church, that men in that communion may rationalize so far, on the one hand, as to become little better than deists; or may Romanize so far, on the other hand, as to become little better than Papists, and still be accounted good Churchmen". In his Epilogue, the editor, Dr. Vaughan, again discourses of American affairs. He thinks our war is the greatest blow that the friends of human progress have received in modern times. "The most self-governed people of modern times has become the most ill-governed". He ascribes our evils to the "want of moral and religious culture". We are suffering for "worshipping the dexterous man". And this same *Review*, which finds no sense in our conflicts, in speaking of Gibraltar, says: "If Marshal O'Donnell seriously asks Lord Palmerston or Lord John Russell for a surrender of the rock fortress, both will respond with a will: 'Take it if you can.' The old rule practised in the past will be practised in the future,

'That they should take who have the power,  
And they should keep who can.'

*The Quarterly Review*, London, November, on the Confederate Struggle and Recognition, is steeped in the old, stupid tory prejudices against all democracy. Prophesying our inevitable failure, it ascribes it to the inherent inefficacy of a democracy to meet a great national crisis. The assumed superiority and success of the South is explained on the theory, that slavery tends to cultivate some of the aristocratic virtues. The *North British Review* continues its tirades against the North, in a somewhat less florid vein, but still ignoring the vital elements and issues of our strife with the slave power. Even the Emancipation Proclamation fails to convince these reviewers that the North is contending in the interest of human justice and freedom. Nothing will convince them but success. Even the *London Quarterly Review* (Wesleyan), in its last number, under its new administration, has turned against us.

Mr. Thomas Duffus Hardy, Deputy Keeper of the Public Records, and member of the late Record Commission, has published, in two volumes, a *Descriptive Catalogue of Materials relating to the History of Great Britain and Ireland, to the end of the Reign of Henry VII*—a work of great labor and invaluable, giving an account of all the materials, printed and manuscript, pertaining to any man or period, with a critical estimate of the value of each, and an account of the writers. It is the first work of the kind, aiming at completeness, and gives the results of forty years of painstaking research.

*Journal of Sacred Literature*, October, 1862.—Nature of Prophecy; Ernest Renan, a eulogistic sketch; Dean Ellicott on the Destiny of the Creature—opposing the Dean's position that "the creature" means all animate and inanimate creation related to the saints; The Atonement in relation to Heb. ix, 16-18, by Wratislaw—taking the ground, that Christ's death symbolized the death of both God and man, in behalf of the New Covenant; The Tree of Life—historical notices; Syriac Literature; Life and Miracles of Apollonius of Tyana, on the basis of Chassang's recent work;

Biblical Canon; Marcus Antoninus, a Persecutor—a reprint of an old English tract, by Moyle; The Resurrection—a sermon, by Luis de Granada, translated.

The old *Sarum Missal*, the national liturgy of England, is at last to appear in a superior edition. It is sent out from the Pitsligo press, by Mr. Forbes, all of the printing being done by women, "mostly converts from Presbyterianism". The first volume, comprising the *Temporale*, is out; the second, the *Sanctorale*, will soon follow. The title is *Missale ad Usus insignis et præclaræ Ecclesiæ Sarum*. C. J. Stewart is the London publisher. Some of the earlier editions were 1492, 1510-11, 1534; Paris, 1527; two editions by Prevost and Regnault, Antwerp, 1527. The *Sarum Missal* prevailed in the south of England; was used in Scotland and Ireland, and in Portugal and Galicia. It was moulded on the missal of the church of Rouen. The present volume is sold for seven shillings; previously it cost three or four pounds. Within a few years, says the *Christian Remembrancer*, the way to liturgical studies has been made easy and cheap by the reprints of the *Sarum Breviary*, the *Aberdeen Breviary*, the primitive liturgies, and the English church services—so that the student can obtain for fifteen shillings what not long since cost as many pounds.

Rev. A. R. Roberts, in his discussions on the Gospels, has revived the theory that Greek was the language spoken by Christ. From the fact that the New Testament was written in Greek, he concludes that this was the language of the Apostles and those to whom they wrote, and also of Christ.

Two new works on the Hindu Religion and Philosophy have recently been published by native converts. One is entitled *Dialogues on the Hindu Philosophy*, by Rev. K. M. Banerjea, Professor of Bishop's College, Calcutta. The other, by Nehemiah Nilakantha Sastri Gore, was written in Hindu, and translated by Fitz-Edward Hale, of Oxford. The former is said to be written by the author, in admirable English, and shows remarkable refinement in speculation. Mr. Gore's work, *A Rational Refutation of the Hindu Philosophical System*, has a more direct practical value for the training of Hindu scholars.

A Church Congress, presided over by the Bishop of Oxford, was held at Oxford, July 8-10. Many topics of general interest were fully debated, but that of ministerial education took the lead. The deplorable defects of the present English system were fully brought out. Professor Harold Browne complained of "a gradual dearth of men for the clerical office, at least of the intellectual and academic mark to which bishops' chaplains (the examiners) had heretofore been accustomed". Dean Ellicott suggested cutting down the academic course to two years, and then to devote a third year to theology. Bishop Wilberforce was in favor of instituting a theological tripos, and of having a kind of apprenticeship to a parish priest. No conclusions were reached. As to the present state of things at Oxford, the *Christian Remembrancer* says, that at Oxford they have "nearly let go" theological teaching, and at Cambridge it "holds only by the slender thread of 'voluntary' examinations". It adds that the disputations for the bachelor's degree of divinity "are to a dry humorist the funniest yet dreariest thing at Oxford". As to the decrease in the number of ministerial candidates, the following statement was made by the Bishop of Winchester, in a recent charge, "that the number of candidates for Orders, which in 1841 was 606, in 1851 was 614, was in 1861 only 510. The population of England has doubled in thirty years, while the clergy have increased by only one fifth. He stated at the same time that the propor-

tion of University graduates among those who are ordained is steadily diminishing, especially with Oxford men; and that the proportion of *liberals* (not University men) is as steadily on the increase".

Newspapers published in Great Britain in 1861, 1,165, viz. 845 in England, 139 in Scotland, 33 in Wales, 134 in Ireland, 14 in the British Isles. The number in 1851 was 563.

A report that requires confirmation, is, that 1,300 new letters of John Knox have been discovered. Mr. Laing is now carrying-through the press the 6th and last volume of Knox's writings.

The Most Rev. John Bird Sumner, D.D., late Archbishop of Canterbury, was born in 1780, and was educated at Eton and King's College, Cambridge, where he graduated, 1803; was appointed a Canon of Durham, 1820. He was consecrated Bishop of Chester in 1828, and translated to the See of Canterbury in 1843. Dr. Sumner was a prolific theological writer, having published besides other works, "Evidences of Christianity," "Expository Lectures" on the whole of the New Testament except the Apocalypse, in nine separate volumes, and several volumes of sermons. The vacant Primacy has been offered to, and accepted by, the Archbishop of York, Dr. Longley. Dr. Longley was born 1794; educated at Westminster School and Christchurch, Oxford, being first-class in classics. He was public examiner in 1825. In 1829 he was elected to the head-mastership of Harrow School. In 1836 the See of Ripon was founded, and Dr. Longley was appointed the first Bishop.

The Right Rev. William Thomson, D.D., nominated to the Archbishopric of York, was born on the 11th of February, 1819; entered at Queen's College, Oxford, where he became scholar, fellow and tutor, and provost; graduated in 1840, when he took a third class in classics. In 1853 he was chosen to preach the Bampton Lectures at Oxford, his subject being "The Atoning Work of Christ". In 1858 he was elected preacher of Lincoln's-inn; in 1859 made one of Her Majesty's chaplains; and in 1861, nominated Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol. The new Archbishop is well known by his work entitled, *An Outline of the Laws of Thought*, and by his preface to the work called *Aids to Faith*, which was intended to be a counteractive to the *Essays and Reviews*. A curious precedent is quoted from ante-Reformation times, in the case of Cardinal Baynbrigge, who, like Dr. Thomson, was born in the Northern Province, raised himself by his own ability, was educated at Queen's College, Oxford, of which he became Provost, and after being Bishop one year (of Durham, however, not Gloucester and Bristol), was translated to York.

Albert Durer, the celebrated German artist, engraved about A.D. 1508 or 1509, a series of thirty-seven wood-cuts, which were published with a text, under the name of *The Passion of Christ*. Thirty-five of the original wood-cuts were by some singular piece of good fortune preserved, and are now in the British Museum, having been obtained by the trustees in 1839. An edition of these cuts, with the missing ones supplied as well as possible, was printed in 1844 at the Chiswick press.

Mr. Lovell Reeve, who has recently published, in *fac-simile*, by the new process of photo-zincography, Shakspeare's *Sonnets* and *Lover's Complaint*, will follow it up with the *Venus and Adonis*, *Lucrece*, the rare quarto plays published before the collected edition of 1623; and lastly, the famous folio itself. *Much Ado about Nothing* is already in hand.

Sir George Cornewall Lewis has in the press a new edition of *An Essay on the Origin and Formation of the Romance Languages; containing an Examination of M. Raynouard's Theory on the Relation of the Italian, Spanish, Provençal, and French to the Latin*.

Mr. Nichol, of Edinburgh, proposes a reissue of the following commentaries, edited by Rev. Jas. Sherman—subscription price 25s. 6d.—formerly published at £3 5s., viz. Rev. Thos. Adams on Peter's Second Epistle, (1663); Hosea, by Burroughs, (1643); Jude, by Wm. Jenkyn, (1653); and Daille's Philippians and Colossians (1639), translated by Sherman.

Dr. Robert Vaughan's bicentenary memorial volume on English Nonconformity is announced. In three Books it gives an account of the Religious Life in England before 1660; the Confessors of 1662; and English Nonconformity since 1662.

The *Home and Foreign Review*, the new Roman Catholic Quarterly, succeeding the *Rambler*, has already been denounced by Cardinal Wiseman, Bishop Ullathorne, and other prelates.

The Gospel according to St. John has been translated from the eleven oldest versions, except the Latin, by Rev. S. C. Malan, with Notes. 4to, 50 pp. 36s. The translations are from the Syriac, Æthiopic, Armenian, Georgian, Slavonic, Sahidic, Memphitic, Gothic, Anglo-Saxon, Arabic and Persian.

A literary triplet has just been published in London—*Specimens of Ancient Gaelic Poetry*. It was collected between 1512 and 1589 by the Rev. James McGregor, Dean of Lismore, and is translated and edited by the Rev. Thomas McLaughlin; with an Introduction and Additional Notes by Mr. William F. Skene.

The British government has granted a pension of £100 to Mr. Isaac Taylor, as an acknowledgment of his eminent services to literature, especially in the departments of history and philosophy.

Professor A. De Morgan has been long employed upon a work examining the Logic of Sir William Hamilton. He has repeatedly called upon the Hamiltonians to answer him some questions about the logic, and repeats them in a still more urgent style in the *Athenæum*, thus:

"What was the meaning of the word 'some' in the system of the quantified predicate, which Hamilton taught from his chair 'to place the key-stone in the Aristotelic arch'? When he enunciated—'Some A is B'—'Some men are wise'—or the like, did his nomenclature imply 'and the rest as may be,' or did it imply 'and the rest are not'?"

Rev. John Keble is writing a Life of Thos. Wilson, Bishop of Sodor and Man.

Among the new books announced are—Lyell on the *Antiquity of Man*; Rawlinson, *The Five Great Monarchies*; a new edition of Dean Milman's *History of the Jews*; Stanley, *Lectures on the Jewish Church*; A. S. Farrar, *History of Free Thought*; Horner's translation of Villari's *Savonarola*; R. W. Mackey, *The Tübingen School and its Antecedents*; Prof. Huxley, *Man's Place in Nature*; *Book of Job*, by Geo. Croly; *Revised Translation of New Testament*, by Highton; a translation by Wm. Alexander of Saisset on *Modern Pantheism*—an acute work; *Historical Theology*, by the late Principal Cunningham, of Edinburgh; *Hymnologia Christiana*, by Dr. Kennedy—full and valuable; a translation of Wieseler's *Chronological Synopsis of the Gospels*; a third edition of Fairbairn's *Ezekiel*; *Beza's Codex*, edited by Scrivener; *Leo's Sermons on the Incarnation*, translated by Bright; C. J. Vaughan on the *Epistle to the Philippians*; Theodore Parker's Works, in 12 vols.; Ed. Churton on the *Latitudinarians*; Alford's *New Testament for English Readers*, 2 vols.



## UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

*The Census of 1860 on Periodicals in the United States.*—In 1850 their number was 1,630. In 1860 it was 3,242, being an increase of nearly 100 per cent. In 1850 the number of religious papers and periodicals was 191. In 1860 it was stated at 277, being an increase of 45 per cent. In 1850 the number of papers and periodicals of every class in the United States was 2,526. In 1860 the aggregate under this head reaches, as before stated, 4,051, showing a rate of increase of 60.37. The total circulation of all kinds amounted in 1850 to 426,409,978 copies. In 1860 the annual circulation is stated at 927,951,548 copies, showing a ratio of increase of 117.61. In 1850 the annual circulation of all kinds afforded 21.81 copies to each white person in the Union. In 1860 the total circulation was at the rate 34.36 per person. Of the total circulation in the country, three States, New York, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, furnish 539,026,124 copies, or considerably more than half of the aggregate amount. Of 4,051 papers and periodicals published in the United States, at the date of the census of 1860, 3,242, or 80.02 per cent, were political in their character; 298, or 7.38 per cent are devoted to literature. Religion and theology compose the province of 277, or 6.83 per cent, while 234, or 5.77 per cent, are classed as miscellaneous.

In New England, the Middle and Western States, the value of book, job, and newspaper printing is returned as \$38,428,043, of which eleven millions' worth consisted of books, the value of the latter being nearly equal to the whole product of the same branch in 1850, which was returned at \$11,586,549. The manufacture of paper, especially of printing paper, has increased in an equal ratio, the State of Massachusetts alone producing paper of the value of \$5,968,469, being over fifty-eight per cent of the product of the Union in 1850. New York returned paper of the value of \$3,516,276; Connecticut, \$2,528,758, and Pennsylvania, \$1,785,900.

*The Ecangelical Quarterly Review*, Gettysburgh began a new volume in October (the 14th), under the able editorship of Prof. M. L. Stoever. The articles are. The Book of Job, from the German of Schlottmann, by Dr. Schaeffer; Martin Luther, from Köstlin, by Dr. Diehl; Spéner, from Tholuck, by Prof. Muhlenberg; Our General Synod; The Crusades, by Dr. Lintner; The Great Commandment, by Dr. Lintner; Remarks on Romans vi, 3, 4, by Dr. Greenwald.

A tract of Franklin's, long supposed to be lost, is soon to be republished, viz. *Discourse on Liberty and Necessity, Pleasure and Pain, in a Letter to a Friend*. He wrote it in London, when first there, in reply to Wollaston's *Religion of Nature*, the types of which he was setting up. His main position was, that nothing could be wrong in the world, since God was infinitely good and wise—that virtue and vice were empty distinctions. Becoming dissatisfied with it, he burned all but a few copies. Of one of these there is an account by James Crossley, in the *Notes and Queries*, 1852. Mr. Stevens, has a copy dated 1725, 8vo, pp. 32.

Mr. Tibbals, New York, is bringing out a compact and cheap edition of Stier's *Words of the Lord Jesus*, in 2 vols., revised by Dr. Strong. The Edinburgh edition has had a large sale in this country.

*Chronicles of the Franciscans in Brazil*, vol. 2, Rio Janeiro, 1861. The first volume was issued just a century ago.

An English translation of *Graul's Distinctive Doctrines*, by the Rev. D. M. Martens, of Ohio, is published by Rev. J. A. Schulze, Columbus, Ohio. It is a valuable work.



Mr. Fletcher Harper, in a letter to the *Athenæum*, says, that the Harpers have paid more money to British authors than all the other publishers in America; and, in the past five years, have paid more to British authors for early sheets than British publishers have paid to American authors since the first book was printed in this country.

Prof. I. D. Rupp, well known as editor of a *History of Denominations*, is preparing a *History of the Germans in Pennsylvania*, giving, also, an account of various sects. *The Lutheran and Missionary*—an excellent and well-conducted newspaper, furnishes extracts, which show that it will be a work of decided value.

Mr. Charles Perkins, of Boston, who has been for some time residing in Florence, has recently finished a work on sculpture, which has been accepted by the Longmans, of London, and will be shortly published there. It is profusely illustrated with outlines of sculpture, drawn by Mr. Perkins, and will bear much the same relation to the plastic art that Mrs. Jameson's works do to painting.

The Theological writings of Archbishop Whately are to be republished in this country, under the direct editorship of the author, by Draper, of Andover, who will put to press, at an early day, *Essays on some of the Difficulties in the Writings of the Apostle Paul*, to be followed by *Essays on some of the Peculiarities of the Christian Religion*, etc.

The American Bible Society is now publishing, besides the English Scriptures—1. The Armeno-Turkish translation of the whole Bible, by the Rev. Dr. Goodell, of Constantinople—the work of a long and devoted missionary life. 2. The continued translation of the Bulgarian Scriptures, by Dr. Riggs. 3. The Arabo-Turkish translation of the New Testament, by Dr. Riggs—nearly completed and in press. 4. The completion of the revised edition of the Bible in Chinese, by Rev. Dr. Culbertson and his coadjutors—a work of years, and of vast importance. 5. The Arabic Bible, begun by the late Dr. Eli Smith, and completed by Dr. Van Dyck; now ready for the press—will be in great demand. 6. Added to the above is the interesting fact, that a native of Syria has cut a complete set of matrices and punches for the type of a Syriac New Testament, soon to be printed at the Bible House. 7. Within three years we have printed, says the *Record*, 14,000 copies of the Scriptures for Turkey. Of the Armenian Scriptures six editions have been issued from the Bible House, from three sets of electrotype plates, of three different sizes. This is a most beautiful specimen of Oriental typography, and is very popular among the Armenians. 8. A new Spanish edition of the Bible is now in process of revision and of electrotyping. To this work Dr. Brigham gave many laborious hours, down to the close of his life.

*Skeddadle*. Etymological speculations are still rife as to the origin of this word. Some prefer the Greek. A writer in the *Historical Magazine* says that "it is of both Swedish and Danish origin, and has been in common use for several years through the Northwest, in the vicinity of immigrants from those nations. It is Americanized only in orthography; the Swedes spelling it 'skuddadahl,' while the Danes spell 'skyededeht,' both having precisely the same signification. This phrase is also becoming Indianized, at least among the Sioux, who frequently use it in place of their word 'poch-a-chee,' which signifies 'clear out,' 'go off,' etc. I will also add that the Swedes use the word *skudda*, and the Danes the word *skyede*, in the same sense as we do the word 'scud'." Lord Hill writes to *The Times* (London) October 13th, that "skeddadle is commonly used in Dumfriesshire, my native home. To *skeddadle* means to spill in small quantities any liquids. The Americans totally misapply the word".

## Literary and Critical Notices of Books.

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### BIBLICAL LITERATURE.

*The Pentateuch and Book of Joshua Critically Examined.* By the Right Rev. JOHN WILLIAM COLENSO, D.D., Bishop of Natal. New York: Appleton & Co. 1863. 12mo, pp. 226. If it be not praise, then it must be terrible satire, to say of a new work like this that it is "a remarkable book by a remarkable man". So have many critics pronounced it. So we think it. And yet, in our judgment, there is nothing very remarkable about either the book or the man, separately considered. The remarkableness is all in the conjunction of the two. A stranger phenomenon certainly has not occurred of late in the literary world. That an English bishop—who has been for nine years amongst the Zulus of South-Eastern Africa, trying to convert them to Christianity—should thus have struck his flag in the face of heathendom, abjuring his life-long faith, not only in the Divine inspiration, but even in the historic truth of the Pentateuch, and other, if not all the other Scriptures, is, to say the least of it, something to be stared at. Had this book been written by a heathen Zulu, or had the Natal Bishop written quite another sort of book, in defence of the Pentateuch as inspired and credible, no great stir would probably have come of it. In the one case, we might have had to pity and pray for the poor Zulu; or, in the other case, we might have had to thank the worthy Bishop for good intentions not very vigorously realised. But now we have to do with a Zulu book from an English bishop! The conjunction staggers us.

The champions of orthodoxy, it is often said, are apt to enter the lists against a heretic by denouncing him as a bad man. We shall indulge ourselves in no such charge, in no such suspicion even. We believe the Bishop to be a very good man. His book certainly is pious; altogether too pious for the common run of infidel readers. The tone of it is not defiant, but deprecatory. Evidently it pains him to march out of the old camp, and range himself upon the other side. He pleads for charitable judgment on the part of his former comrades, with the pathos of one who really values the sympathy of Christian men. He prints his book, as he embraced his new opinions, not in wrath, but in righteousness of purpose; not in obedience to any lust of reputation, place, or power, but simply because he felt constrained thereto by the instincts of an honest mind. He *ceased* to believe, and therefore speaks. Cost what it may, he cannot be silent even, seeming to hold opinions which have departed from him. Having discarded alike, and equally, the Divine inspiration, the Mosaic authorship, and the historic truth, of the Pentateuch, he must make a clean breast of it in the face of Natal, England, and the world. He may cease to be a bishop, but he cannot consent to be a hypocrite. And so he disrobes himself like a martyr for the stake. Yet not quite, for "the decision of the Court of Arches" holds out some promise that one may hereafter be a bishop with-

out believing. And to make a sure thing of it—that there may be neither martyrdom, nor wear and tear of conscience, in the future as in the past—he importunes the English laity to let their Bible slide. Not without interest shall we await their answer to this appeal. We are curious to know whether, in the land of Wycliffe and Latimer, the Bible, the Koran, the Vedas, the Zend-Avesta, and the nine Classics of China, are all to go upon the same shelf.

But if not a bad man, how could Bishop Colenso have been left to write such a book? The secret is an open one. It comes of a meagre professional discipline. In the University, probably, he studied Thucydides and Æschylus more than he studied Moses and Isaiah. And from the University, like the majority of English clergymen, he went probably to his parish without anything like a proper theological training. The way in which he speaks of such writers as Bleek, Ewald, Kurtz, Hävernicks, and Hengstenberg, shows plainly enough that he has not been familiar with the higher literature of his profession. In *Allibone's Dictionary* he is named as Rector of Fornett St. Mary, Norfolk, and author of works on arithmetic, algebra, and plane trigonometry for schools. In Africa, he had to study the Bible in order to translate it into Zulu; and, in attempting it, his faith went to wreck against difficulties, which he ought long ago to have encountered and escaped. He deprecates in advance the imputation of having borrowed his infidelity from Germany. For those who know anything of German infidelity, there was no need of this. His infidelity is all his own, of English seed on heathen soil.

Doubtless the book may work some mischief as coming from a bishop's pen. There are those who will be imposed upon by his sweeping assertions of absurdity and contradiction, launched against the Mosaic records. There are those who have not the perspicacity to detect the exaggeration with which he states a difficulty, nor the skill to turn its edge. There are those who do not know why an *argumentum ad ignorantiam* is not as cogent as any other. And there are those who have not been taught to read the Scriptures in the light of the well-established principles of modern science. All such persons are likely to suffer harm. But the mischief wrought will soon be redressed. Those whose business it is to expound the Scriptures will be driven to a more critical and deeper study of them, and compelled to give a better account, than they are now able to do, of the faith once delivered to the saints.

This is not the place to notice in detail the points chosen for assault by the Bishop. There are some eighteen or twenty of them in all. So far as we have observed, none of them are new, and, to judge from the few that we have carefully examined, none of them are formidable. To make difficulties where there are none, by holding the writer of the Pentateuch to a strictness of construction not at all required by the context, and then to exaggerate ingeniously existing difficulties, such as are always to be expected in rapid and concise narration, is not quite so fair as it is easy. A faith which can be overwhelmed by such tactics, deserves to be overwhelmed. That the Bishop of Natal should have frittered away his own faith by a process so utterly at war with the very rudiments of criticism, though painful enough, cannot be surprising to such as have noticed his previous vagaries. An interpreter of Scripture who can plead for the permission of polygamy to heathen converts amongst the Zulus, and teach for doctrine that Christ has not only made an atonement for the sins of men, but actually redeemed the race by his sufferings, is an interpreter whose final landing-place may be guessed but never calculated.

R. D. H.

## THEOLOGY AND CHURCH HISTORY.

*Die göttliche Offenbarung*, von Dr. E. A. AUBERLEN. Bd. I. Basel. 1859. Prof. Auberlen is well known to English readers by the translation of his work on Daniel and the Apocalypse. He belongs to that school of German theologians, who have revolted against the abstractions of philosophy, and insist upon historical facts, as containing the reality of the Christian revelation. This new work on Divine Revelation is a defence of the Christian system against rationalism, in a method conformed to this view. The first part gives the evidence, on historical ground, that a supernatural revelation is found in Christianity, attested by miracles, proved by all proper historical tests. The second part recounts the history of rationalism—a very able review. The third part, not yet published, will discuss the underlying metaphysical questions, as to the possibility of miracles, etc., on the basis of the true idea of God and his workings, vindicating the necessity of a revelation. The principles and arguments of all the later German schools of philosophy are ably reviewed, as well as all the main modern theological systems. In the historical proof of the reality of a supernatural revelation, he begins with Christ and the Apostles, starting with only those epistles which even the school of Baur acknowledge to be genuine, Romans, Corinthians, and Galatians. Then in a regressive method, he goes to the Old Testament, and examines particularly its prophecies, as well as the evidence of a divine economy running through the elder dispensation. "The last alternative", he says, reviewing the whole, "is, that the world is a mad-house, or the temple of the living God".

*S. Bonaventuræ Opuscula duo præstantissima, Breviloquium et Itinerarium Mentis ad Deum*. Ed. C. J. HEFELE. Editio tertia. Tubing. 1861. 18mo, pp. 356. This beautiful, correct and cheap edition of two of the best treatises of John of Fidenza, to whom St. Francis gave the name Bonaventura, and whom the Greeks, for his pacific counsels, called Eutychius, —is a boon to the scholar. Baumgarten Crusius said that the *Breviloquium* is the best dogmatic work of the mediæval period. It goes over all the main topics of theology in a natural method, and gives clear doctrinal statements. The *Itinerarium* is a manual of practical divinity, in the best spirit of the mystics of the middle ages. Chancellor Gerson said of these two works: "*Bonaventuræ opuscula duo tanta sunt arte compendii divinitus composita, ut supra ipsa nihil*". The volume can be had for about 75 cents.—Bonaventura became Prof. of Theology in Paris, in 1253; and was at the Council of Lyons in 1274. A Protestant German theologian, Hollenberg, has just published *Studies on Bonaventura*, giving an account of his theology and of his mystical writings.

*Preuves que Tho. à Kempis n'a pas composé l'Imitation de N. S. Jésus Christ*. Par P. TAMIZEY DE LARROQUE. Paris. 1862. No country has honored the immortal *Imitation* of Jesus Christ with more profound devotion than France. De Larroque states the number of translations at more than a hundred; the editions are countless. It is no wonder, then, that an effort should be made to disprove its foreign origin, even if a French authorship cannot be proved. This was the object of M. de Larroque in his elaborate articles in the *Annales de Philosophie Chrétienne*, now collected in a small volume. His object is to prove from internal evidences that à Kempis cannot have composed this work. Germany, Italy, and France have contended for the authorship; Germany for à Kempis; Italy for Gersen and Jean de Cabanaco; France for Gerson. Ullman, Liebner, Gieseler,

Delprat, Scholz, Clarisse, Quérard, Lalanne, and Malon of Belgium, advocate the claims of the first; the work of Malon, 1848, new edition 1858, gives all the arguments in a complete form. The claims of Gerson are defended by Cajetan, Guerini, De Gregory (2 vols. 1842), Renan, Chateaubriand, and Rohrbacher. Many French writers have favored Gerson; M. Gence wrote 21 works in his favor; with him agree Berrier, Vert, and Villemain. Some enthusiastic Frenchmen have even said, the Imitation is "the work of France itself". The contest has also been carried on between the monastic orders; the regular canons of St. Augustine and the Jesuits contending always for à Kempis (as Amort, Molinet, Gély, Bellarmine, etc.); and the Benedictines for Gerson. What Gregory the Great said of the Book of Job has also been applied to the Imitation, that "the only thing that seemed certain was, that the Holy Ghost was its author". And it is reported of de Merillac, that after hearing Malon's prolix arguments for à Kempis, he remarked, "that God had granted to the saintly author the honor of being forgotten". But M. Tamizey de Larroque reopens the question with great zeal. His work is devoted to a comparison of the Imitation with the acknowledged writings of à Kempis. He certainly shows marked differences in style; e. g., *abnegation* and *resignation* constantly recur in the Imitation — the former in à Kempis rarely, the latter not at all; the adverbs of the latter end usually in *ter*, of the former seldom; allegory and antithesis abound in à Kempis, and not in the Imitation; citations of holy books are frequent in the former, and not in the latter, which however has several from classical authors, in which à Kempis was not versed. The devil is introduced into the Imitation only seven times, he appears on every page of à Kempis; the former rarely speaks of hell, and of heaven only in general terms, while the latter describes both minutely. In the Imitation there is only one narrative, but stories abound in à Kempis. The latter has many artificial metaphors; the former abounds in simpler tropes. A multitude of special and characteristic terms are found in the Imitation, and not in à Kempis; e. g., absorption in God; the abyss of deity (*abyssalis deitas*); the aliment of immortality (*immortalitatis alimonium*); ambulare; tuba for buccina; contradicere, contradictiones; conditor mundi; genera and species, etc. And so in à Kempis are many phrases never occurring in the Imitation: *carnis aestus*, *carnis lascivia*; frequent diminutions, similes on all fours, etc. The meditations on death in the Imitation are simple and profound; in à Kempis descriptive and imaginative. The Imitation has no preface; even the minor works of à Kempis have long introductions. One of the most remarkable facts however is, that in the Imitation the Virgin Mary is spoken of only three or four times, and then quite incidentally, without any special homage; while à Kempis prayed every day an hour to the Mother of God, and introduced her with rapture and veneration into almost every discourse. De Larroque thinks that à Kempis may have received the credit of writing the Imitation, because, being a calligraphist, he wrote it out in a fair hand, adding the equivocal formula: "*Finitus et completus anno Domini MCCCCXXI, per manus fratris Thomae à Kempis*". There are mss., however, older than this of Antwerp (now at Brussels). He also thinks that the testimony to à Kempis of Buschius, a cotemporary, is interpolated. He also tries to show that the author must have been a Frenchman, but is not able to decide for Gerson. *Adhuc sub judice lis est.*

*Bibliotheca Patrum Selectissimo.* Ed. G. B. LINDNER. Fasciculi i-iv. Lips. 1857-61. This *Bibliotheca* is intended to give some of the minor treatises of the Fathers of the Church, unabridged, at a very moderate



cost. Four fasciculi have been published: the first contains the Epistle to Diognetus—one of the very best of the post-apostolic writings in the second century; and the Martyrdom of Polycarp. The second gives in full the text of Tertullian on the Resurrection; the third, Clement of Alexandria's treatise, entitled, *Quis Dives Salvetur*; the fourth, Tertullian-De Anima. The cost of the four is about one dollar.

*Les deux Theologies nouvelles dans le Sein du Protestantisme Français.* Etude historico-dogmatique par J.-F. Astié. Paris. 1862. Pp. 344. Professor Astié, of Lausanne, in this interesting and well-written work, reviews the conflicts and progress of opinion among the Protestants in France and Switzerland, for the past twenty years. A devoted admirer of Vinet, whose system he has presented, with pertinent extracts, in another work,—he is radically opposed to the rationalism of Scherer, Colani, and Pécaut, and to the attempt to carry theology back to the scholastic formulas of the *Consensus Helveticus*. While pleading for liberty of thought, and the freedom of the Church, he is reverential to the Divine Word, and opposed to the license of unilluminated reason. The work is divided into three parts. 1. The Past. 2. The Crisis—a full account of the controversies with Scherer, Colani, Réville, Pécaut, and Renan. 3. The Future—a eulogium of the theology of Vinet, as the theology of conscience.

*Lange's Bibel-Werk.* 1862. IX. Theil. The ninth part of this valuable commentary contains Schenkel on the Epistles to the Ephesians, Philippians, and Colossians. He defends against Baur the genuineness of these Epistles, and gives a lucid and condensed commentary, under the three heads of exegetical, doctrinal, and homiletic. Though Schenkel is not as thoroughly orthodox as some of the writers of this Bible-Work, he is always suggestive, and he has the gift of clear statement and arrangement.

#### BIOGRAPHY.

*Johannes Brenz.* Von JULIUS HARTMANN. Elberfeld. 1862. 8vo, pp. 338. This life of the distinguished Suabian reformer forms the sixth volume of the *Lives and Selected Writings of the Fathers of the Lutheran Church*, now in progress. Hartmann published in 1840-2, a larger work on the same subject, very much of it from unpublished sources. This new work will be of more interest to the general reader. Brenz was born in 1499, and died in 1570. Luther won him to the reformation at Heidelberg in 1518. He was a man of great learning, eminent as a divine and preacher, the author of numerous commentaries, and also the chief instrument for organizing the Church in Würtemberg. Of his works, 8 vols. folio appeared, 1576-90, not comprising the whole. The *Syngramma Suevicum*, 1525, on the Lord's Supper, is from his pen; the Würtemberg Confession was also drawn up by him. He wrote against the Münster Anabaptists. This new life will commend him anew, as a faithful, earnest and able reformer and divine, to the gratitude and favor, not only of the Lutheran church, which he so faithfully served, but also of many in other communions.

*Joannes Saresberiensis, nach Leben und Studien, etc.* Von Dr. C. SCHAABSCHMIDT. Leipzig. 1862. 8vo, pp. 359. Another example of those excellent monographs for which the German literature, especially in church history,



has become so noted. John of Salisbury was born in England "not before 1110 nor after 1120"; studied in France, returned to England, and was involved in the controversies about Thos. à Becket, 1163-1170; became Bishop of Chartres 1176; died 1182. His chief works are the *Policraticus*, addressed to Becket; the *Entheticus*; the *Metalogicus*; biographies of Anselm and Becket; *Epistles*. Some of his commentaries are lost. Dr. Schaarschmidt goes over all the ground of his life, writings, influence, and of the times in which he lived, with full research. The second part of the work, on the Teachers and Studies of John, is particularly interesting, giving accounts of the state of classical and patristic learning in the 12th century in the most famous schools. His relation to the realistic and nominalistic controversy is also fully discussed. Usually accused of being indifferent or negative in his philosophical views, Dr. Schaarschmidt tries to show that he was rather discreet than undecided; too wise to be a partisan of any extreme speculations.

*Memoirs of the Rev. Nicholas Murray, D.D.* By SAMUEL IRENEUS PRIME. New York: Harper & Brothers. 1862. 12mo, pp. 438. Dr. Prime has here given to the public a truthful and interesting biography of an honored minister, a laborious pastor, and a popular writer. We might not fully agree in the very high estimate put upon Dr. Murray's ministerial ability by his friend, still we willingly concede to him many admirable qualities of mind and heart; and we believe he was a conscientious, earnest, and faithful preacher and pastor. That he was industrious and methodical beyond most men, genial and warm-hearted, is known to all who enjoyed his acquaintance. His "Kirwan" letters were an extraordinary success, making him favorably known abroad as well as at home, and were blessed to the conversion of many from Romanism. We confess that the reading of this Memoir has not a little increased our respect and admiration for Dr. Murray. It is well adapted to quicken the zeal of his brethren, and stimulate them to work while it is day. A very speaking likeness accompanies the volume.

*The Life of Edward Irving, Minister of the National Scotch Church, London.* Illustrated by his Journals and Correspondence. By MRS. OLIPHANT. New York: Harpers. 1862. 8vo, pp. 627. With a portrait. This biography is of absorbing interest. It is the only full record of the dazzling career of one who, with all his faults and errors, will ever be regarded as a man of extraordinary genius. Only a great nature could have fallen into such great errors. There is a strange fascination about such a life. And what a wonderful conjunction there is in the three Scotch names: Chalmers, Carlyle, and Edward Irving! And in magnificence of native genius, the last was the most regally endowed. But he was always soaring and visionary; and the dizzy height at last bewildered his senses. As Carlyle so nobly says of him: "Irving gave to his Belief, as to his soul's soul; followed it whithersoever, through earth or air, it might lead him; toiling as never man toiled to spread it, to gain the world's ear for it—in vain. Ever wilder waxed the confusion without and within. The misguided, noble-minded, had now nothing left but to die." "Adieu, thou first Friend; adieu, while this confused Twilight of Existence lasts! Might we meet where Twilight has become day." Coleridge, too, said of him (*Church and State*, p. 153): "Edward Irving possesses more of the spirit and purposes of the first Reformer, he has more of the head and heart, the life, the unction and the genial power of Martin Luther than any man now alive, yea, than any man of this and the last century".

This volume, too, is most instructive as well as intensely interesting. It lets us into the inner religious history of a great soul struggling with great problems. Irving, like few men, tried to make the facts of religion living realities. The truths of his creed were not mere propositions, but solemn, awe-inspiring facts. He dwelt in the most mysterious of them, remote from common thought and ways. Prophecy and the millennium, heaven and hell, the sacred Person of our Lord and his coming, the reality of the Divine promises and of spiritual gifts—these themes absorbed his soul. And nature at last gave way—and there is only a sound as of Babel left behind.

The chief doctrinal and ecclesiastical points, by which he became suspected, were: that Christ assumed our fallen, sinful humanity (but by assuming also sanctified it); that Christ made atonement for all; baptismal regeneration; the gift of tongues, and the apostolate revived. As to the Person of Christ, his own statement (p. 301) of the point at issue, is, "whether Christ's flesh had the grace of sinlessness and incorruption from its proper nature, or from the indwelling of the Holy Ghost; I say the latter". He quotes on his side the old Scotch Confession, which he preferred to the Westminster.

The author of *Margaret Maitland*, in this, to her, new field of literature, has achieved a marked success.

#### PRACTICAL RELIGION.

*A Catechism for Sunday-Schools and Families.* By PHILIP SCHAFF, D.D. 18mo, pp. 167. Philadelphia: Lindsay & Blakiston. 1862. The plan of this Catechism is excellent. After sundry Introductory Lessons, Part First is on the Lord's Prayer; Part Second, on the Apostles' Creed; Part Third, on the Commandments. It happily blends the historical and doctrinal elements. In doctrine it is most nearly conformed to the Heidelberg Catechism. While we might except to, here and there, a form of statement, or a somewhat un-English idiom, yet, as a whole, we heartily commend its method and execution. With slight modifications, it would be an invaluable help in Sunday-school and Family instruction.

The *American Tract Society*, New York, has published several excellent volumes for the young in an attractive style: *Illustrations of the Ten Commandments*, pp. 172, full of illustrative anecdotes; Dr. E. P. ROGERS, *The Prodigal Son*, pp. 151, a series of pertinent and impressive sketches; *Harry the Sailor Boy*, pp. 119; *My Brother Ben*, pp. 142; *The Naughty Girl Won*, pp. 135; *The Woodman's Nannette*, pp. 110, an affecting narrative; *Cheerily, Cheerily*, pp. 205, an interesting story; *My Picture-Book*, pp. 64, beautifully illustrated.

*American History.* By JACOB ABBOTT. Vol. iv. *Northern Colonies.* New York: Sheldon & Co. In a perspicuous and simple narrative, adapted to interest the young, the settlement of the Northern Colonies of this country is here described. This volume is one of a series, to be completed in 12 volumes. It is well illustrated with maps and engravings. To recommend Mr. Abbott's works is quite superfluous.

*A New Memoir of Hannah More; or, Life in Hall and Cottage.* By Mrs. HELEN C. KNIGHT. Am. Tract Soc., New York. 12mo, pp. 282. This excellent biography, revised from a previous edition, has already made its way to many hearts, and is destined to do still greater good, wherever female excellence of the highest type is known and honored.

## PHILOSOPHY.

*Lectures on Moral Science*, delivered before the Lowell Institute, Boston. By MARK HOPKINS, D.D., LL.D., President of Williams College. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 1862. Pp. 304. These Lectures will deservedly increase the high reputation of President Hopkins as a thinker and author. He shows himself capable of dealing with some of the highest problems of thought in a style at once perspicuous, and affluent, not only throwing new light upon old truths, but also advancing aspects of the science not so fully discussed in previous treatises. While conservative in his general spirit, he does not hesitate to give and receive new light. Reverential to the Divine Revelation, he allows to reason an adequate scope; and has it for one of his main objects to show that the analysis of the mind and its functions in relation to ethical truth not only harmonises, but is identical with the declarations of the Divine Word. While we might differ with him here and there on some points of theory or of statement, yet we concur in the general aim and spirit of this able treatise.

One of the excellencies of this system is the mode in which profound speculations are made level to the understanding of almost all intelligent students. The simplicity of the style, the pertinent use of words, the ease and fitness of the illustrations must strike the most casual reader. This is a great gift and a rare attainment. There is nothing obscure or mystical; no affectation of originality in speech, though there is real originality in thought.

Another advantage of the treatise is found in its conciliatory spirit in respect to theories, which the author is compelled to reject. He is just to all, acknowledging the relative truth of those views, which he cannot accept as final. His aim seems to be so to embrace whatever is true in other theories, as to put each partial speculation in its proper post of subordination. Thus in respect to self-love, and the various forms of the utilitarian scheme, and the relation of virtue to the Divine will. Adopting what is true in them, he also shows their metes and limits.

For use as a text-book, too, this volume keeps up a just proportion between the theoretical and the practical part of ethics. The discussion of principles predominates. The student is made a thinker. And he is made a thinker in the best way—being guided by a superior and candid mind.

The peculiarity of the work as a scientific treatise consists in its formal adoption of the doctrine of "ends", in distinction from that of "ultimate right" as the constructive idea of the system. This harmonises with the Aristotelian definitions. Dr. Hopkins says, that in this respect the Lectures as they are now re-written differ from the form in which he had generally given them to his classes. Moral philosophy is defined as "the science which teaches man the end for which he was made, why he should attain that end, and how to attain it". Ends are divided as subordinate, ultimate and supreme. The supreme end, or the highest good, is found "in the activity of the highest powers in a right relation to their highest objects". This end is not holiness alone, nor happiness alone, but "holy happiness", "blessedness". While this seems to us to be giving too large a place to the element of happiness in the construction of the ethical system, yet it is also carefully guarded by a discrimination of the different kinds of happiness. But still happiness is so vague a term, and it has been so much abused in ethics, that it seems desirable to leave no room, in the statement of the theory, for any possible unwarrantable inferences. And happiness, as Dr. Hopkins repeatedly in substance states, is in fact only the psychological condition of the

exercise of all our powers — of all the capacities of sentient agents. In and of itself it has, and can have no moral character. The ethical element must be found in something else, that is, in the holiness and not in the happiness. Only thus can ethics be sharply distinguished as a distinct science.

Of the relation of virtue to the will of God some subtle suggestions, of a profound speculative import, are made on p. 239. "It may be that what we must reach in our ultimate analysis is a free personality, — a Person with no nature, or fate, or fitnesses of things back of him or above him; who is himself, by his own free choice, the originator of everything that may properly be called nature, and of all fitnesses of things." "It may be that the nature of God is nothing distinct from his personality, and that so he is wholly supernatural." We wish that Dr. Hopkins might develop this view still further in its bearings on pantheism.

*Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik*, Neue Folge, Bde. 40–41, 1862. This Philosophical Journal, edited by Fichte, Ulrici, Wirth, still maintains the highest rank among periodicals devoted to speculative research, opposing pantheism and the excesses of idealism. Among the essays in the last two volumes are, F. Hoffman on the Dualism of Anaxagoras and the monotheism of Socrates and Plato; J. G. von Hahn and Carrière on the Formation of Myths; Lütterbeck on Baader's Philosophy, three articles; Sengler on the Theory of Knowing; Sträter on Aristotle's Poetics, two articles; Hoffman on Ulrici's God and Nature, (a very able work), with Ulrici's reply, etc. Reviews of the most important recent works on philosophy are also given, and a full philosophical bibliography. Ulrici reviews McCosh's late writings in a candid way, though taking exception to some of his indeterminate positions and lack of thorough method.

*Zeitschrift für exacte Philosophie*. Bde. 2, 3, 1861–2. This periodical represents the school of Herbart, and is ably edited by Allihn and Ziller, opposing all the various forms of the recent idealism, and claiming to be the true representative of the Kantian system. In the first volume a full bibliography of the school of Herbart was given. Besides reviews of recent works, the 2d vol., and vol. 3, parts 1 and 2, contain Drobisch on Locke as the Forerunner of Kant; Thilo on Happiness in Aristotle's system; Cornelius on Matter and the Theory of Vision; Volkmann, the Principles and Methods of Psychology; Zimmermann, the Reform of Æsthetics as an exact Science; Allihn, Herbart's Reform of Ethics, Hegel's Logic in Paris, and Philosophical Propædæutics; Thilo on the Religious Philosophy of Descartes; Ratkowsky, the Principle of Legitimacy and Nationality; Nahlowsky, on Beneke's Psychology, etc.

#### PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY.

*An Inquiry into the Philosophy of History, with Special Reference to the Principles of the Positive Philosophy*. London, 1862. Pp. 461. The anonymous author of this able work, investigates three theories, viz. that of Chance, that of Law, and that of Will, or divine Providence. The method and principles of the Positive Philosophy of Comte are subjected to a searching criticism. Two other volumes are to follow, one on the Elements and Ideas of History, and another on the Laws of History. The general spirit of the work may be seen from the following extract: "Philosophy will fail to fulfil its mission, and must renounce the high character which it claims as the eye of Science and the hand of Art, the proper basis of society, and the true frame-work of history, until it places itself in intimate accord with

that theism which it sometimes repudiates and contemns. The union of both makes science religious and religion scientific, philosophy devout and piety philosophical, because in that union law is conceived as interpenetrated, informed, and directed by the infinite mind, the eternal thought, the omnipotent and beneficent will of that of which it is the grand and sublime expression, and whose faintest whisperings it is the highest glory of man to interpret and obey." After examining the theories of Chance and Law at length, the final conclusion is thus stated, that the desideratum of a correct theory "is supplied by the theory of Will, a Supreme Will, of which all phenomena and laws are the expression, and of which, under different but accordant aspects we may conceive as a primary cause, the source of all being, and as a presence, a power, a providence informing all nature, energizing all life, exercising a just and wise and beneficent moral government over rational creatures, and guiding all events to their destined ends". The criticism of Comte, and incidentally of Mill, is searching, and opens many new veins of reflection. The argument in support of the existence of a supreme will seems to us to be much less ably conducted — being resolved in fact into an analysis of the process of thought in forming the idea of God. The logical steps and the ontological ideas involved in this process are not very thoroughly or adequately analyzed. The second chapter of the book considers three objections to the theory of will, viz. the objections to a primary cause, to a providence, and to final causes. The vindication of final causes is able and ample — one of the best parts of the book. On Providence, many just remarks are made, though it is pretty nearly identified with the chain or series of regular causes, and the existence of free will is hardly recognized with sufficient definiteness. Of the problem of evil and sin, in relation to Providence, little or no account is taken; and it is difficult to see how miracles and a supernatural revelation would be consistent with the general theory. Yet there are also noble vindications of essential points in the theistic belief. "Divine knowledge involves divine providence, divine providence involves divine government, and divine government is the true philosophy of life, of society, of history (p. 234)."

The third chapter examines with philosophic calmness, the Positive Method in the use of hypotheses against the Theory of Will, viz. the hypotheses of the perpetuity of Matter, of Spontaneity, and of Spontaneity and Necessity combined. An appendix discusses more fully and acutely than any previous work, an underlying question of the whole theistic argument, on the doctrine and Law of Causal Resemblance, how far, and in what cases, the cause may and may not resemble the effect.

The whole work is rather an argument for Theism, as against the principles of the Positive Philosophy, than a theory of history itself. It is able, acute and comprehensive on many of the questions raised. It amply vindicates the necessity of a supreme, intelligent Will to account for phenomena. It makes law to be the expression of such a Will; but it subjects Will to Law, rather than Law to Will, and leaves little basis for a specific and positive Revelation above and beyond the course of Nature.

*The Divine Footsteps in Human History.* Blackwood & Sons, Edinburgh. 1862. 8vo, pp. 445. The author of this curious volume has made a discovery, that is, that in Ezekiel's description (ch. xl sq.) of the city which he saw in vision, its gates, chambers, courts, porches, we have an exact measurement and outline of human history, the cubits of measurement standing for years; prophecy and fact fitting each other most accurately. The great factors and movements in history are developed under the form of "chambers". The four powers now in contest, are Romanism, Mohammedanism, Imperialism and Protestantism. The whole tendency of history is



to the separation of Church and State, in order to the final triumph of Christ's Kingdom here on earth. This has been carried forward most completely, and is now peculiarly represented in the "United Presbyterian church of Scotland". The author, for example, has "one double and six single chambers, explanatory of the position occupied by the United Presbyterian church of Scotland, in the revelation of Christian history, and demonstrative of the grand result of the Roman church's claim, based on its spurious Christian unity and enforced ecclesiastical obedience". This United Presbyterian church of Scotland is, undoubtedly, a most excellent body of Christians; but we had not supposed that they occupied such a preëminent position as Ezekiel's prophecy is here made to give them. He also finds confirmation of his view in our present American crisis, it being all foreshadowed, and there being no possibility of a reünion (p. 246). Some of his interminglings of distant parallelisms are quite remarkable, e. g.: "Six chambers, having each two periods of equal duration, connecting historically the Jewish church with English and Scotch church secessions, and the Romish church with the Scotch church secession". While there are many fanciful and some ingenious combinations of facts, and parallelisms of dates, yet the whole scheme of the work is so intricate and involved, that neither prophecy nor history receives much elucidation.

#### GENERAL LITERATURE.

*Sermons.* Preached and revised by Rev. C. H. SPURGEON. Seventh series. New York: Sheldon & Co. 1862. 12mo, pp. 378. The sermons of this remarkable man improve. This volume has less of his faults and more of his excellencies on the whole than any volume which has preceded it. We rejoice that such sermons are preached to thousands, and then published and read by hundreds of thousands more. There are few preachers who would not be benefited by reading and studying such specimens of homiletics.

*Lessons for the Little Ones* is an excellent little book, which our Publication Committee have added to their list. It is specially adapted to Infant-schools and the younger classes in Sabbath-schools.

*Ernest. A True Story.* New York: Anson D. F. Randolph. 1862. An excellent book for children,—natural, truthful and scriptural in its teachings. We heartily commend it as worthy a place in every family and in every Sunday-school library. We assure our readers, from a personal knowledge of many of the facts stated, that it is a true story. The persons and scenes described are familiar to us; and the scene referred to on p. 131 will never fade from our memory.

*Lyra Cœlestis. Hymns on Heaven.* Selected by A. C. THOMPSON, D.D., author of the "Better Land", "Hours at Patmos", etc. Boston: Gould & Lincoln. 12mo, pp. 383. 1863. This work contains a choice selection of Hymns on Heaven, many of which, the author, in his preface, says are not accessible to the majority of readers; that, besides those originally English, there will be found translations from the Syriac, Latin, Russian, German, French, Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese, etc., including a great variety of topics; the productions of a large number of the very best poets. The general subjects are as follows: I. Where is Heaven? II. What is Heaven? III. Who are in Heaven? IV. What are they doing in Heaven? V. What is the Way to Heaven? VI. How soon in Heaven? VIII. How long in Heaven? Thousands will thank Dr. Thompson for this labor of love. Many of the hymns are exceedingly beautiful. The arrangement is happy, and the style of the book is tasteful and appropriate.



## ECCLESIASTICAL RECORD.

[UNDER this head it is proposed to give, in each number of this REVIEW, full lists of all appointments to the ministerial office, and of all changes in the same, in our branch of the Presbyterian Church. This record will be furnished by E. F. HAYFIELD, D.D., Stated Clerk of the General Assembly.—Eds.]

### LICENSED TO PREACH.

Mr. D. Henry Palmer,	June 11th, 1862, by the Presb. of Rochester.
" Edmund P. Hammond,	Oct. 6th, " " " " N. York, 3d.
" John L. Landis,	" 10th " " " " Harrisburgh.

### ORDINATIONS.

Mr. James B. Beaumont,	June 5th, 1862, by the Presb. of Genesee Valley, Pastor, Olean, N. Y.
" Horace Allen,	" 19th, " " " " Rochester, Evangelist.
" Alva Allen,	" 19th, " " " " " " "
" John P. Watson,	" 22d, " " " " N. York, 3d, " "
" Lyman Dwight Chapin,	July 6th, " " " " " " " " For. Missionary.
" Samuel P. Halsey,	" 8th, " " " " Rockaway, Pastor, Rockaway, N. J.
" Anthony Simpson,	Aug. 14th, " " " " Philadelphia, 3d, Evangelist.
" John D. McCord,	Sept. 16th, " " " " Huron, Pastor, Peru, O.
" A. H. Fullerton,	" 19th, " " " " Chenango, Evangelist.
" Albert Erlman,	" 29th, " " " " Philadelphia, 4th, Evangelist.
" Whiting C. Birchard,	" 29th, " " " " Meadville, " "
" G. N. Mackie,	Oct. 1st, " " " " Watertown, Pastor, Adams, N. Y.
" Marcus N. Preston,	" 2d, " " " " Cayuga, Pastor, Skaneateles, N. Y.
" Lewis M. Birge,	" 5th, " " " " N. York, 3d, Evangelist.
" Albert G. Ralston,	" 12th, " " " " " 4th, " "
" William R. Eastman,	" 12th, " " " " " " " "
" John L. French,	" " " " " " Madison, " "
" Aurelian H. Post,	Nov. 18th, " " " " Chicago, " "

### INSTALLATIONS.

Rev. James Donaldson,	June 3d, 1862, by the Presb. of N. River, Pleasant Valley, West. N. Y.
" Frederick Starr, Jr.,	" 12th, " " " " Geneva, Penn. Yah, N. Y.
" Job Pierson,	" 19th, " " " " Rochester, Victor, N. Y.
" Stephen Bush,	July " " " " Albany, Greenbush, N. Y.
" Charles B. Dye,	" 1st, " " " " Geneva, Romulus, N. Y.
" John McLean,	" 6th, " " " " St. Louis, St. Louis, North, Mo.
" Albert Mandell,	Oct. 1st, " " " " Newark, Madison, N. J.
" Lewis Kellogg,	" 12th, " " " " Troy, Whitehall, N. Y.
" Dwight Scovel,	" 12th, " " " " Ontario, Genesee, First, N. Y.
" Samuel W. Boardman,	" 14th, " " " " Cayuga, Auburn, Second, N. Y.
" James Y. Mitchell,	" 26th, " " " " Phila. 4th, Phila., N. L., Central, Pa.
" Erskine N. White,	Dec. 3d, " " " " New-York, 4th, New-Rochelle, N. Y.

## DISSOLUTION OF PASTORAL RELATION.

Rev. Alex. S. Twombly,	May 31st, 1862, by the Presb. of Otsego, Cherry Valley, N. Y.
" Asahel Bronson,	June 10th, " " " " Fly Creek, N. Y.
" Samuel W. Bush,	July 1st, " " " " Cooperstown, N. Y.
" George M. Maxwell,	" " " " Cincinnati, Cincinnati, 8th, O.
" James W. Wood,	Sept. 17th, " " " " Hudson, Chester, N. Y.
" Gustavus L. Foster,	" 25th, " " " " Washtenaw, Ypsilanti, Mich.
" Ebenezer Cheever,	Oct. 1st, " " " " Newark, Paterson, N. J.
" William H. McGilfert,	" 15th, " " " " Utica, Booneville, N. Y.
" Benjamin Judkins, Jr.,	" 15th, " " " " Phila. 4th, Allentown, First, Pa.
" Herrick Johnston,	" " " " " Troy, Troy, First, N. Y.
" Joseph B. Bittinger,	" " " " " Cleveland, Cleveland, Euclid st., O.

## CHANGE OF RESIDENCE.

Rev. Edward Anderson,	from Chicago, Ill.,	to Michigan City, Ind.
Mr. Whiting C. Birchall,	" Cambridge, Pa.,	" Cherry Tree, Pa.
Rev. Samuel W. Bush,	" Binghamton, N. Y.,	" Greenbush, N. Y.
" Isaac E. Carey,	" Keokuk, Ill.,	" Freeport, Ill.
" Henry C. Cheadles,	" Niconza, Ind.,	" Tupper's Plains, O.
" Jacob E. Conrat,	" Liberty, Minn.,	" Mapleton, Minn.
" Samuel W. Crittenden,	" Philadelphia, Pa.,	" Kingsessing, Pa.
" Rufus R. Deming,	" Ellenburgh, N. Y.,	" Laurenceville, N. Y.
" Ansel D. Eddy, D.D.,	" Wilmington, Ill.,	" Seneca Falls, N. Y.
" William J. Easick,	" New-Richmond, O.,	" Wabash, Ind.
" John Glass,	" Ypsilanti, Mich.,	" Janesville, Iowa.
" George W. Goodale,	" Vandalia, Ill.,	" Granville, Ill.
" Philander Griffin,	" Buffalo, N. Y.,	" Carleton, N. Y.
" James Harrison,	" Waterloo, Iowa,	" Cedar Valley, Iowa.
" Marcus Hicks,	" St. Cloud, Minn.,	" Manketo, Minn.
" Horace C. Hovey,	" Coldwater, Mich.,	" New-Haven, Ct.
" Thomas B. Hudson,	" Union Springs, N.Y.,	" Auburn, N. Y.
" A. Alexander Jamison,	" Greenville, O.,	" Connersville, Ind.
" William J. Johnston,	" Lena, Ill.,	" Freeport, Ill.
" Lewis Kellogg,	" Trumansburgh, N.Y.,	" Whitehall, N. Y.
" William Kendrick,	" High Point, Iowa,	" Leon, Iowa.
" Peleg R. Kinney,	" Webster, N. Y.,	" Virgil, N. Y.
" James Knox,	" Sturgis, Mich.,	" Clinton, Iowa.
" George E. W. Leonard,	" Cedar Rapids, Iowa,	" Pleasant Prairie, Iowa.
" Wilbur McKelz,	" Peoria, Ill.,	" Cincinnati, Ohio.
" Albert Mancell,	" Newark, N. J.,	" Madison, N. J.
" John Martin,	" Galena, O.,	" Sunbury, O.
" Edwin G. Moore,	" Chillicothe, O.,	" Wilmington, Ill.
" Aurelian H. Post,	" Walnut Hills, O.,	" Lake Forest, Ill.
" James F. Read, D.D.,	" Buchanan, Pa.,	" Birmingham, Pa.
" Rollin A. Sawyer,	" Yonkers, N. Y.,	" Newark, O.
" Samuel Sawyer,	" Marion, Ind.,	" Memphis, Tenn.
" Hannibal L. Stanley,	" Jonesville, Mich.,	" Lyons, Io.
" Townsend E. Taylor,	" Columbia, Cal.,	" Fetaluma, Cal.
" William S. Taylor,	" Munson, Mich.,	" Petersburg, Mich.
" Samuel L. Tuttle,	" Madison, N. J.,	" Rochester, N. Y.
" Daniel C. Tyler,	" Litchfield, N. Y.,	" South-Trenton, N. Y.
" William P. Wastell,	" White Lake, Mich.,	" Holly, Mich.
" Ira M. Weed,	" Waukegan, Ill.,	" Granville, Ill.
" Lemuel P. Webber,	" Franklin, Ind.,	" Indianapolis, Ind.
" Benj. F. Willoughby,	" Parishville, N. Y.,	" Verona, N. Y.

## DEATHS.

Rev. Ashbel Parmelee, D.D.,	May 24th, 1862,	of the Presb. of Champlain, Malou , N. Y., 77.
" Hiram Gregg,	June 20th, " "	Dayton, Dayton, O.
" Josiah Hopkins, D.D.,	" 27th, " "	Cayuga, Geneva, N. Y., 76.
" John B. Hoyt,	July 4th, " "	Chenango, Coventry, N. Y., 68.
" John Dyke,	" 5th, " "	Kansas, Albany, Mo., 62.
" Benj. J. Wallace, D.D.,	" 25th, " "	Phila. 3d, Philadelphia, Pa., 52.
" Hugh Barr,	Aug. 1st, " "	Illino., Jacksonville, Ill., 72.
" Amos C. Tuttle,	Sept. 24th, " "	Kalamazoo, Lapeer, Mich., 60.
" William H. Corning,	Oct. 8th, " "	Troy, Saratoga Springs, N. Y., 41.
" Erastus Cole,	" 18th, " "	Elyria, Litchfield, O.
" Andrew G. Carothers,	" 20th, " "	D. of Colum., St. Pierre, Martinique.
" R. Richard Kirk,	Nov. 15th, " "	St. Lawrence, New-York City.
" Tim. Woodbridge, D.D.,	Dec. 7th, " "	Columbia, Spencertown, N. Y., 73.

## THEOLOGICAL STUDENTS.

## THE INCREASE OF THE MINISTRY.

All the Catalogues for the current year not being issued, we are unable to give the exact number of students in our Theological Institutions; but we are credibly assured that in the Union, Auburn, and Lane Seminaries, there are not far from 185; Union has 89; Lane, 27.

The General Assembly's Permanent Committee on Education are assisting students for the ministry as follows:

In Auburn Theological Seminary,.....	22
Lane " ".....	14
Union " ".....	22
Private study,.....	1
Hamilton College,.....	8
Union ".....	3
Yale ".....	1
Marietta ".....	9
Western Reserve College,.....	4
Wabash, ".....	5
Knox, ".....	2
Michigan University,.....	2
New-York Free Academy,.....	1

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In addition to the above, there must be over fifty more who are aided by private benevolence and by foundations in different institutions.

The number of students has been diminished by the embarrassments consequent on the war. Some have been prevented from commencing study, some have temporarily suspended their studies, some have enlisted in the army, and some of them have been broken down in their health, and some fill soldiers' graves.

## PRESBYTERIAN BODIES.

The following summary from Wilson's Presbyterian Almanac for 1862, shows the numbers belonging to the various Presbyterian bodies in the world, as reported that year. In some cases the statistics are estimated. For some of the churches we have added later reports.

United States.			
	Ministers.	Churches.	Com'cta.
Presbyterian Church in United States, (N. S.)	1,555	1,466	185,454
Presbyterian Church in United States, (O. S.)	2,859	3,636	303,289
United Presbyterian Church of North America	444	669	57,567
Reformed Presbyterian Church, (General Synod.)	56	116	10,000
Reformed Presbyterian Church, (Synod.)	59	78	6,650
Cumberland Presbyterian Church	1,150	1,250	109,000
United Synod of the Presbyterian Church	116	193	12,934
Reformed Protestant Dutch Church	411	422	50,295
Associated Reformed Synod of the South; of New York; Associate Synod, etc.	143	165	14,700

## British Provinces of North America.

Canada Presbyterian Church	226	236	34,000
Church of Scotland in Canada	109	126	18,500
Church of Lower Provinces	75	95	9,617
Church of Scotland in Nova-Scotia and Prince Edward Island	21	26	2,100
Church of New Brunswick	21	27	1,600
Church of Scotland in New Brunswick	14	16	1,500

## Great Britain.

Church of Scotland	1,185	1,208	.....
Free Churches of Scotland	790	875	.....
United Presbyterian Church of Scotland	586	540	163,554
Reformed Presbyterian Church of Scotland, etc.	87	90	10,000
Presbyterian Church of Ireland	560	530	57,000
Reformed Presbyterian Church in Ireland, (E. Syn. and S. Syn.,)	45	55	4,000
Presbyterian Church in England	91	103	10,000
Presbyterian Church of Victoria	137	150	15,600
Total	10,746	12,232	1,022,460

## OTHER EVANGELICAL DENOMINATIONS.

## Associations, Conferences, Synods, etc.

Congregationalists' Associations	24	2,592	2,856	250,110
Baptists' Associations	568	6,018	12,648	1,067,576
Methodists, (North,) Conferences	51	6,337	.....	968,383
Methodists, (South,) Conferences	24	2,494	.....	721,023
Lutheran Synods	49	1,305	2,487	260,135
German Reformed Classes	24	407	1,054	92,933
Protestant Episcopal Dioceses	33	2,045	2,045	140,57